Dolphin submarine. “Dolphin” with a nuclear hump: what else are the “doomsday” submarines capable of Compartments nuclear submarine 667 brdm

MISSILE SUBMARINE CRUISERS

STRATEGIC PURPOSE OF PROJECT 667BDRM

MISSILE SUBMARINE CRUISER OF STRATEGIC PURPOSE OF THE PROJECT 667BDRM

19.01.2017


The strategic nuclear submarine Tula will be transferred to the Russian Navy after undergoing scheduled repairs in December 2017, official representative of the Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center Evgeny Gladyshev told RIA Novosti on Monday.
In December 2014, the Tula nuclear submarine was sent to the Zvezdochka Center for repairs, which will extend the submarine’s service life by 3.5 years. “The transfer of the strategic nuclear-powered missile submarine cruiser Tula to the Navy after scheduled repairs is scheduled for December this year,” said E. Gladyshev. He added that in the first quarter of 2017, the Tula will be removed from the boathouse, after which Zvezdochka specialists will carry out work afloat.
RIA News

21.01.2017


Extending the service life of SSBNs pr. 667BDR and 667BDRM is undesirable, since they do not meet modern requirements. This statement was made by the general director of the Rubin Central Design Bureau, Igor Vilnit.
According to him, these boats are very noisy and have been in service for 30 years; their repair and modernization is irrational. The new strategic boats Project 955 meet both the security interests of the country and are economically feasible.
Boats pr. 667BDR and 667BDRM are equipped with liquid-fueled SLBMs to destroy enemy strategic targets.
Military parity

Nuclear submarines with nuclear weapons on board are themselves a work of art with a displacement of several thousand tons. Doomsday submarines are unique weapons in every sense. Technical solutions to ensure survivability, weapons and means of monitoring the situation and communications are not just individual components and assemblies, but a dozen works of specialized research institutes and enterprises. It is precisely because the developers took into account the potential for modernization when designing submarines that many of the submarines from the Cold War era are returning to service after being re-equipped with modern equipment and weapons.
Experts are confident that a relatively small amount of modernization work will allow for decades to ensure nuclear parity and the inevitability of a nuclear retaliatory strike in the event of aggression against Russia, and the conversion of submarines for the use of deep-sea vehicles will allow solving highly specialized tasks at great depths. Potential threat For any potential enemy, combat duty on a strategic missile submarine is a headache that turns into a migraine. The degree of danger of such submarines, or more precisely, missiles with a nuclear warhead in their weapons compartments, is very succinctly described by one foreign term. “Unacceptable damage” in the understanding of foreign militaries is, first of all, associated with the very possibility of delivering a full-scale nuclear strike by the entire “nuclear triad” - from air, land and sea. As a result, the magnitude of “unacceptable damage” is also blurred. However, experts note that for the American military, the main opponent of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, the main fear was and remains submarines capable of striking unexpectedly, while being in close proximity to the country’s borders.
It was the creation and modernization of such submarines, first in the Soviet Union and then in Russia, that special attention was always paid. Building up the country's nuclear shield is a necessary and important matter, but modernizing existing submarines and re-equipping on-board equipment and weapons is a task of no less importance. The nuclear submarine of Project 667BDRM "Dolphin", despite the year the lead ship was launched, is a unique submarine. Even at the development stage, the specialists of the Rubin Central Design Bureau took into account almost everything that was necessary for the construction of strategic submarine missile carriers.
The boat received a durable hull, covered with a special material to reduce noise and visibility, a redesigned power plant, and a world-famous weapons compartment - the same “hump” several tens of meters behind the wheelhouse in which intercontinental ballistic missiles are stored. Experts and fleet historians note that despite the partial similarity of the second and third generation nuclear submarines, in terms of the level of technological solutions, the Dolphin could compete with the lunar program or the creation of a promising orbital station. Destruction and record
Ensuring the use of a ballistic missile in conditions where the carrier submarine is actually the “number one” target is not easy even for an experienced crew. Despite the fact that combat duty and control of a cruiser with a total displacement of more than 18 thousand tons is trusted only to professionals, the use of weapons, on which the life of an entire state depends, must be mastered to perfection. The use of ballistic missiles from the Dolphin is a unique process. The design of the boat and missile silos allows you to “carry” up to 16 R-29RMU2 “Sineva” ballistic missiles.
The launch of such missiles in combat conditions can take place without the submarine surfacing to the surface from a depth of up to 50 meters, and the missile’s flight range is limited to just over 9 thousand kilometers. "Dolphin", by the way, holds a completely unique strategic missile record, which the navies of foreign states have not yet been able to repeat. As many have already guessed, we are talking about the unique operation "Behemoth-2", which was based on the worst a scenario for the development of an international crisis in which the crew of a submarine cruiser was required not only to launch a missile, but to release all the submarine’s transportable ammunition in the direction of a mock enemy. 16 ballistic missiles with an interval of several seconds of operation from the surface flew towards the mock enemy, and the K-407 submarine and its crew staked out the title of the first in the world in such operations. However, the submarine of this project will have to carry out unique operations in the near future.
From “strategist” to “saboteurs”
One of the Project 667BDRM submarines recently returned to service after a major overhaul. However, the K-64 (BS-64 “Moscow Region”) has changed significantly. The unique submarine was transformed from a “horseman of the apocalypse” into a unique underwater reconnaissance saboteur. It should be noted that the modernization process turned out to be complex and long - the work has been carried out since 1999 and for various reasons the commissioning of nuclear submarines was seriously adjusted.
However, despite these difficulties, the nuclear reconnaissance saboteur has already entered sea trials, and upon completion will be accepted into the fleet. The phrase “reconnaissance saboteur” is used specifically in this context, because the main weapons of the K-64 are now not huge ballistic missiles capable of wiping entire countries off the surface of the planet, but deep-sea vehicles. The main purpose of such deep-sea modules is to counter any attempts to infiltrate communication and control channels, the so-called “bugs” on underwater cables. The peculiarity of deep-sea vehicles “launched” from a submarine is not so much in the depth to which such equipment can dive, but in how autonomously and for a long time such equipment can operate.
Experts note that the submarine in this case will only serve as a carrier, and after the separation of the deep-sea vehicles, it will be able to “go home” and return to the area after the deep-sea reconnaissance officers have completed all the work. Experts note that the unique submarine will operate, including in the Arctic latitudes. It is this region that has recently attracted the close attention of leading world powers - colossal mineral deposits and the territorial claims of some states will be in the news headlines more than once.
Despite the fact that the composition of the equipment used for offshore work in the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research is unknown, the choice of unmanned marine reconnaissance aircraft to work at great depths is simply explained. Experts note that none of the existing deep-sea vehicles with a crew inside can compare with drones in terms of survivability and safety. “Deep-sea work has already been carried out by the AS-12 Losharik submarine.” Then, after 20 days of sailing, they simply corrected the hull deformations caused by pressure at great depths, and also carried out minor repairs and checked the operation of a number of mechanisms,” explained military expert Alexey Leonkov. There is reason to believe that in addition to the re-equipment of the carrier submarine, the deep-sea vehicles themselves will undergo significant modifications.
In addition to performing tasks in the interests of the Russian Ministry of Defense, deep sea drones will be able to engage in geological exploration and other scientific work. Among other things, such a submarine can also be used in search and rescue operations - for example, to inspect sunken ships or crashed airliners. Experts do not rule out that in the future, as new strategic missile cruisers are built and submarines are put into operation, the special-purpose submarine fleet may be increased, because the tasks that require deep-sea equipment and corresponding carrier ships are becoming more and more every year.

"Dolphin" is the first combat submarine of the Russian fleet, which served as a prototype for the subsequent development of domestic ships of this class until 1917. The project was developed by a special commission consisting of I.G. Bubnova, M.N. Beklemishev and I.S. Goryunova. The main ballast tanks were located in the light ends and ventilated inside the PC.

Submarine "Dolphin" - video

The construction of the submarine was clearly experimental in nature, and it did not have much combat value. The design and construction of the first combat submarine in Russia marked the beginning of the development of the domestic type of submarines.
On the recommendation of the Marine Technical Committee, on December 19, 1900, a commission was appointed to develop the project, consisting of naval engineer I. G. Bubnov (assistant to the head of the Experimental Pool), M. N. Beklemishev (teacher of the mine officer class in Kronstadt) and I. S. Goryunov (assistant fleet mechanical engineer). For the work of the commission, premises were allocated at the Experimental Pool in St. Petersburg; All available materials on scuba diving were placed at her disposal.
The outstanding engineer and scientist Ivan Grigorievich Bubnov (1872-1919) is known in the history of Russian shipbuilding as the founder of ship structural mechanics, the creator of the first combat submarine and the hulls of the largest battleships. His classic works in these areas are now the most valuable aids for shipbuilders.

Fifteen-year-old I. Bubnov in 1887 entered the shipbuilding department of the St. Petersburg Technical School of the Maritime Department (that was the name of the Higher Naval Engineering School in those days). In 1891, he completed the course with honors and his name was included on the marble plaque among the names of the best graduates. To gain practical experience, I. G. Bubnov worked for three years at the state-owned shipyard “New Admiralty” in St. Petersburg.
In 1896, he graduated from the Maritime Academy with the highest grades in all disciplines. The talented engineer was left at the Academy, where he taught ship structural mechanics and supervised the graduation design. Bubnov devoted all his free time to studying the problems of scuba diving.
In 1901, Ivan Grigorievich was appointed chief builder of submarines at the Baltic Shipyard.
In 1909 he was appointed professor of the shipbuilding department of the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute, and the following year he became a professor at the Maritime Academy.
In 1915, at a competition announced by the Russian government, his design for a submarine with a displacement of 971 tons was accepted, although it was inferior to Holland’s project (952): it was decided to develop a Russian type of submarine.
Premature death from typhus cut short the vigorous life of a talented man - the creator of the first Russian combat submarines.

Bubnov’s co-author when creating the projects of the first boats “Dolphin” and “Kasatka” was N. N. Beklemishev; the third member of the commission, I. S. Goryunov, worked only until October 1901. The submarine design commission was well informed about the state of diving abroad and the designs of submarines being built there. First of all, the commission was aware of the projects submitted to the 1898 International Competition in Paris, where the projects of Drzewiecki (“water-armored destroyer”) and Lobeuf (“double-hulled submarine “Narwhal”) were demonstrated. Based on this project, Lobeuf created a new project for a one-and-a-half-hull submarine, according to which in France in 1901-1903. 4 submarines were built.
Bubnov and Beklemishev were well aware of the design features of other foreign submarines. Beklemishev repeatedly traveled abroad to familiarize himself with the designs of boats being built there. So from Beklemishev’s report on a business trip to the USA in 1901, it is clear that he was able to visit Holland’s last boat and get acquainted with its structure. It turned out that on Holland’s boats the main ballast tanks are located inside a durable hull. On the Protector submarine, built in America according to Lack's design, part of the water ballast was placed differently - in the superstructure above the durable hull. Beklemishev was present during one of the dives of Holland's boat. Beklemishev also visited England, Germany and Italy.

Having collected and summarized this information, Bubnov and Beklemishev developed their own project, which differed from foreign ones. They placed the main ballast in the end light tanks, outside the pressure hull. This arrangement of the main ballast tanks allowed Russian-type boats to dive to the maximum depths for a strong hull, without fear that if these tanks were damaged, sea water would get inside the strong hull of the boat.
To design the submarine, the following tasks were developed.

Durability and simplicity of the device with significant, highest technically achievable engine power (based on the principle of least cost, it was proposed to build a boat with the smallest possible displacement, but given the paucity of information about submarines regarding the specific value of weights for systems and devices and finding this data using our own calculations, the displacement of the boat about 100-150t were offered);

The surface speed of the boat should only be sufficient to attack ships passing by it, since in the first experiment, according to the authors, it was impossible to achieve a speed sufficient to attack ships by catching up with them. The boat must make independent transitions on the surface of the water, as well as dives from the surface to the underwater position and ascent. Due to doubts among the authors of the project about the possibility of satisfactory control of the boat underwater at high speed, the latter was not considered particularly important for this boat;

The main object of attack by boats was supposed to be ships anchored or staying at the entrance to the harbor at low speed;

The strength of the boat's hull must ensure complete safety for the crew under water; in this case, the boat must be supplied with provisions, water and air;

The armament was supposed to be exclusively torpedo, and the boat was supposed to be able to quickly

float to the surface (due to the authors’ assumption about the dangerous effect of an explosion on the hull of a boat under water). Based on these tasks, the following tactical and technical data of the boats were determined:

Displacement on the surface 113 and underwater 123 g;

Working immersion depth 50 m; the body is lined with wood to protect it from impacts on the ground; destruction of the ends of the boat will not affect its combat effectiveness;

Cruising range on the surface of the water when running a gasoline engine is 700 miles at 11 knots and 2,500 miles at medium speed;

For underwater travel, it is proposed to install a battery consisting of 50 cells with a capacity of 5000 Ah, providing the boat with an electric motor speed of 8 knots for 3 hours (130 hp), 7 knots for 5 hours (100 hp) and 6 knots for 10 hours (65 hp);

For firing torpedoes, it is proposed to install two deck lattice devices (with a possible increase in the number of devices, after preliminary tests of the boat, to four);

The boat must have: a supply of 1 liter of air compressed to 100 atm; high pressure compressor; fans capable of ventilating the entire boat volume for 12 minutes; magnetic compass; an electric galley and a supply of provisions (exclusively in canned form).

The design of this first combat boat of the Russian fleet incorporated the basic principles of the Russian type of boats that developed in Russia until 1915. In their project, Bubnov and Beklemishev moved away from foreign types of boats, especially with regard to diving systems and torpedo weapons, and applied many new design solutions .
Subsequently, it turned out that the method they used for ventilating ballast tanks inside a durable hull with an insufficient cross-section of the valves leads to a significant increase in immersion time.
The method of filling and draining tanks using special “main ballast pumps” also turned out to be unsuccessful. By the spring of 1901, the project was developed and submitted for consideration to the Marine Technical Committee, and on July 5, 1901, the Baltic Shipyard received an order to build a boat according to this project. The design bureau of the shipyard, under the leadership of the commission, immediately began drawing up working drawings.
During the winter of 1901-1902. The Baltic Shipyard completed the main hull work. The construction of the boat was delayed by the fact that the mechanisms for it were not yet ready. In particular, the delivery of air guards, which were manufactured at the Obukhov plant, was late. But the longest wait was for the gasoline engine. Engine tests at the Daimler plant were unsuccessful. Seeing the impossibility of delivery conditions, the Daimler plant was ready to refuse to supply the engine altogether. A commission was appointed (Beklemishev, Dolgolenko, Vernander); Having examined the engine, the commission drew up a report, listing all the shortcomings that the company undertook to eliminate in a short time. The condition was set that the motor would be accepted if it passed the required tests. A month after this, the engine passed the tests, developing a power of 315 hp. With. But according to the contract, the engine had to be tested a second time at the Baltic Plant.

Submarine "Dolphin" before modernization, Baltic Sea 1904.

The commission decided not to wait for the installation of the motor and began testing the boat without it, since the remaining mechanisms and devices were already installed on the boat by the spring of 1903. The boat, built first under the name “Destroyer No. 113” and then “Destroyer No. 150”, was named “Dolphin”. A team of surface fleet specialists (non-commissioned officer rank) was assigned to it and agreed to voluntarily serve on the submarine. Captain 2nd Rank M.N. Beklemishev, a member of the commission, was appointed commander of the Dolphin. It was only at the end of June 1903 that the engine finally arrived, the installation of which began immediately. The boat was tested under the constant supervision of members of the commission.
At the same time, Holland's American company was building submarines according to its design both for the US Navy and for sale to other countries. Boats of this type were acquired by the tsarist government during the Russo-Japanese War.
Successful tests of the Dolphin proved the possibility of independently building submarines at domestic factories. In this regard, on August 13, 1903, the Naval Ministry gave instructions to begin developing a project for a submarine of increased displacement (up to 140 g). A preliminary design of the new boat was prepared by a commission led by Bubnov, and on December 20 of the same year, the Marine Technical Committee approved this project.
According to the ten-year shipbuilding program adopted in 1903, the Navy Ministry intended to build 10 submarines by 1914. In accordance with this program, on January 2, 1904, the Baltic Shipyard was given an order for the construction of the first Kasatka-class submarine with a displacement of 140 tons according to the design of Bubnov and Beklemishev.
The problem of training crews and officers for the submarines under construction arose with particular urgency. In those years in Russia there was no organization for training submarine specialists. Beklemishev was considered the only authority on this matter; He was entrusted with the task of training personnel for the submarines being built.

Beklemishev had the only way - to prepare teams of specialists taken from surface ships, in a practical way, in the process of building and testing boats. And while there were none yet, it was decided to use the Dolphin submarine for this purpose, which, despite the demand of the Governor of the Far East Alekseev to urgently send it to Port Arthur, was left in St. Petersburg.
Excessive haste in training the teams on the Dolphin led to an accident and the death of a significant number of people trained on it. On June 16, 1904, at 9.30 am, the Dolphin was diving at the western wall of the Baltic Shipyard, having on board, in addition to its main crew (10 sailors and 3 officers), 24 sailors from other boats “in order to accustom them to being on a boat underwater.” position."
Before this, the Dolphin had already carried out 17 training dives, and the number of excess people (in addition to its regular crew) sometimes reached 45. Despite such a large overload (about 4 g), all previous dives of the boat went well thanks to the experience of its commander - captain 2 rank Beklemishev. He had three assistants: lieutenants Cherkasov and Elagin and lieutenant of the Admiralty Gorazeev. Lieutenant Cherkasov stood out for his composure, management and knowledge of the matter, participated in all previous dives and repeatedly managed the dive of the boat under the leadership of Beklemishev. On June 16, Beklemishev was sent to Kronstadt on official business and, as usual, Cherkasov remained to replace him. On this day he dived on his own for the first time. The boat had an overload of about 2 tons. The weather was calm, there was no excitement on the Neva; no ships passed on the river.

It should be noted that the Dolphin submarine had a significant design flaw: during the dive it was necessary to keep the conning hatch ajar to relieve air pressure. The mentioned drawback of the boat was caused by the fact that the main ballast tanks located at the ends of the boat were filled very slowly by gravity; the boat sank for about 10 minutes. To speed up the filling of the end tanks, special “suckers” were adapted in the form of connecting the internal ventilation of these tanks with the receiving pipes of ship fans that suck air from the tanks; Thanks to the vacuum, the tanks filled faster. Air from the fans entered the boat, the pressure in it increased, which was released when diving through the conning hatch. At the very end of filling the end tanks of the main ballast, it was necessary to close the wheelhouse hatch. Cherkasov missed this moment, water poured into the hatch, and the boat sank.
When water poured into the wheelhouse, one of the sailors tried to close the wheelhouse hatch cover, but he was pinched between the lid and the coaming. Other sailors pulled their dead comrade out of the hatch. Three sailors managed to get out of the boat first. After them, 7 more sailors and 2 officers (Elagin and Gorazeev) surfaced. Lieutenant Cherkasov and 24 sailors were killed.
It is characteristic that in the commission’s act drawn up on June 21, 1904, nothing was said about the design flaws of the boat and all the blame for the accident was placed on Lieutenant Cherkasov, who was temporarily in command of the boat; Cherkasov’s corpse was found not in the wheelhouse, but in the stern of the boat. Cherkasov's departure from his post during the sinking of the boat was condemned by the commission in the mentioned act.

M. N. Beklemishev puts a different light on Cherkasov’s behavior. When questioned during the investigation, he testified: “according to one of the surviving lower ranks of the ship’s crew, he himself (i.e. Cherkasov - G. T.) during the death of the latter did not want to save himself, but retired to the stern.” From Beklemishev’s testimony it is clear that Cherkasov, being under the wheelhouse hatch and having every opportunity to emerge from the boat as one of the first, did not take advantage of this opportunity. He showed exceptional courage, following the tradition of sailors: in the event of the death of a ship, the commander is the last to leave it. When the boat was submerged, officers Elagin (in the bow) and Gorazeev (in the stern) were located at the end tanks. They were further from the conning tower hatch than many of the sailors. However, the sailors helped the officers get to the wheelhouse hatch and surface (as can be seen from Elagin’s testimony at the investigation about the causes of the boat accident).
The boat was raised and restored, after which it underwent calibration tests, and in the fall of 1904 it was sent to Vladivostok.
11/15 to 12/23/1904 transported by railway. from St. Petersburg. to Vladivostok and enlisted in the Siberian Flotilla. During the Russo-Japanese War, she carried out positional and patrol services on the approaches to the hall. Peter the Great. On May 5, 1905, it sank in the port of Vladivostok from explosions of gasoline vapors, but was raised, restored and put back into operation. Major repairs in 1909 in the Vladivostok port. 06/09/1916 6 was delivered by railway. from Vladivostok to Arkhangelsk and on 10/8/1916 was enlisted in the SLO flotilla. 04/26/1917 washed ashore in Kola Bay. during a strong storm. On August 2, 1917, it was handed over to the Murmansk military port for storage and on August 23, 1917, it was excluded from the SLO flotilla. After the Civil War, it was transferred to the State Shiplift, then to the White Sea Party EPRON under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, excluded from the lists of floating craft of the People's Commissariat of Water and handed over to Rudmetalltorg for dismantling.

Submarine "Dolphin" (1901 - 1904)

Tactical and technical characteristics of the submarine "Dolphin"

Chief designer	I. G. Bubnov
Speed ​​(surface)	9 knots
Speed ​​(underwater)	6 knots
Working depth	50 meters
Crew	10-20 people
Dimensions	Surface displacement: 113.0 t Underwater displacement: from 124 t to 135.5 t Maximum length (according to water line): 19.6-20.0 m Hull width max.: 3.66 m Average draft (according to waterline): 2.9 m
Power point	gasoline engine 320 hp, electric motor 138.6 hp, rechargeable batteries 50 cells
Armament	2 Dzhewiecki TA, 2 torpedoes of the 1898 model

Having reviewed publications in American magazines and relying on the experience of Russian shipbuilding engineers, the naval department on December 19, 1900 created a commission to design underwater vessels consisting of:

Senior assistant shipbuilder Ivan Grigorievich Bubnov
- senior mechanical engineer Ivan Semenovich Goryunov
- Lieutenant Mikhail Nikolaevich Beklemishev

The commission, which received a separate secret room in the Experimental Shipbuilding Pool, began work and on May 3, 1901 presented the project for “destroyer No. 113” (the class of submarines did not yet exist in the Russian Navy). On July 5, the project was approved, and a few days later the St. Petersburg Baltic Shipyard was already given a construction order. I.G. was appointed the builder of “destroyer No. 113”. Bubnova.

The creation of the submarine was based on the following considerations:

1. The principle of least cost, based on which the displacement of the submarine should be minimal.
2. The surface speed of the boat must be sufficient to attack ships passing by it, either at anchor or moving at the entrance to the harbor at low speed.

Original drawing of the submarine "Dolphin"

The preparation of working drawings was entrusted (under the direction of the commission) to the design bureau of the Baltic Shipyard, which was later transformed into the underwater diving department ("Podpla"). Having successively changed a number of names and undergone numerous transformations, this oldest underwater bureau still exists today - this is the Rubin Central Design Bureau of Marine Equipment.

The commission was involved in Podpla to develop details and provide guidance during the construction of the boat. Mechanical engineer I.S. Goryunov could no longer take part in the work and was replaced by mechanical engineer Dolgolenko.

The Putilov Plant Society supplied sheet and profile steel, the Obukhov Steel Plant supplied air cylinders, and the Baltic Plant itself manufactured the main ship equipment. The gasoline engine, designed by the Russian-born engineer Lutsky, was ordered from Daimler, where he worked as chief engineer (with his help, M.N. Beklemishev visited the USA on one of the Holland submarines). Batteries and electric motors were ordered from France.

Original drawing. Section along the midframe

The riveted hull had a circular cross-section along its entire length; it was supported by 32 external frames and 8 internal stringers along the skin grooves. The outer frames were made up of two halves, connected by forge welding and reinforced with a riveted cover. There were no transverse watertight bulkheads or compartments.

The outside of the strong hull was covered with larch boards, in the midship area there was a strong cylindrical wheelhouse riveted, which had an entrance hatch with a lid, and in the bow of the hull there was a rectangular hatch for loading batteries and other equipment.

The main ballast tanks were located at the ends of the submarine. The steering device consisted of a vertical and three pairs of horizontal rudders, with the middle horizontal rudders used to dampen residual positive buoyancy and usually shifted to a constant angle. The armament consisted of two external (lattice) Drzewiecki tubes and two torpedoes of the 1898 model.

It was assumed that after testing the submarine, the possibility of increasing the number of Drzewiecki torpedo tubes to four would be considered.

Destroyer No. 150

In March 1902, “destroyer No. 113” was listed in the fleet as “destroyer No. 150.”

In May 1903, the submarine was launched and sea trials were completed in October of the same year. The end date of the tests, October 14, 1903, can be considered the birthday of the Russian submarine forces. Appointed as its commander, M.N. Beklemishev reported:

• Scuba diving capability at 5 knots is accurate to within 1 foot;
• surface speed of 8.5 knots can be increased by installing a propeller with rotating blades;
• the practical cruising range under the electric motor was determined to be 60 miles at a speed of 5.2 knots, and fresh food was cooked, ventilation and lighting were carried out for 4 days;
• the possibility of charging batteries from the motor has been practically tested many times;
• not only the command, but even several craftsmen working on the boat tolerate scuba diving calmly...

Submarine "Dolphin"

Until March 11, 1906, Russian submarines were listed in the class of destroyers; on May 31, 1904, all Russian destroyer submarines were given names by the Highest Command and “destroyer No. 150” began to be called “Dolphin”.

We must pay tribute to the care with which Beklemishev selected the crew for the Dolphin - he chose "technically educated people, healthy build, good behavior, non-smokers", as well as those wishing to serve on this submarine.

The first and until the autumn of 1904 the only Russian submarine "Dolphin" became a school class through which officers and sailors who expressed a desire to serve on submarines passed.

"Dolphin" near the wall of the Baltic Shipyard

On June 16, 1904, regular training sessions were carried out with submariners at the western wall of the Baltic Shipyard. Acting commander Lieutenant Cherkasov, 2 officers and 33 crew members had to spend 3 hours submerged at a depth of about 7 m (22 ft).

There were flaws in the Dolphin's design. During the dive, the air displaced from the boat was released through the conning hatch. The boat commander kept the lid ready and determined by eye the moment when it was time to slam it shut. After the command to “fill the tanks,” Cherkasov was late in battening down the hatch. Because of his mistake, the boat went under water with the hatch open and sank. One of the frightened team members rushed up through the half-closed hatch and got stuck in it, which increased the flow of water. An attempt to blow out the tanks did not lead to ascent, because... the boat was already almost completely filled with water. 2 officers and 10 crew members managed to open the hatch and swim out of the boat. Lieutenant Cherkasov and 23 lower ranks were killed. All the rescued sailors expressed a desire to continue serving in the submarine.

On June 18, a crane was brought to the sunken submarine and the boat was raised. After repairs, on November 15, 1904, the submarine "Dolphin" was sent to Vladivostok to participate in the Russo-Japanese War. The first trip to sea (due to the delay in sending torpedoes) took place on February 28, 1905. The Dolphin made several trips to sea, but never encountered Japanese ships.

May 5, 1905 There was a serious accident on the Dolphin. To eliminate the malfunction of the vertical rudder that arose the day before, it was necessary to open the necks of the aft gasoline tanks. People were removed from the boat and began to ventilate it with portable fans. The next day the boat continued to be ventilated under the supervision of two watchmen. The helmsman Sotkin and the engine driver Khamchenko remained on board. They were once again under strict orders to exercise extreme caution. At 10:20, an engine quartermaster from one of the cruisers came to the submariners. He wanted to join the submariners and was interested in learning more. By coincidence, he turned out to be a fellow countryman of Khamchenko, and that decided everything. They went down into the boat, and 20 seconds later there was an explosion. Only the half-burnt Khamchenko was able to jump up. Thick black smoke poured out of the hatch and, although all the authorities arrived at the port, no one could do anything. A second explosion followed, after which the boat sank (it was later discovered that 29 rivets of the pressure hull were knocked out in the area of ​​the aft gasoline tanks). The Dolphin slowly sank stern first into the water to a depth of 14 m. The likely cause of the explosion could have been a spark from turning on the switch to illuminate the boat.

When lifting the boat, an explosion of explosive gases occurred; the boat was sunk, and during subsequent ascents the explosions were repeated 5 times. Major repairs were completed only at the end of the year after the end of the war.

On December 9, 1914, another explosion occurred on the Dolphin submarine while charging batteries from the Ksenia transport. The cause of the explosion was considered to be a spark between the light bulb and the socket, which occurred when the electrician touched the light bulb with his hat.

Until May 1916, the boat was part of a detachment of submarines of the Siberian Flotilla (as the Russian naval forces in the Far East were called at that time).

Submarine "Dolphin"

In 1916, to protect the Kola Bay, it was decided to organize a division of special-purpose submarines in Aleksandrovsk (now Murmansk). This detachment was to include submarines No. 1 and No. 2 (small submarines built according to the 27-B project of the American company Holland at the Nevsky Plant, intended to protect sea fortresses), as well as "Dolphin" and "St. George".

On May 23, the Dolphin was sent from Vladivostok to Vologda by rail. In Vologda they were loaded onto a barge, in which they were delivered to Arkhangelsk, from where they were sent by tow to Aleksandrovsk.

On the night of April 26, 1917, the Dolphin was severely damaged by a storm - the mooring lines weakened, the service was carried out carelessly, the impacts on the submarine No. 1 loosened the rudder seals, and a large amount of water entered the Dolphin. Submarine No. 1 sank.

Taking into account the technical condition of both damaged boats, the Naval Headquarters on August 8, 1917 decided not to restore the boats and hand them over to the port, which was done on August 10 of the same year.

The last vessel of the “667 family” and the last Soviet submarine missile carrier of the 2nd generation (in fact, smoothly transitioned into the third generation) was the strategic missile submarine cruiser (SSBN) of Project 667-BRDM (code “Dolphin”). Like its predecessors, it was created at the Rubin Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering under the leadership of the general designer, academician S.N. Kovalev. (the main observer from the navy is captain first rank Piligin Yu.F.). The government decree on the development of an underwater nuclear submarine was issued on September 10, 1975.

The main submarine was supposed to be the D-9RM missile system, which had 16 R-29RM intercontinental liquid-propellant missiles (RSM-54 - treaty designation, SS-N-23 "Skiff" - NATO designation), which had an increased firing range, spread radius and accuracy combat blocks. The development of the missile system began in 1979 at KBM. The creators of the complex were focused on achieving the maximum technical level and tactical and technical characteristics with limited changes in the submarine design. The new missiles were superior in combat capabilities to all modifications of the most powerful American Trident naval missile systems, while having much smaller dimensions and weight. Depending on the number of warheads, as well as their mass, the firing range of ballistic missiles could significantly exceed 8.3 thousand km. The R-29RM was the last missile developed under the leadership of V.P. Makeev, as well as the last Soviet liquid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile - all subsequent domestic ballistic missiles were designed as solid fuel.

The design of the new submarine was a further development of the 667-BDR project. Due to the increased dimensions of the missiles and the need to implement design solutions to reduce hydroacoustic signature, the submarine had to increase the height of the missile silo fencing. The length of the stern and bow ends of the ship was also increased, the diameter of the strong hull also increased, and the contours of the light hull in the area of ​​the first – third compartments were somewhat “filled out”. In the durable hull, as well as in the design of the intercompartment and end bulkheads of the submarine, steel was used, which was obtained by electroslag remelting. This steel had increased ductility.

When creating the submarine, measures were taken to significantly reduce the noise of the vessel, as well as to reduce interference with the operation of hydroacoustic on-board equipment. The principle of aggregating equipment and mechanisms, which was placed on a common shock-absorbing frame relative to the strong hull of the vessel, was widely used. Local sound absorbers were installed in the area of ​​the energy compartments, and the efficiency of the acoustic coatings of the durable and lightweight hulls was increased. As a result, the nuclear submarine, in terms of hydroacoustic signature characteristics, has approached the level of the American nuclear submarine with third-generation ballistic missiles "Ohio".

The main power plant of the submarine consists of two VM-4SG water-cooled reactors (each with a power of 90 mW) and two OK-700A steam turbines. The nominal power of the power plant is 60 thousand liters. With. On board the submarine there are two DG-460 diesel generators, two TG-3000 turbogenerators, and two economy electric motors. stroke (power of each 225 hp) the nuclear submarine is equipped with five-bladed low-noise propellers with improved hydroacoustic characteristics. To ensure a favorable operating mode for the propellers, a hydrodynamic special is installed on the lightweight hull. a device that equalizes the oncoming flow of water.

In the Project 667-BDRM submarine project, measures were taken to improve habitability conditions. The cruiser's crew had a sauna, solarium, gym and the like at their disposal. An improved system of electrochemical air regeneration due to the electrolysis of water and the absorption of carbon dioxide by a solid regenerating absorber ensures an oxygen concentration of within 25 percent and carbon dioxide of no more than 0.8 percent.

For centralized control of the combat activities of the SSBN of Project 667-BDRM, it is equipped with the Omnibus-BDRM BIUS, which collects and processes information, solves the problems of tactical maneuvering and combat use of missile-torpedo and torpedo weapons.

The nuclear submarine with ballistic missiles is equipped with a new SJSC Skat-BDRM, which in its characteristics is not inferior to its American counterparts. The hydroacoustic complex has a large antenna with a height of 4.5 and a diameter of 8.1 meters. On ships of Project 667-BDRM, for the first time in Soviet shipbuilding practice, a fiberglass antenna radome was used, which has a ribless design (this made it possible to significantly reduce hydroacoustic interference that affects the antenna device of the complex). There is also a towed hydroacoustic antenna, which was retracted into the hull of the submarine when not in use.

The navigation complex “Sluice” provides the boat with the necessary accuracy in using missile weapons. The location of the submarine is clarified by means of astrocorrection when ascending to periscope depth at intervals of once every 48 hours.

The 667-BDRM submarine missile carrier is equipped with the Molniya-N radio communication system. There are two buoy-type pop-up antennas that allow you to receive radio messages, target designation signals and space navigation systems at great depths.

The D-9RM missile system, put into service in 1986 (after the death of Viktor Petrovich Makeev, its creator), is a further development of the D-9R complex. The D-9R complex consists of 16 liquid-fueled three-stage ampuled missiles R-29RM (Ind. ZM37) with a maximum range of 9.3 thousand km. The R-29RM missile even today has the highest energy and mass efficiency in the world. The missile has a launch weight of 40.3 tons and a throw weight of 2.8 tons, that is, almost equal to the throw weight of the much heavier US Trident II missile. The R-29RM is equipped with a multiple warhead designed for four or ten warheads with a total power of 100 kt. Today, all nuclear submarines of Project 667-BDRM have deployed missiles, the warheads of which are equipped with four warheads. High accuracy (the circular probable deviation is 250 meters), comparable to the accuracy of the Trident D-5 missiles (USA) whose CQO, according to various estimates, is 170-250 meters, allows the D-9RM complex to hit small-sized highly protected targets (silo ICBM launchers, command posts and other facilities). The entire ammunition load can be launched in one salvo. The maximum launch depth is 55 meters with no restrictions in the launch area due to weather conditions.

The new torpedo-missile system, which is installed on the Project 667-BDRM submarine, consists of 4 torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber with a fast loading system, which ensure the use of almost all types of modern torpedoes, PLUR (anti-submarine missile torpedo), and hydroacoustic countermeasures devices.

Modifications

In 1988, the D-9RM missile system, which is installed on Project 667-BDRM boats, was modernized: the warheads were replaced with more advanced ones, the navigation system was supplemented with space navigation equipment (GLONASS), and it was possible to launch missiles along flat trajectories, which makes it possible to more reliably overcome promising missile defense systems of a potential enemy. We increased the resistance of missiles to the damaging effects of nuclear weapons. According to some experts, the modernized D-9RM is superior to the Trident D-5 - its American counterpart - in such important indicators as the ability to overcome enemy missile defenses and the accuracy of hitting targets.

In 1990-2000, the K-64 missile carrier was converted into an experimental vessel and renamed BS-64.

Construction program

K-51, the lead missile carrier of Project 667-BDRM, was laid down in Severodvinsk at the Northern Engineering Enterprise in February 1984, launched in January of the following year, and put into operation in December. In total, from 1985 to 1990, the Northern Engineering Enterprise built 7 SSBNs of this project.

Status for 2007

Currently, nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles (according to our classification - strategic missile submarine cruiser) of Project 667-BDRM (known in the West as “Delta IV class”) are the basis of the maritime component of the Russian strategic nuclear triad. All of them are part of the third flotilla of strategic submarines of the Northern Fleet based in Yagelnaya Bay. There are special facilities for placing individual submarines. shelter bases, which are underground, securely protected structures intended for parking and ensuring the recharging of reactors with nuclear fuel and repairs.

Submarines of Project 667-BDRM became one of the first Soviet nuclear submarines that were almost completely invulnerable in their combat duty area. Carrying out combat patrols in the Arctic seas, which are adjacent directly to the Russian coast, submarines, even under the most favorable hydrological conditions for the enemy (complete calm, which is observed in only 8 percent of “natural situations” in the Barents Sea), can be detected by the latest nuclear-powered multipurpose submarines of the type “Improved Los Angeles” by the US Navy at distances of no more than 30 km. But in conditions that are typical for the remaining 92 percent of the year, in the presence of wind at a speed of 10-15 m/s and waves, nuclear submarines with Project 667-BDRM ballistic missiles are not detected by the enemy at all or can be detected by a sonar system of the BQQ-5 type at a range of up to 10 km. In addition, in the polar seas of the north there are vast shallow water areas in which the detection range of Project 667-BDRM boats, even in complete calm, is reduced to less than 10 thousand m (that is, almost absolute survivability of submarines is ensured). At the same time, it is necessary to keep in mind that Russian missile submarines carry out their combat duty actually in internal waters, which are quite well covered by the fleet’s anti-submarine weapons.

In 1990, a special test was carried out on one of the Project 667-BDRM cruisers. tests with the preparation and subsequent launch of the entire ammunition load consisting of 16 missiles in a salvo (as in a real combat situation). Such an experience was unique not only for our country, but for the whole world.

SSGN pr.949-A and SSBN "Novomoskovsk" pr.677-BDRM in the database

Project 667-BDRM submarines are currently also used to launch artificial earth satellites into low Earth orbits. From one of the nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles of Project 667-BDRM in July 1998, the Shtil-1 launch vehicle, developed on the basis of the R-29RM rocket, launched for the first time in the world the artificial Earth satellite Tubsat-N, a German design (launch performed from an underwater position). Work is also underway to develop the Shtil-2 naval launch vehicle of greater power with the weight of the launch load, which has been increased to 350 kilograms.

It is likely that the service of Project 667-BDRM missile carriers will continue until 2015. To maintain the combat potential of these ships at the required level, the military-industrial commission in September 1999 decided to resume production of R-29RM missiles.

Main tactical and technical characteristics of the 667-BDRM project:
Surface displacement - 11,740 tons;
Underwater displacement - 18,200 tons;
Main dimensions:
- greatest length (according to waterline) – 167.4 m (160 m);
- maximum width – 11.7 m;
- draft along the vertical line – 8.8 m;
Main power plant:
- 2 pressurized water reactors VM-4SG with a total power of 180 mW;
- 2 PPU OK-700A, 2 GTZA-635
- 2 steam turbines with a total power of 60,000 hp. (44100 kW);
- 2 turbogenerators TG-3000, power of each 3000 kW;
- 2 diesel generators DG-460, power of each 460 kW;
- 2 electric motors for economic propulsion, each with a power of 225 hp;
- 2 shafts;
- 2 five-blade propellers;
Surface speed – 14 knots;
Underwater speed – 24 knots;
Working immersion depth – 320...400 m;
Maximum immersion depth – 550...650 m;
Autonomy – 80...90 days;
Crew – 135...140 people;
Strategic missile weapons:
- SLBM launchers R-29РМ (SS-N-23 “Skiff”) of the D-9РМ complex – 16 pcs.;
Anti-aircraft missile weapons:
- MANPADS launchers 9K310 “Igla-1”/9K38 “Igla” (SA-14 “Gremlin”/SA-16 “Gimlet”) – 4...8 pcs.;
Torpedo and missile-torpedo weapons:
- torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber - 4 (bow);
- torpedoes SAET-60M, 53-65M, PLUR RPK-6 “Waterfall” (SS-N-16 “Stallion”), 533 mm caliber – 12 pcs;
Mine weapons:
- can carry up to 24 minutes instead of some torpedoes;
Electronic weapons:
Combat information and control system - “Omnibus-BDRM”;
General detection radar system - MRK-50 "Cascade" (Snoop Tray);
Hydroacoustic system:
- hydroacoustic complex MGK-500 “Skat-BDRM” (Shark Gill; Mouse Roar);
Electronic warfare equipment:
- “Zaliv-P” RTR;
- “Zavesa-P” radio direction finder (Brick Pulp/Group; Park Lamp D/F);
GPD means – 533 mm GPD;
Navigation complex:
- "Gateway";
- KNS GLONASS;
- radio sextant (Code Eye);
- INS;
Radio communication complex:
- “Molniya-N” (Pert Spring), SSS “Tsunami-BM”;
- buoy towed antennas “Paravan” or “Lastochka” (VLF);
- Microwave and HF antennas;
- sound-underwater communication station;
State identification radar - "Nichrom-M".