He fought honestly. He was one of many - one of those who stopped the onslaught of the New Order to the best of his strength and capabilities. That time the New Order did not pass.

This article could never have been written if not for the brilliant tandem of brave and honest Russian historians - Dmitry Khazanov - Nikolai Gordyukov. The result of their meticulous archival work was the monograph “Su-2 Short-Range Bomber.” Thanks to them.

The birthday - or, more precisely, the “conception” - of the BB-1/Su-2 aircraft should be considered December 27, 1936. It was on this day that the resolution of the Council of Labor and Defense was issued (hereinafter - a quote from the monograph by Khazanov - Gordyukov) “on the construction of a high-speed long-range attack reconnaissance aircraft according to the low-wing design. The basic requirements for the aircraft were determined, which should have been submitted for testing in August 1937:

Maximum speed at an altitude of 4000...5000 m - 420–430 km/h;

Maximum ground speed is 350–400 km/h;

Landing speed -90–95 km/h;

Practical ceiling - 9000 - 10,000 m;

Normal cruising range - 4000 km;

With overload - 2000 km;

Armament - 3–5 machine guns and 200–500 kg of bombs.”

On August 25, 1937, the chief pilot of TsAGI (Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute - G.K.), the brilliant Mikhail Mikhailovich Gromov, who had just returned to the USSR after the famous flight over the North Pole to San Jacinto, lifted the first copy of the ANT-51 aircraft into the air , aka “Stalin’s task-1” - SZ-1, aka “Ivanov”, aka - in the future - BB-1, aka Su-2. According to the doyen of Soviet pilots, “the plane turned out to be simple and convenient in piloting, had good stability and controllability."

From February 21 to March 26, 1938, the aircraft successfully passed State tests in Yevpatoria.

In March 1939, the State Defense Committee issued a decree on the launch of Sukhoi’s Ivanov aircraft into series under the brand name BB-1 - “short-range bomber, the first.”

On December 9, 1941, by a joint resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Su-2 aircraft was withdrawn from production.

From the beginning of the series until the end of production, 893 Ivanov/BB-1/Su-2 aircraft of various modifications left the factory stocks.

This is an extremely brief history of the aircraft that served as the first, and not the steepest, step to the pedestal of Glory for one of the greatest aircraft designers of the 20th century - Pavel Osipovich Sukhoi.

This is an extremely brief history of the aircraft, which served as the object of the most powerful propaganda provocation of the late 20th - early 21st centuries.

1. Su-2 and “Day M”

We are talking, of course, about the “terrible fairy tale” of a certain “Viktor Suvorov” called “M-Day”. More precisely, about the 6th (“About Ivanov”) and 11th (“Winged Genghis Khan”) chapters of this epoch-making collection of fairy tales. I can’t say for whom I’m more offended - for I.V. Stalin or for the plane. In any case, let's try to figure it out. The “Bible” of Soviet aviation history will help us in this - the book by V.B. Shavrov “The History of Aircraft Designs in the USSR, Part Two, 1938-50” and the excellent monograph “Su-2: Short-Range Bomber”, written by two remarkable modern historians - Dmitry Khazanov and Nikolai Gordyukov, publishing house “Technology for Youth”, as well as a number of books, reference books and magazines mentioned below in the text.

*Shavrov’s most valuable book, “The History of Constructions...” Until recently, was a bibliographic rarity, practically inaccessible to a wide range of aviation enthusiasts. Now the situation has changed - anyone can read it on the website eroplan.boom.ru. Let's thank the editors of "eroplan" for this!

So, let’s move on to “virtual history” - to that version of a bygone reality that is offered, or rather, imposed on us by a group of talkative employees of the special group of the Psychological Warfare Department of the British intelligence MI-5, which is hiding under the code “Viktor Suvorov”.

…one day, in 1936, Stalin gathered aviation designers at his nearby dacha, treated them with all Caucasian hospitality, and then set the task of building an airplane (the best in the world, no need to explain this) called “Ivanov.” Work on the Ivanov project was carried out simultaneously by many teams, including those under the leadership of Tupolev, Neman, Polikarpov, Grigorovich. In those days, the design groups of Petlyakov, Sukhoi, Arkhangelsky, Myasishchev worked under the general leadership of Tupolev, Mikoyan and Gurevich worked under the leadership of Polikarpov, Lavochkin and Grushin worked for Grigorovich. Everything that Stalin ordered Tupolev, Grigorovich or Polikarpov automatically applied to the vassal design groups.

Let’s leave the “nearby dacha” on the conscience of “Suvorov” and his (their) wild imagination: not a single designer remembers anything like that, and the author, as usual, did not bother to confirm his verbal passages with a reference. Let's take a closer look at the composition of the participants. According to “Suvorov”, it turns out that since Tupolev HIMSELF accepted the sw`qrhe in the competition, it means that the entire Design Department of Experimental Aircraft Construction of the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute - KOSOS TsAGI - headed by him - abandoned everything and collapsed with his chest on "Ivanov". Petlyakov and Sukhoi, Myasishchev and Arkhangelsky - all together design “Ivanov”, each with his own, and jealously cover the drawing boards with their palms - lest a neighbor spy on them... Competition!

Strongly. Impressive. It's just not true. The fact is that KOSOS, headed by A.N. Tupolev, really consisted of several brigades, being the main forge of aviation developments in the country. And each team was engaged in ITS development. For the period described, Petlyakov’s team finalized the ANT-42 project, also known as TB-7 (V. Rigmant, “Pe-8 Bomber,” Aviation and Cosmonautics No. 5/6, 2002); Arkhangelsky brigade - ANT-40, aka SB ("The Pride of Soviet Aviation", War in the Air Nos. 64–65); The rest of the brigades also completed their tasks. The phrase “team under the leadership of Tupolev” in practice means the following: Andrei Nikolaevich, having received the TTT (tactical and technical requirements) for “Ivanov” by official mail, got acquainted with them - and passed them on, along with his general considerations, to one of the brigade leaders. Namely - P.O. Sukhoi. And here I am forced to slow down and launch into a long explanation.

Today, even a person far from aviation, when mentioning the name “Sukhoi” or at least the abbreviation “Su”, will at least somehow indicate understanding. This is natural: KB im. Sukhoi is now one of the most authoritative in the country and, perhaps, the most famous. And rightfully so. Aircraft with the letters “Su” represent all classes of Russian military aviation, except for heavy bombers, and they represent them with dignity. Therefore, the idea that P.O. Sukhoi “from the beginning of time,” so to speak, from time immemorial, so to speak, was the largest figure in the domestic aircraft industry, seems natural and self-evident. Accordingly, everything that came off his drawing board was, at the time of its creation, the most important task and the “edge of the main blow” of the Soviet aircraft industry.

And this is fundamentally wrong. Aircraft designer P.O. Sukhoi did not suddenly appear to the world in glory and splendor. By and large, this does not happen at all.

At the time the development of Ivanov began, Sukhoi had, frankly speaking, little in his assets.

1. The ANT-25 plane, aka RD-25, aka “Stalin’s route” - the same one on which Chkalov and Gromov showed the world what Russian aviation means - with their polar flights between the USSR and the USA. The main one, naturally, was Tupolev, but it was Sukhoi who led the project.

So what? The RD-25 is an experimental, record-breaking aircraft that serves to ensure breakthroughs in the field of high-tech, but is in no way combat or serial.

2. I-4 fighter. It seems to be a combat vehicle, but again produced in a small series; the identity of the Red Army Air Force was in no way determined. Cause? Simple: it was the FIRST Soviet all-metal fighter, in fact, again an experimental aircraft. The mere fact that it was made according to the “parasol” scheme and had a casing made of corrugated duralumin says everything. The few vehicles produced were used for experimental purposes: testing Kurchevsky's dynamo-reactive guns; experiments under Vakhmistrov’s “aircraft-flight” program.

What happens? It turns out that with the light hand of A.N. Tupolev, “a super-important Stalinist task” (yes, so super-important that the fate of Stalin himself and his Empire depended on its implementation, no more, no less - it’s not me who says, it’s “Suvorov” who says so ) ended up in the hands of - yes, a gifted, promising, but - by no means a venerable TsAGI employee. If we accept the statement of “Suvorov” that “Ivanov” is the most important instrument of the aggressive war planned by Stalin, it turns out that Comrade. Tupolev treated Stalin's task without due reverence. Formally, one might say, he did.

Even more amusing are the attempts of “Suvorov” to “defend the honor and dignity” of N.N. Polikarpov:

Look, among those present at Stalin’s dacha is Nikolai Polikarpov. In the previous 1935, at an aviation exhibition in Milan, Polikarpov's I-15bis was officially recognized as the best fighter in the world, and Polikarpov already has the I-16 series and something in development. Polikarpov is the leader in the world race for the best fighter. Leave Polikarpov, don't disturb him, don't distract him: he knows how to make fighters, just don't slow him down. There is a race going on, and every hour, every minute is worth its weight in blood. But no. Take a break, Comrade Polikarpov. There is more important work than building a fighter jet. Comrade Stalin is not interested in a fighter for a defensive war.

We agree - it's impressive. Nikolai Nikolaevich is all about fighters, he can’t and doesn’t want to think about anything else, but here it’s on you! Two semi-literate, semi-sober security officers with the mandate of People's Commissar N.I. Yezhov: drop everything, you bastard! Do "Ivanov"! Otherwise...

Readers of the site rossteam.ru have already seen this: in the same way, evil semi-literate security officers (already under Beria) forced A.N. Tupolev to build a four-engine dive bomber (rossteam.ru, “The difficult fate of the PB project”). Upon closer examination, the “saga of the vile Beria and the brave Tupolev” turned out to be a forgery. So, even more tales have been told about the Ivanov competition at Suvorov...

Let's go back one quote: “under the leadership of Polikarpov - Mikoyan and Gurevich...” That’s all true. At that time, N.N. Polikarpov headed the second most powerful aircraft design association in the USSR - after KOSOS TsAGI, Tupolev's team - the Special Design Bureau, OKB. And he also had several design teams subordinate to him. And one of them was working on “Ivanov”.

But Mikoyan and Gurevich were just working out the calculations for... a fighter! Why: “Comrade Stalin is not interested in a fighter for a defensive war.” Apparently, it was precisely as a result of I.V. Stalin’s disregard for fighters that the Mikoyan-Gurevich brigade was a little later allocated to a separate design bureau with the task of bringing the Polikarpov I200 high-altitude fighter, the future MiG-1/MiG-3, into production. Details of this difficult story can be read at: base13.glasnet.ru, V. Ivanov, “MiG-1 - Polikarpov’s machine.”

But the matter is by no means limited to the I-200 fighter. Let’s open Shavrov’s book, which “Suvorov” advertises to us, and see what N.N. Polikarpov was doing in the late 30s, that is, when, according to “Suvorov”, all Soviet designers at the point of the KGB revolver only and they raced to make Ivanov.

It turns out that AT THIS VERY TIME the Polikarpov Design Bureau is developing and building the FIRST fighter in the USSR with a liquid-cooled Hispano-Suiza engine and a ShVAK motor-cannon. A little time will pass, and fighters of this design will fill the skies of the Eastern Front - LaGG-3 and Yaks of all numbers...

AT THIS VERY TIME, the OKB is developing a fighter with a radial engine, a promising successor to the I-16 - the I-180 fighter. It is not the fault of the Central Design Bureau that this wonderful machine did not make it into the series.

AT THIS VERY TIME, the OKB is working on a very promising family of twin-engine vehicles MPI (multi-seat cannon fighter) - VIT (high-altitude tank destroyer) - SPB (high-speed dive bomber).

All this can be read both from Shavrov and in the fascinating book by test pilot, front-line soldier, P.M. Stefanovsky - “300 Unknowns”.

And here’s the thing: “Suvorov” cites both of these books in the bibliography of his opus and even quotes them a little. But in such a way as not to harm yourself. If you start reading Shavrov in a row, and not in strictly measured pieces, if you have the “whole” Stefanovsky, the picture changes 180 degrees. Pyotr Mikhailovich flew Polikarpov’s fighters just at the time when Polikarpov, “according to Suvorov,” was categorically forbidden to do anything other than “Ivanov”... This is how the evil Yezhov did not allow Polikarpov to build fighters.

Let's look further. Design bureaus of Grigorovich, Kocherigin, and Neman also took part in the competition under the motto “Ivanov”. No offense to Dmitry Pavlovich Grigorovich, but in the 30s it was clearly in circulation. Strictly speaking, after the flying boats of the M series during the First World War (WWII), he did not create anything worthy of the series at all. The I-Z fighter, which came out of the drawing room of his design bureau, turned out to be a more than mediocre machine and quietly went into oblivion. Alas, D.P. Grigorovich is a clear outsider on this list.

“Suvorov” is driving into the circle the designers allegedly involved in the work on “Ivanov,” as well as Lavochkin and Grushin. On the grounds that they worked for Grigorovich. Let's look at them too.

Grushin. Who knows at least one production aircraft of Grushin? That's right, no one. Because they did not exist in nature. There were some interesting projects, but nothing ever materialized in metal. And we note with a sigh of disappointment: Grushin is also an outsider. And what to do? In the world of creativity you can’t do without it: some are on top, and some are not so good.

S.A. Lavochkin. Tracing paper from P.O. Sukhoi: there is a reverse transfer, only even more unlawful and rude. In 1936, the young engineer Lavochkin was nothing more than a trainee. He has not yet designed a single aircraft. He will become “Lead Designer” only in four years, and Chief Designer in five years.

Kocherigin. Tracing paper from Grushin, almost one to one. Another outsider.

Professor Neman. To begin with, we note that the Neman Design Bureau is, let’s say, semi-handicraft. It operated on a voluntary basis and consisted of teachers and students of the Kharkov Aviation Institute (KhAI). We agree, this is a very strange choice of the design bureau to work on “the most important instrument of aggressive war.” We will return to Neman and his “Ivanov” later, but now let’s move on to the competition itself - both in the description of “Suvorov” and in real life.

**The thoughtful reader probably noticed that the author of the article forgot about the third powerful design association - TsKB, the Central Design Bureau, headed by S.V. Ilyushin. No, I haven't forgotten. We'll get to it soon. And we will be surprised together.

"Suvorov":

Each Soviet designer, regardless of his competitors, chose the same design: a low-lift monoplane, one engine, radial, two-row, air-cooled. Each Soviet designer proposed his own version of the Ivanov, but each version is strikingly similar to its unfamiliar brothers and to its distant Japanese brother in spirit and design. And this is not a miracle: it’s just that all designers were given a task: to create a tool for a certain type of work, for the very work that in a few years Japanese planes will do in the skies of Pearl Harbor. And since the work to be done is the same, then each designer will create approximately the same tool to perform it.

We open the boring book by Khazanov - Gordyukov, look at the preliminary designs presented by the “competitors”... And we are surprised. It turns out that Polikarpov and Grigorovich proposed a “high-plane” scheme! Grigorovich even managed to move the engine above the fuselage - on a pylon, like a flying boat. And what really doesn’t fit anywhere is every single one of the designers! - we chose the AM-34 liquid-cooled V-shaped engine as the power plant. For a very simple reason: at that time it was the most powerful and promising Soviet aircraft engine. Our smoking room lied again. But the most interesting thing in the history of the super competition is Ilyushin’s behavior.

Formally participating in the competition, Sergei Vladimirovich did not even bother to present the projections of his “Ivanov”. Calling a spade a spade, Ilyushin simply gave up on the competition. And this is completely natural! By that time, Ilyushin had already formed his own views on the appearance of a battlefield aircraft, and his reluctance to be distracted by the development of an aircraft that, in his opinion, was obviously outdated and unpromising was quite understandable. The behavior of the “Chekist sadists” is also interesting - in terms of compliance with the fictions of “Suvorov”. According to Suvorov, Soviet designers were obliged to make Ivanovs almost under pain of execution. But then Ilyushin clicks his teeth contemptuously and makes it absolutely clear that he doesn’t give a damn about “Ivanov.” And what? Nothing. No “black crows” rushed to him, no one grabbed him by the zugunder and dragged him to Butyrka. Do I like "Ivanov"? Okay, try to do it your way. We'll see. Ilyushin did - and he did not just anything, but the Schwarze Todt - the legendary Il-2.

The competition ended after consideration of the preliminary designs. All! None of the submitted projects were recommended for development to the stage of working drawings. There is no doubt that the competition was not intended to immediately obtain a project suitable for implementation in a real device. It was of an evaluative nature - what can design ideas on the topic of “single-engine, two-seat reconnaissance bomber” provide today? Based on the results of the competition, the People's Commissariat of Defense Industry, which then included GUAP - the Main Directorate of the Aviation Industry - proposed building the machine in three versions: all-wood, composite (mixed design) and all-metal. Prof. was appointed chief designer for the first option. Neman, with a production base at plant No. 135 in Kharkov, for the second - N.N. Polikarpov (plant No. 21, Gorky / Nizhny Novgorod), and for the third - P.O. Sukhoi (experimental structures plant - ZOK GUAP). The choice of Sukhoi for the post of Chief of “metal” is quite natural: he had just returned from a business trip abroad to the USA, during which he became familiar with advanced methods of designing and building all-metal aircraft. Moreover, as a member of the Soviet trade and purchasing mission, Pavel Osipovich bought something in the States precisely on the topic of the Ivanov project - but more on that later. So come on, comrade. Dry, implement, teach.

So the “icebreaker” myth about the super-important Ivanov competition has burst. It turns out that it was a completely ordinary, working organizational event, in which not the masters were directly involved. In the light of what we learned, the conspiracy theories of “Suvorov” somehow imperceptibly faded and faded. Like cheap wallpaper in bright sunlight. But this is just the beginning! “Icebreaking Tales” continues to gain power, color and juice. Let's look further.

Listen to “Suvorov”, so the result on the topic “Ivanov” was the only and only BB-1/Su-2. It is on him that he attacks with all the force of his accusatory talent. But the fact is that the Neman aircraft was ALSO built, put into service, produced in a relatively large series - 528 aircraft, more than half the production of the Su-2 - and was actively used on the fronts of the Second World War until the end of 1943. We are talking about the KhAI-5 , aka R-10. The natural question is: why does Suvorov pass him by in deathly silence? It's very simple. Propagandists (the British Einsatzkommando “Victor Suvoroff” are not historians, but propagandists) need ONE bright image, single and indivisible, in which, “like a drop of water,” would concentrate everything that needs (ordered) to expose or glorify. This is an ironclad rule of PR technologies. We will encounter it again below. Therefore, the Suvorovites prefer to remain modestly silent about the R-10. In order not to explain that there were two “winged jackals” (actually not two, but more) and, most importantly, not to blur the impression, NOT TO DIVIDE THE EFFECT.

“Ivanov” Polikarpov was unlucky. In connection with the reorganizations of the GUAPNKAP, Polikarpov temporarily lost his production base and was unable to meet the deadlines for testing a prototype of his machine (Mikhail Maslov, “Polikarpov Bomb Carriers,” Aviation, No. 5). At the same time, in order to reduce the cost of production, it was decided to produce the Sukhoi aircraft in series not as an all-metal aircraft, but as a composite one - with a wooden fuselage. It was considered inappropriate to tinker with a second similar machine (“those who didn’t have time are late”), and the topic was closed. By the way, Grigorovich’s Ivanov was also built. But due to the illness and death of Dmitry Pavlovich, his design bureau was disbanded and all work, naturally, was closed (Khazanov - Gordyukov).

The next eruption of lies begins when the Suvorovites proceed to describe the design features of the “winged jackal”. Here we can only shrug our shoulders. They seem to be fundamentally at odds with reality.

***By the way, the lies regarding Soviet military aviation begin with “Suvorov” long before the chilling horror films about “Ivanov”. "Icebreaker", ch. 3 - “Suvorov” quotes the book of the English pilot Alfred Price “WW II Fighter Conflict”: “The Russian I-16, designed by Polikarpov, had the most powerful weapons among the world’s serial fighters in September 1939... The I-16 had twice the firepower of “ Messerschmidt-109E" and almost three times "Spitfire-I". Among all the pre-war fighters in the world, the I-16 was unique in the sense that it was the only one that had all-round protection around the pilot.”

Let us forgive “Suvorov” the original spelling of the word “Messerschmitt”; You never know, it’s a typo, and let’s look at the real I-16. Here in front of me are two powerful monographs on the I-16: “War in the Air,” vol. 41–43, “The fighting donkey of Stalin’s falcons”; and Mikhail Maslov’s book “I-16 Fighter”, Armada, 1997. I-16 is here in all conceivable and inconceivable projections, sections and sections. Where did Price (and Suvorov after him) see “all-round protection for the pilot”? Excuse me, what place? 8-mm armored back weighing 32 kg - and THAT'S ALL. In front, the pilot is to some extent protected by a big engine. There is no armored glass. Bottom and sides - 5 layers of birch veneer. Speaking about the armament of the I-16, Price, apparently, is mistaken - due to a lack of information, and Suvorov happily replicates this mistake. The fact is that the combination of two ShVAK cannons and two ShKAS machine guns was carried only by I-16 type 17, type 27 and type 28 fighters, produced in limited quantities and intended mainly for assault operations. We take the technical characteristics of the weapon from Shavrov, make a simple calculation and get the weight of a second salvo for the I-16 type 17: 3.04 kg. The basic fighter of the Luftwaffe in September 1939 was the Bf.109E-1; We open any monograph on the Messer (and there are a dime a dozen of them now) and read: the mass of a second salvo is 2.2 kg. The Emil's armament is almost identical to the I-16 type 17: two synchronized MG17 machine guns and two MG FF wing cannons. Where the overseas comrades saw double superiority here is unclear... Indeed, the ShKAS was superior in its parameters to the MG-17, and the ShVAK was superior to the MG FF. But it’s not double, is it?? But the bulk of the “donkeys” were armed with either four ShKAS, or 2 ShKAS + 1 BS. By the way, the Spitfire I also does not look toothless at all: 8 Colt Browning machine guns provided it with a second salvo of 1.6 kg.

I made this digression so that anyone could personally, and not from my words, be convinced of the systematic distortion of the truth by the “suvoryats”. Okay, Price can be forgiven - foreign people still firmly believe that the cranberry is a tree, and a spreading one, and in Siberia bears walk along city streets. But the Suvorov group is working “under Russian”! There are plenty of materials on I16 and Bf.109, both on the Internet and on the shelves. Information on weapons can be obtained on the Corner of the Sky website, http://airwar.ru. Who wants to - check, count. And we will return to our sheep, that is, jackals, which are “winged”.

“Suvorov’s cranberry” blooms immediately as soon as he undertakes to educate the reader regarding the design features of the Su2 (then BB-1).

“...And besides, during the work on the Ivanov project, someone’s invisible but powerful hand guided those who deviated from the general course. At first glance, interference at the highest level in the work of designers is simply the whims of a capricious master. For example ", some designers put two firing points on prototypes: one to protect the rear upper hemisphere, the other - the rear lower hemisphere. These were corrected - we will make do with one point, there is no need to protect the rear lower hemisphere. Some covered the crew and the most important components with armor plates on all sides. They were corrected: to cover only from below and from the sides. Pavel Sukhoi made his “Ivanov” in the first version all-metal. Simpler, said someone’s menacing voice. Simpler. Let the wings remain metal, and the body can be made of plywood. Will the speed drop? Nothing. Let falls."

Everything here is not true.

1. The BB-1 short-range bomber went into production with TWO defensive shooting points: the upper Mozharovsky-Venevidov MV-5 turret and the lower LU hatch installation. Where did the assertion come from that someone’s “powerful hand” removed the LU? That's where it comes from. The report of the Air Force Research Institute on state tests of the 2nd prototype BB-1 (product SZ-2) states (Khazanov - Gordyukov): “The hatch installation provides targeted fire in a small sector of firing angles from –11 to –65 degrees, which ensures its use only for firing at ground targets, because enemy air attacks are possible here in exceptional cases and are the least effective. The presented hatch installation does not at all provide protection for the rear hemisphere in the sector of angles close to the axis of the aircraft, where long-term fire from an enemy positioned at the tail of the aircraft in horizontal flight or on turns is most effective.” Thus, the LU brand hatch installation did not correspond to its purpose and, in fact, was an ordinary BALLAST. In September 1940 (serial production of the BB-1 was already in full swing), yes, the LU was liquidated. But it was not the LOWER FIRING POINT that was eliminated, but simply its unsuccessful model. In return, LU Mozharovsky and Venevidov provided the military with an excellent MV-2 lower installation, which completely covered the rear lower hemisphere; but then the military had a new insight. It was decided to remove the installation and leave the hatch to make it easier for the navigator to leave the emergency vehicle. Yes, the military comrades - with the best intentions - played a big fool; but where does the “invisible menacing hand” come into play? A common tactical mistake, one that the military of all countries have made, are making and will make. Only those who do nothing make no mistakes. With the start of the war, the fallacy of this decision became obvious, and factory teams immediately restored the MV2 using sets of parts taken from warehouses.

There is a nuance here. On photos appearance installation - whether LU or MV-2 - cannot be seen. In the stowed position, it is retracted into the fuselage and closed flush with the hatch flaps, so much so that the seam is not noticeable. But when there is a threat of attack by fighters, it moves into the stream, but there was usually no one to photograph the Su-2 with an extended machine gun, a minute before the Messerschmitt attack... For some reason.

2. About armor. You can sift through at least a ton of literature on WWII aviation, but there were only THREE aircraft in nature that had armor “on the sides”: Il-2, Il-10 and Hs.129. On all the others, the armor “on the sides” was either absent altogether, or was hung in the form of separate small tiles designed to cover one or another important component: for example, the pilot’s left hand. Or a projectile container. Little of. Airplanes of all warring parties began to acquire such tiles only in 1940, after the pilots saw firsthand the deadly effect of high-speed machine guns and especially air cannons. As of September 1939, the maximum that the aircraft of ALL warring parties had was an armored back for the pilot and a couple of armor plates for the air gunners. Moreover, many cars did not even have this! For example, the Spitfire, Hurricane, and P-40 Tomahawk went into battle completely “naked.” The English pilot and aviation historian Michael Speke, in his excellent book “Aces of the Allies” (Minsk, “Rusich”, 2001), tells an astonishing case when the engineers of the Hauker company refused to book a Hurricane, doubting the very possibility (!) of such alterations. The commander of the Hurricane squadron had to improvise an armored back from a Blenheim bomber into the cockpit of his fighter, drive the car onto a Hawker and demonstrate it to the bosses there. Only after such a clear demonstration did the engineers admit that they were wrong and correct the situation. If the lack of reservation or its insufficiency is a sign of the aggressiveness of the state, then the British are the undisputed leaders in this regard. Following the results of the first battles with the British, German fighter pilots were unanimously surprised at how easily their opponents caught fire. No wonder - it took the massacre over Wilhelmshaven and the Sedan Massacre for the British to begin equipping their aircraft with gas tank protectors and a neutral gas filling system. And vice versa: in the Luftwaffe, before the war, perhaps the greatest attention was paid to passive aircraft protection systems among the participating countries. Using the logic of “Suvorov”, we come to the conclusion: it was Britain that was planning a “treacherous attack on sleeping German airfields” and subsequent flights “in clear skies”! And these are just the beginnings of “rabid British aggressiveness.” Below I undertake to present the “berries”. As for the Su-2, it was no different in this regard from its other peers, both Soviet and foreign. The pilot has an armored back, the navigator has nothing. Neither from below, nor from the sides. Soviet production workers, like their foreign colleagues, had to urgently eliminate this shortcoming during the fighting. But the Su-2 had protectors and a neutral gas system from the very beginning - unlike the British.

3. Finally, plywood and speed. Here, strictly speaking, there is no relationship at all. The famous British multi-purpose aircraft "Mosquito" was made entirely of wood, both lengthwise and crosswise, but it did not allow it to become the absolute champion in its class in terms of speed, rate of climb and flight ceiling. The flight data of the BB-1/Su-2 did not deteriorate from the transition to a composite design:

A. All-metal BB-1 (SZ-2):

maximum speed near the ground - 360 km/h the same, at the altitude limit of 4700 m - 403 km/h time to climb 5000 m - 16.6 minutes service ceiling - 7440 m b. Composite BB-1 (serial):

maximum speed near the ground - 375 km/h the same, at the altitude limit of 5200 m - 468 km/h time to climb 5000 m - 11.8 minutes practical ceiling - 8800m

Ay! The comrades from MI5 lied again. The fact is that, firstly, the rich experience and high level of working with wood at Soviet factories ensured a very clean surface and high weight class of wooden structures. And secondly, simultaneously with the transition to composite, the 820-horsepower M-62 engine (Russian Wright “Cyclone”) was replaced by the 950-horsepower M-87 (Russian Gnome-Ron “Mistral-Major”). But it was not easy with duralumin in our country at that time. And with the start of the war it only got worse. So the conversion of the BB-1 to composite was completely justified, especially since it did not entail a decrease in flight performance.

Here we will finish the analysis of Chapter 6, simultaneously noting to ourselves that throughout all its 9 pages, the “suvoryats” did not provide a single quotation or link related to the topic, in other words, NOT A SINGLE OBJECTIVE PROOF of their verbose unsubstantiated reasoning. Let's move on to chapter 11 - "Winged Genghis Khan." Maybe the author(s) will be more informative here?

Oh yeah! As many as 10 quotes, not counting the epigraph. And again, almost everything is off topic. We have.

Lieutenant General Pushkin, Air Marshal Pstygo, Major Lashin, Colonel Strelchenko praise the Su-2, its flight characteristics and high survivability. So what of this? Where is the evidence of preparation for an aggressive war? If the plane is good, does it automatically fall into the category of “winged jackals”? But in both chapters of “Suvorov” he goes out of his way to prove that the sign of the undeniable aggressiveness of the Su-2 is precisely its mediocre characteristics! The comrade contradicts himself, but this does not seem to bother him at all. The main thing is more expression!

Field Marshal A. Kesselring: “The terrible mental impact of the “Stalinist organs” is an extremely unpleasant memory for any German soldier who was on the Eastern Front.” And where is the aggressiveness of Stalin, his Air Force and the Su-2 aircraft itself? A talented but beaten German talks about the power of Soviet rocket artillery, nothing more.

Colonel Sivkov: “By the end of December 1940, the formation of the 210th short-range bomber regiment was completed... the pilots arrived from the civilian military fleet.” This is closer to the topic, but let’s take a closer look at the situation. 13 light bomber regiments are being prepared to operate the Su-2. AT THE SAME TIME, by the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR “On Air Force forces of the Red Army" No. 2265-977ss dated November 5, 1940, THIRTEEN DIVISIONS of Long-Range Bomber Aviation are deployed. And they were staffed to a large extent by selected personnel of the Civil Air Fleet and the elite of the elite - the Northern Sea Route aviation. What names, what faces! Vodopyanov and Kamanin, Cherevichny, Akkuratov, Mazuruk! Just a minute. According to the logic of “Suvorov”, light bomber aircraft are an instrument of aggressive war, while long-range bomber aircraft are an instrument of holy defensive war. So what is more: 13 regiments or 13 divisions? A division - roughly - is three regiments; Taking the logic of “Suvorov”, we have: Comrade Stalin prepared for a holy defensive war exactly three times more energetically than for an aggressive offensive one. He's a strange kind of aggressor. Non-offensive.

Further. “Red Star” dated December 15, 1992 allegedly (there is no quote) writes that in 1942 pilots “... with rifles in their hands, were thrown in the thousands near Stalingrad to reinforce the infantry.” They say that the half-educated pilots were baked like pancakes EXACTLY for the Su-2 (from what does this follow?? Allah knows - the Suvorov, as usual, does not bother itself with proof), of which it was planned to configure as many as 100,000–150,000, but... from They refused to release the Su-2, and they threw the half-educated people into the trenches - you don’t feel sorry for them.

Here we come close to a big and tasty topic - production plans for the production of the Su-2. We’ll get to it below, but for now let’s talk about the “dropouts.” So, no one drove the PIlots into the trenches. In the critical autumn of 1942, cadets from several schools found themselves at the front, caught in the zone of the German offensive. These were guys who had undergone 2-3 months of training, maximum - a course of initial flight training. Like, for example, the future Pokryshkin pupil, Hero of the Soviet Union Sukhov. But the PIlots were protected, evacuated, to the Caucasus, beyond the Volga, to the Urals. Examples - Twice Hero of Skomorokhov, and the same Kozhedub, after all.

The topic of “Stalin's incubator” is very interesting in itself. Here “Suvorov” also turned out so powerfully pe`k|mnqr| inside out, that one can only envy the impudence of the “Bristol sages” who write under this label. But, although this topic is related to the falsification of the history of the Su-2, the targeted nature of the article does not allow me to be distracted by the “incubator,” no matter how much I would like.

Let's look at the quotes further. L. Kuzmina, “General Designer Pavel Sukhoi”: “Stalin formulated the task as follows: the aircraft should be very simple to manufacture, so that it could be made as many copies as there are people in our country with the last name Ivanov.”

Where did Madame Kuzmina get this phrase from? And God knows. Stalin did not have sworn stenographers to record every word. But they attributed so much nonsense to him, which he could not say in principle, that now there is and cannot be trust in a single supposedly casually thrown “Stalinist” phrase that was not recorded in documents. Therefore, let’s leave the phrase about the “Ivanovs” on the conscience of Madame Kuzmina and look at the “simplicity” of BB-1. The simplicity of a device is expressed primarily in its cost. “Suvoryats” insistently repeat at every step: Su2 was simple! Very simple! And cheap as an aluminum spoon! It could be made anywhere and by anyone! We look at Khazanov Gordyukov and are once again surprised. The single-engine bomber of mixed design Su-2 produced by plant No. 135 cost 430 thousand rubles, produced by plant No. 207–700 thousand. But the twin-engine, all-metal bomber SB of plant No. 22 cost only 265 thousand rubles, the twin-engine composite BB22 of plant No. 1 - 400 thousand rubles. And where is the ingenious simplicity here? And phenomenally cheap? It is clear that as production improves, it becomes cheaper, but even taking this factor into account, it is clear that there is no question of any extraordinary simplicity or cheapness. Mr. “Suvorov” lied again.

In the same place: “to the aircraft factories that are preparing to produce the Su-2, workers are supplied by military registration and enlistment offices, like soldiers to the front...” Strong. But this statement is not supported by anything at all. Here is the practice of reserving qualified workers in the defense industry from conscription into the army - yes, it happened. But it concerned the entire “defense industry” and there were no special conditions for the production of the Su-2 or for the NKAP in general. And also - this is such a cute detail.

At tripartite negotiations in Moscow in 1939 regarding the creation of an Anglo-French-Soviet anti-Hitler bloc, the head of the French delegation, General Doumenc, informed the Soviet representative Marshal Voroshilov that every worker in the French defense industry has a mobilization card, similar to the mobilization orders of those liable for military service, and with the outbreak of war is obliged to come to the enterprise, indicated on this card. That is, following the “Suvorov” logic, France is a notorious, undoubted aggressor. Hmmm. By the way, these are also flowers. Below will be the “berries” of French aggressiveness.

In fact, the casket, as usual, opens simply. Preparation for ANY war means transferring industry onto a war footing. And it doesn’t matter whether we are waiting for an attack or are preparing to attack ourselves - if we want to win, we are obliged to MOBILIZE industry. The only way!

And what's left? And there remains a quote from V.B. Shavrov: “...Although everything possible was taken from the Su-2 and its authors have nothing to reproach, the aircraft met the actual requirements only before the war.” “Suvorov” interprets this phrase as follows: they say that the Su-2 was designed for an aggressive war, or even more precisely, for a “treacherous strike on sleeping airfields” of the poor victim (these “sleeping airfields” are repeated so obsessively that they set one’s teeth on edge after only a dozen pages) , but Hitler, thank God, attacked first, and in the changed conditions the Su-2 turned out to be useless...

For now, let's put this fragment of the Bristol concoction aside - we will return to it later, but for now we will write down for ourselves: the quotes given by “Suvorov” DO NOT CONTAIN any evidence. As a rule, they are not related to the topic at all. They only serve the purpose of giving Suvorov’s writings the APPEARANCE of evidence, adding solidity and weight to it due to the authority of generals, marshals, and designers.

But Chapter 11 is full of speculation. According to “Suvorov”, it turns out that the Soviet Air Force had plenty of bombs, rockets, and ShKAS machine guns solely because their production was oriented in advance to ensure the production of a monstrous horde of 100,000–150,000 Ivanovs...

Let's watch.

1. The ShKAS machine gun was developed by Shpitalny and Komaritsky in 1932, and went into production in 1934, when there was still no mention of the Su-2. ABSOLUTELY ALL Soviet aircraft were armed with it: I-15, I-16, I-153, TB-3, DB-3, SB, DI-6, R-5, R-5SSS, R-Z, R-9, R -10... In 1940, mass production of Lavochkin, Yakovlev and Mikoyan fighters began, each of which was armed, among other weapons, with two ShKAS, and the Pe-2 bomber (four ShKAS). Consequently, TOZ was focused on producing huge quantities of the ShKAS machine gun. But with the beginning of the war, the insufficient effectiveness of the oskelernb rifle caliber as an air-to-air weapon quickly became apparent, and the “specific gravity” of the ShKAS in the aviation weapons system began to rapidly fall. By the middle of the war, it was almost universally replaced by large-caliber UB. So it is not surprising that the TOZ capacity was quite sufficient to meet the sharply reduced “demand” for ShKAS.

2. Missiles. Firstly, Suvorov's chronology is poor. In V. Shunkov’s excellent reference book “Weapons of the Red Army” it is indicated that the RS-82 rocket was put into service back in 1935. Again - before the assignment was issued for the BB-1! And secondly, the RS-82 was initially considered as an air-to-air weapon and had a fragmentation warhead with a remote fuse, which was of little use for firing at ground targets, which turned out to be the case in 1939 at Khalkhin Gol. And finally, the most important thing. Launch beams and tubes (RO-82 - rocket gun, cal. 82 mm) were envisaged as standard weapons for ALL Soviet fighters, attack aircraft and even the SB bomber. This explains the “missile abundance” in the Red Army Air Force. Moreover, the Yaks and SB, for some reason, almost never used missile weapons.

But for the Su-2, the installation of missile weapons was not envisaged! Exactly for him - it was not intended, period! For the first time, one vehicle was experimentally equipped with 10 beams for the RS132 only in SEPTEMBER 1941, three months after the start of the war. And only in mid-October did production of the Su-2 with attachment points for launch beams begin, and only every fourth one was equipped with standard beams. Comrade “Suvorov” lied again. Well, his lies no longer fit into any gates, not even into the gates of the Su-2 hangar.

3. As for bombs, it’s the same story. The use of aerial bombs was envisaged for all Soviet aircraft, starting with the smallest and oldest - the I-15. By the mid-30s, the range of Soviet bombs was, in general, worked out, production was debugged, thousands of bombs went to Spain and tens of thousands to China... What does the Su-2 have to do with it? This mystery is deep and unknowable...

And “Suvorov” continues to write fairy tales with inspiration.

"... There are enough indications that the Soviet industry was in full readiness for the mass production of the Ivanov. For example, in a defensive war, fighters were needed first of all. Aircraft designer S. A. Lavochkin urgently needs a powerful, reliable engine to modernize the LaGG-Z fighter , and in huge quantities. No problem, the industry is ready to produce in any quantities dbhc`rek| M82, which was intended for the Su-2. The industry is not only ready to produce them, but also has thousands of these engines in stock - take them and put them on the plane. Lavochkin designed it, and the result was the La-5 fighter, famous and beloved by pilots."

And again, the lively singer-songwriters of their own songs are let down by both chronology and texture, as in the case of RS. The first copy of the Ivanov from Sukhoi flew on August 25, 1937 with an M-62 engine; During the production process, the Su-2 was equipped with either the M-87A, then the M-87B, or the M88...

...And at this time Anatoly Shvetsov was still developing, testing and fine-tuning the M-82 engine (later ASh-82). When the development showed success, the priority “buyer” was identified as the newest twin-engine bomber “103U”, also known as Tu-2 (“War in the Air”, issues 66–67). It took a long time for the M-82 to “get on its feet,” or, if you prefer, “on the pistons”: the required level of reliability and at the same time a certain backlog of finished products was achieved by Plant No. 33 only in the fall of 1941.

And here a paradoxical, very rare situation arose. For objective reasons, the production of the Tu-2, which had begun, was temporarily stopped; as a result, there are engines, but there are no planes for them (usually the opposite is true). By this point, it became clear that the only real opportunity to dramatically increase the performance characteristics of the Su-2 was to increase the power of the power plant. Sukhoi tried to adapt the “orphan” engine to his aircraft - it turned out well. However... By 1942, the optimal battlefield aircraft had already been determined with utmost clarity; it was, of course, Il-2. Khazanov - Gordyukov: On November 19, 1941, by a decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, production of the Su-2 was stopped, and plant No. 135, which produced it, was disbanded in order to strengthen plants No. 30 and 381 with people and equipment.

So, again, “Ivanov” did not play any noticeable role in the fate of the M-82 engine. Again, Mr.(s) “Suvorov” casts a shadow on the fence. Well, at least a piece of truth - for a change. There is nothing.

And finally. Aircraft production is not about stamping clay whistles or wooden spoons with Khokhloma roosters. It is unthinkable without clear planning, repeatedly reflected in hundreds of documents. What are these strange numbers that the Bristol Einsatzkommando is insistently thrusting under our noses? 100,000–150,000 aircraft! No, not even that. In capital letters, like this: HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND! Horror…

Let's start with a significant message from Suvorov that in August 1938, Sukhoi's Ivanov under the brand name BB-1 (the first short-range bomber) was put into production at two factories at once. As Goebbels said, you need to lie with p`gl`unl. “Suvorov” completely agrees with the Reich Minister of Propaganda of the Third Reich. Therefore, he lies uncontrollably.

IN MARCH 1939, the State Defense Committee issued a decree on the launch of the BB-1 into series at two factories. A year and a half - is there a difference? But that's not all. The decision to launch a series and the start of mass production are noticeably different things.

“... Then they began to produce it at the third: a gigantic fourth plant was being built, and, in addition, factories that produced other types of aircraft were ready to switch to Ivanov production upon order.”

This is nothing more than an attempt to make “scary eyes” when telling a child about Buka, Koshchei and Baba Yaga. Let's look at those factories:

1. Plant No. 135, Kharkov (head). Before switching to the Su-2, the 135th built all-wood R-10s and had neither equipment nor experience working with metal. This is an aircraft factory, but it is a SECOND-RATE factory.

2. Sarcombine plant, Saratov. The name speaks for itself. This is an agricultural machinery plant, which was transferred to the NKAP on the eve of the war (later - plant No. 292).

Then the People’s Commissariat “re-passed the cards” - they transferred Sarcombine to the production of Yak-1 fighters, which were really simple to the point of indecentness, which yesterday’s specialists in reapers and threshers could cope with. In return, Sukhoi was given...

2a. Plant No. 207, Dolgoprudny. This is ALSO not an aircraft factory. It was called "Dirigiblestroy" and built, accordingly, airships. These are, of course, not mowers, but they are far from airplanes either. And finally,

3. Plant No. 31, Taganrog. This is, yes, an aircraft plant, but, firstly, again, it is far from leading, but Secondly, this is traditionally a MARINE plant. He worked for the Navy and simultaneously produced MBR-2, MDR-6, GST and KOR-1, not counting spare parts for the R-5SSS and R-Zet. And then - not in return, but in addition - they load him with BB-1/Su-2. There was no reason for the director to climb the wall...

I wonder why People’s Commissar Shakhurin did not entrust the implementation of “Stalin’s most important order of all time” to one (or two, or all four) of the 4 leading Soviet aircraft factories - No. 1, 18, 21 and 22? In 1940, they provided 78% of the total production of the NKAP. Any of them could single-handedly solve production problems for Su2. If we accept Suvorov’s point of view about the extreme importance of the Su-2 program, the attitude of the NKAP leadership towards its implementation looks at least cool, if not sabotage. If at the same time ophmr| “general democratic” point of view about a priori Stalinist bloodthirstiness, then the heads of the directors and officials of the NKAP should have simply fallen like rain, and Shakhurin’s head was the very first. But this is not observed. Some people, yes, were removed. And some people sat. But not Shakhurin! And at the 135th, and at the 207th, and at the 31st factories, they also didn’t twist anyone’s hands or drag them to jail. Moreover:

I’m curious, what is this “giant fourth plant” that was “being built”? I know of only two of these: in Kazan and in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. The first was intended first for TB-7, then for PS-84 and Pe-2. the second - under DB-3/IL-4. The Su-2 NEVER appeared in their production plans. Once again he’s sculpting a hunchbacked “Suvorov” for us, a blackamoor is in charge, he’s throwing out black stuff... This is me in his favorite thieves’ language. With whomever you behave, that’s how you, as they say, should...

But in reality, not out of thin air, what were the production plans for the Su-2? In 1939, NOT ONE Sukhoi aircraft was built; in 1940, NKAP order No. 56 of 02/15/40 ordered the production of 135 vehicles in the first half of the year; in the middle of the year there was a revision of the aircraft building program based on the results of the fighting on the Western Front - and the 31st plant was TAKEN away from Sukhoi and reoriented it to LaGG-3 (Comrade Stalin, according to Suvorov, did not need fighters). As a result, the total production of Su2 for 1940 amounted to 125 copies. On December 9, 1940, at a joint meeting of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars, a program for the production of combat aircraft for 1941 was adopted, which provided for the production of 6070 bombers, of which only 1150 were Su-2. Hmmm. Not empty, but not dense either; 18.9% does not even reach every fifth... But this is 1941! “Comrade Stalin is preparing to attack”... In fact, 728 were released; Well, that doesn't matter anymore. It is important that there is no hint of “hundreds of thousands” or even “tens of thousands” of Su-2 in the government’s plans.

We see that there was no “super-priority”, “archivally important” Su-2 production program. He was one of many, no more and no less. This is how it should be: a balanced air force has a variety of aircraft, some are needed more, others less, but this does not mean that some are more important than others.

It also happens that over time the conditions of armed struggle change and some concepts that were workable yesterday are now being put into circulation. This is exactly what happened with the Su-2.

2. Su-2: how? For what? Why?

To understand how and why this or that design was born, it is very useful to trace its genesis. To figure it out, so to speak, what happened “before that”? In this case, to find out whether the Su-2 in the Soviet Air Force had a predecessor, an aircraft ideologically and conceptually close to it?

Of course it was! There is no need to look for him. This is the R-5/R5SSS/R-Z family. They were assigned the SAME FUNCTIONS that were redirected to the Su-2, it’s just that technically these requirements were implemented at the level of the previous generation of aircraft: biplane box, composite with a predominance of wood and percale, fixed landing gear, open (on R-Z - semi-closed) cockpit, from 3 to 6 ShKAS, bombs up to 500 kg, crew - 2 people. Do we find out? Certainly. There were many of them built - 4914 R-5, 620 R-5SSS and 1031 RZet. But! The first flight of the R-5 took place already in 1928. It turns out that this was back when the vile Stalin planned a blitzkrieg against peaceful, sleeping Germany! Here's the villain. But the fact is that Germany at that time did not have any aviation at all, not even any noticeable civilian one, and there was still no leader, Comrade Stalin, but only “secretary” Koba, who, to the surprise of everyone, had just thrown off his sworn enemy from the sky-high heights of the Russian people, the cannibal maniac Leibu Bronstein-Trotsky. And Comrade Stalin still had a very long way to reach the levers of state power. He still didn’t have the necessary party power at his disposal.

In Spain, the R-5 and R-Z, acting as light attack bombers, repeatedly inflicted crushing blows on the Francoists. But by the end of the campaign it became clear that the age of these machines was over.

IT WAS INTENDED TO REPLACE THEM "IVANOV" - BB-1 - SU-2.

That's all!

And we will try to look even deeper into the fog of the past. What about “up to P5”? And a whole string. R-4, R-3, R-1 - all the same. In turn, the R-1 is a Soviet replica of the English De Havilland DH.9, the famous aircraft of the end of the First World War, attack aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, spotter and even, if necessary, a heavy fighter. After the war, he became a role model for a long time in many countries of the world, not only in the USSR.

Wow, how deeply has the infectious idea of ​​the “winged jackal” penetrated into the depths of time! But that's not all.

The ancestor of this class is, again, a British aircraft, the reconnaissance bomber AVROE504K, a single-engine two-seat biplane of the classical design with a pulling propeller. All other designs - gondola, with a pusher propeller, etc. - were eventually cut off and eliminated as unviable, and 504K, having entered the war on August 1, 1914, lived long after its end.

What happens? That back in 1913 (year of creation 504K) the British conceived an aggressive war, planning to treacherously, vilely, treacherously fall on someone’s sleeping airfields one fine Sunday morning, putting into practice the fixed idea of ​​the Imperial General Staff: the concept of blitzkrieg in “clear skies” ...

Rave? Yes. Only this is not my nonsense, because the logic is not mine. This is the logic of the Bristol wizards, the creators of the “virtual past”, which, characteristically, every time comes into insurmountable contradiction with elementary facts.

Meanwhile, insanity is getting stronger. Aircraft almost identical to the 504K multiplied in all warring and non-warring countries like cockroaches. The English RAF Be.2 and De Havilland, the French Potez and Breguet, the German Albatross and Halberstadt of different brands - they are all similar to each other, like twins, both in appearance and in their flight performance. All of them are classic, single-engine, two-seat reconnaissance bombers. How shoud I understand this? In the midst of a global meat grinder, are the British, French, Germans, and Austrians planning a treacherous attack on sleeping airfields? I wonder whose? Maybe in Swedish?

Of course no. It’s just that at that time, at that technical and tactical level, this concept best met the requirements for a reconnaissance and attack aircraft. There hasn't been anything better yet.

There is another very important nuance here, which determined the military’s long-term commitment to the concept of a single-engine reconnaissance bomber. We are talking about its combat stability and defense capability. At the technical level of WWI, the flight data of a reconnaissance bomber and a single-seat fighter were not fundamentally different. The reason for this was the difference in the power plant. For a long time, the thin design of the fighter did not allow it to accommodate a powerful engine, which at that time was only an in-line liquid-cooled engine. Star-shaped rotary air-cooled engines, which had less mass, also had less power, as well as a number of other disadvantages. So, for example, the speed of these engines was not regulated. The engine was either running at full throttle or spinning at idle. No more, no less. It was these engines that were equipped with the vast majority of fighters.

And as a result, it turned out that two-seat reconnaissance bombers, despite their larger mass and geometric dimensions compared to fighters, due to their more powerful power plant, were not so inferior to fighters in flight performance as to be a “sitting duck” in battle. All of them had one or two machine guns for firing forward “fighter style” and, of course, a tail turret. So in a maneuverable battle, the reconnaissance bomber could very well fend for itself. This point needs to be remembered...

...And now let's go back, up the time scale, but this time through the foreign air forces.

And we see what was expected: in the interwar period, all aviation powers built such machines in hundreds and thousands. It is clear that aerodynamics and aviation technology did not stand still, and the appearance of the reconnaissance bomber was gradually changing. Pine slats gave way to steel tubes and profiles, percale was gradually replaced by veneer, veneer by metal panels, the biplane turned first into a braced parasol monoplane, then into a cantilever low-wing aircraft, but conceptually absolutely nothing changed.

Here is an excellent reference book, “Planes of the Battlefield”, Moscow, “Libri”, 1995. Or “Aviation of the Second World War”, “Rusich”, 2001. Or “Planes of the Second World War”, AST, 2000. Yes, any, now there are many of them. How did the Air Force approach the beginning of World War II? foreign countries?

So, according to Suvorov, Hitler has a single-engine Junkers Ju.87 bomber, therefore Germany is the undisputed aggressor. Divine Hirohito has a single-engine Nakdazima B5N "Kate" bomber, and Japan is the undisputed aggressor. Accordingly, since Stalin has a single-engine Su-2 bomber, that means..?

...In fairness, it should be noted that the seasoned aggressor Mussolini also has the same bomber. This is a Breda Va.64 - yes, a copy of the Su-2. Well, everything is natural: Italy is pure aggression. Don’t feed bread - give it suddenly, at sleeping airfields... True, for some reason the Italians never did this signature trick of theirs...

But here before us is peaceful, long-suffering Poland. In our time, it has become commonplace to portray lordly Poland as a kind of innocently suffering victim, torn apart by the claws of bloodthirsty predators Hitler and Stalin. Writing about Poland with anything other than a compassionate sob is considered “politically incorrect.” Meanwhile, in 1938, the noble lords took an active part in the seizure of Czechoslovakia. There is no need to blame everything on Hitler: Czechoslovakia was divided by Hitler, Horthy and the proud nobleman Rydz-Smigly, at that time a Polish dictator, no better than Adolf. He grabbed a strong piece (Meltyukhov, “Soviet Polish Wars”, Moscow, “Veche”, 2002). It was for this robbery that the Mother of God of Czestochowa turned away from the lords. Serves it right!

But this is by the way. But in the case we have the following: as of September 1939, the basis of Polish army aviation was light single-engine bombers PZL P-23 Karas. This is the Su-2’s brother, only the “elder” one. His “bast shoes” have not yet been removed and the cabin is semi-closed. The rest is one to one. Characteristics, naturally, are worse - age. Issued in a decent, by Polish standards, series - 350 copies. Whether anyone wants it or not, we will have to, thinking in “Suvorov’s” categories, write Poland down as a seasoned aggressor. Now everything is clear - Hitler barely managed to forestall the unstoppable rush of the gentry towards Berlin...

We look at a peaceful, patriarchal, native Britain for the “suvoryats”. By the fall of 1939, the backbone of the Royal Air Force's front-line bomber force was the Fairey Battle light single-engine bombers. This is actually an identical twin of the Su2, only worse: a cantilever low-wing aircraft with a closed cockpit and retractable landing gear. Here are its brief performance characteristics:

****In order not to clutter up an already long article, I do not present the performance characteristics of all the aircraft mentioned in it in a row. Website addresses and names of books in which they can be found are given in the text and at the end of the article. Study, check for health.

Fairy "Battle":

Empty weight - 3015 kg, maximum take-off - 4895 kg;

Maximum speed at an altitude of 3960 m is 388 km/h;

Climb time 1525 m - 4.1 minutes;

Service ceiling - 7165 m;

Armament: 1 7.71mm machine gun - forward, 1 7.71mm machine gun - up and back;

There is no downward-backward machine gun and never has been. Maximum speed - 388 km/h. According to Suvorov’s logic, the worse the plane, the more aggressive it is; This means that the Battle is noticeably more aggressive than the Su-2. I wonder how many of them have been set up? A lot of! 1818 only combat ones, not counting training ones... But that’s not all. On the eve of the war, the British Vickers Wellesley (176 copies produced) and Westland Lysender (1550 copies) belonged to the same class. Compare with 893 Su-2. Let's add 528 R-10 here. Hmmm, but their king, together with q)pnl Neville Chamberlain, is 2.5 times more aggressive than Stalin! Actually, Wellesley and Lysender are not all, but about the rest of the British “relatives” of the Su-2 a little lower. For now these are enough.

But maybe things are different in beautiful France? No, the same. On the one hand, even as of May 1940, Armee d’la Air still had many old aircraft of the previous generation - Breguet Br.27, Muro 113/115/117, Pote 25, Pote 29, biplanes and parasols with fixed landing gear.

On the other hand, the basic aircraft for interaction with ground forces were the Pote 63.11 (925 copies produced) and Breguet 69 (382 copies). These are twin-engine aircraft, but this is where their difference from the Su-2 and the rest of the light bomber fraternity ends. Here, for example, is the performance characteristics of the most popular vehicle - Pote 63.11:

empty weight - 3135 kg, maximum take-off weight - 4530 kg;

maximum speed - 421 km/h;

time to climb 3000 m - 6 minutes;

practical ceiling - 8500 m;

armament - 1 - 4 7.5mm machine guns - fixed forward, one 7.5mm machine gun - up and back, another one - down and back;

Well, how is it different from the Su-2? Nothing. Moreover, it is noticeably worse. The low design level of the then French aircraft industry did not allow any of the advantages of the twin-engine design to be realized. Thus, it can be considered indisputably proven that by the autumn of 1939, dear, extremely democratic France was ready to mercilessly aggressive someone. It's no joke - 1207 new “winged jackals”, not counting the old ones. It was by revealing these intentions of France that Hitler was forced to launch a preemptive strike. Let us emphasize - he applied it with a suffering soul! Reluctantly! Through “I can’t”! He had no other choice...

What is there, overseas, in the land of popcorn and Charlie Chaplin? With this, it seems like there is no one to physically attack. Canada is already staring down the face, even though it is a British dominion, and talking about Mexico is ridiculous.

However, the white-toothed smiling Yankees are rapidly forging a dagger for a treacherous and sudden attack on sleeping airfields... however, for this they will first have to cross somewhere overseas, but this does not bother the sons of Liberty (which is the Statue). They forge it in such a way that where is the brutally aggressive Albion and the lone artisan Stalin:

Curtiss-Wright CW-22 - 441 copies;

Northrop A-17 - 436 copies;

Vought SB-2U “Vindicator” - 258 copies;

Valti A-35Vendens - 1528 copies;

Douglas A-24 “Banshee” - 989 copies.

The total production of the listed models alone is almost 3,600 cars. But this is not all. For some, I simply don’t have production data. In short, Stalin is resting. But what looks especially comical against the backdrop of Suvorov’s angry denunciations is the fact that the prototype for the BB-1 was... the American light bomber Valti V-11. They even bought a license for it, but after thinking it over and weighing it, they decided to build their own, and used the documentation, equipment and samples of materials to master the advanced plazo-pattern method of building aircraft.

Another comical touch. The first aircraft of the well-known aviation company SAAB, produced for the Air Force of neutral Sweden, was none other than the licensed American Northrop A-17. 107 copies were produced for the peaceful Swedish Air Force. Not otherwise, the Swedes were aiming to attack Norway in the 40th. Thank God, Hitler prevented. Otherwise we would have to put Sweden on the list of notorious aggressors...

So, “progressive” and “peace-loving” countries churned out “winged jackals” en masse. This absurdity forces us to go back a little and take a closer look at the seemingly indisputable and unambiguous “jackals” - the Ju.87 and B5N “Kate”. Maybe not everything is so simple there?

Certainly! It’s just that “Suvorov” is shamelessly deceiving us here too. His job is such that you can't help it.

First of all, comparing the Su-2 with the Ju.87 is completely incorrect. The Junkers is a dive bomber, both structurally and tactically it differs from the Su-2. That is why it survived the Su-2 on the fronts: the Germans used the Ju.87 massively until the end of 1943, and sporadically until the end of the war, despite the heavy losses of the Laptezhniks. The effect was really good if they broke through to the target. Well, the FW.190F/G did not arrive quickly enough to replace it...

BB-1 ()

combat use

In his infamous “Icebreaker,” the traitor-defector Rezun, who illegally appropriated the name of our great commander, called this plane a “winged jackal.” However, the chronicle of aircraft combat operations completely refutes this definition.

Su-2in battle, summer 1941

The beginning of the war became a serious test for the Red Army Air Force. The suddenly attacking enemy caused enormous damage to our air units. Particularly hard hit were the units located in the Western Special Military District, where anti-aircraft artillery was hit as a result of the treacherous activities of the quartermasters. Covering the airfields, it found itself without ammunition.

Http:="">Already in the afternoon of June 22, Luftwaffe bombers, having dealt with the border airfields, began to strike at the rear airfields of the Western Special Military District, including Bobruisk, where Major Ivantsov’s 97th Regiment, which had 50 ( 43 serviceable). However, it later became known that losses from enemy raids turned out to be insignificant: pilots and navigators fired from turrets directly from the cockpits of aircraft standing on the ground, forcing the Germans to drop bombs past the target. The next day, artillery ammunition from the internal districts was delivered to the airfields, and Hitler’s air raids on our airfields ceased after that.

Having brought the planes that arrived at the airfield a few days before the war into combat condition, the 97th bap from the Minki field airfield (southeast of Bobruisk) on the third day of the war began bombing the advancing formations of the 2nd tank group. The most intense battle took place at noon on June 26, when 25 bombed a tank column near Slonim from a height of only 300 m. Lacking fighter cover, the bombers actively engaged in air combat. Their crews reported the destruction of five Messerschmitts, two of which were accounted for by senior political instructor Sharonov and another by his crew’s navigator, Lieutenant Zasorin.

Recently, many have been criticizing the armament of our pre-war aircraft, saying, in particular, that they could not fight enemy aircraft. However, in fact, at close range he literally cut through enemy aircraft. It was simply necessary to fire at certain places on the plane. So, if you direct a burst of fire towards the area where the tail unit is attached, the fin and stabilizer will fall off the plane in a second.

Vladimir PROKLOV

PLANES OF THE DRY PERIOD OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The birth of the Sukhoi Design Bureau practically coincided with the beginning of World War II.

Having received the status of an independent design bureau in July 1939, the team continued planned work on modifying the short-range bomber BB-1 (Su-2, Su-4), designing and building the I-135 fighter (Su-1, Su-3), and also began to the design of the armored attack aircraft OBS (Su-6), and then the DDBSh (Su-8).

Along with the planned tasks, the OKB carried out research on some initiative projects of fighters and bombers.

In September 1935, Brigade No. 3 KOSOS TsAGI, headed by P.O. Sukhim, began research on the project of high-speed reconnaissance aircraft No. 51 (ANT-51) with the M-34FRN engine.

According to preliminary calculations, the aircraft should have the following basic data:

Aircraft length, mm 9390

Wingspan, mm 13000

Wing area, m2 28.16

Aircraft weight, kg:

- empty 2076

- flight 3210

Maximum speed at N 4000 m, km/h 455

Landing speed, km/h 109

Climb time, min:

- 11 3000 m 5.2

- 11 /000 m 18.6

Practical ceiling, m 9800

Flight range (H=6000 m; V=290 km/h), km 1500

Until the end of 1935, aerodynamic and alignment calculations were carried out. Four experimental wing sections were put into production for testing.

In March - April 1936, military engineer 2nd rank Kulikov (Red Army Air Force Research Institute) prepared tactical and technical requirements (TTT) for an attack reconnaissance aircraft with the AM-34FRN.

In mid-1936, the design teams of P.O. Sukhoi, S.A. Kocherigin, I.G. Neman, N.N. Polikarpov, S.V. Ilyushin and D.P. Grigorovich received from Glavaviaprom the task of preliminary preliminary design and calculations for a mass reconnaissance attack aircraft with an AM-34FRN engine.

The need to create such a vehicle was caused not only by the lack of a modern long-range reconnaissance attack aircraft in service with the Red Army Air Force, but also by the need to create a vehicle for the domestic AM-34 engine, which has great prospects for mass production.

By December, preliminary designs were submitted to the Main Directorate of Aviation Industry (GUAP).

Reconnaissance attack aircraft AM-34FRN (drawings by B.M.Kondorsky)

General view of a reconnaissance attack aircraft with AM-34FRN

Layout diagram of a reconnaissance attack aircraft with AM-34FRN

In the memorandum “On long-range and speed attack reconnaissance aircraft” sent to the government by the head of the GUAP M.M. Kaganovich, it was noted that: “... All presented aircraft projects in their geometric dimensions, weight and flight-tactical data differ little from each other friend and technically fit within very narrow limits.

Having discussed these projects together with the designers, we came to the following conclusion:

It is not possible to design and build an aircraft in a short period of time (8-9 months) to meet the specifications specified above by the efforts of one design bureau.

The design and construction of this aircraft in a short time is possible only with the collective development of the project by creating a cross-cutting team from all design bureaus and scientific institutes of VIAM, CIAM, TsAGI, with the involvement of specialists in individual disciplines, such as: engine technology, materials, production technology, aircraft equipment, etc.

In this way, all the best experience accumulated by the Union Design Bureau will be concentrated in this machine, and the creation of the machine will be ensured, taking into account its mass production ... "

However, M.M. Kaganovich’s idea of ​​​​creating a cross-cutting team composed of designers from six design bureaus remained on paper, since it was not supported by any organizational measures. The issue of the production base of such a brigade was not resolved either.

“... 1. Approve the proposal of the GU-AP on the construction of a long-range attack aircraft with the following flight-tactical data:

a) maximum speed at an altitude of 4-5000 meters - 420-430 km/h;

b) maximum speed near the ground - 350-400 km/h;

c) landing speed - 90-95 km/h;

d) practical ceiling - 9000-10000 m;

e) range at normal load at an altitude of 5000 m - 2000 km;

f) range with overload at an altitude of 5000 m - 4000 km;

g) cruising speed - 300-350 km/h...

…3. The aircraft's armament should include the installation of 3-5 machine guns, the bomb load in the normal version is 200 kg for an attack aircraft and 500 kg for a bomber due to overload.

The aircraft must be capable of installing a bomb rack with a total capacity of 1000 kg. ...

…6. Oblige SUAI to develop the aircraft in 3 variants:

1 - duralumin based on American design and technology, 2 - wooden structure and 3 - mixed design.

7. Approve by the designers responsible for the design and construction of approved aircraft on time: for duralumin aircraft, etc. Sukhoi, wooden - T. Neman and mixed - T. Polikarpov.”

The TTT for the attack reconnaissance aircraft was approved in February 1937.

During the design process, the aircraft received the code "Ivanov". To increase combat survivability, in March they decided to replace the AM-34FRN engine (1200 hp) with an M-25 or M-62 engine.

Aircraft SZ-2 M-62

In May 1937, the model of the “Ivanov” or “Stalin’s Task” (SZ) aircraft, built at plant No. 156, was approved.

On July 25, 1937, the Defense Committee (DC) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved a plan for experimental aircraft construction for 1937-1938. Among other tasks, the teams of P.O. Sukhoi (plant No. 156), N.N. Polikarpov (plant No. 21) and I.G. Neman (plant No. 135) were assigned to design and build Ivanov aircraft with an M-25 engine (775 hp). Each of the designers was required to create four variants of the aircraft (reconnaissance aircraft, attack aircraft, bomber and escort). The vehicles were released for state testing in September 1937.

On August 25, 1937, test pilot M.M. Gromov made the first flight on a Sukhoi SZ-1 aircraft with an M-62 engine (1000 hp).

By this time, in the design bureau of N.N. Polikarpov, due to the heavy workload of other work, there was a significant backlog on the Ivanov aircraft, and the team of I.G. Neman received a five-month delay associated with the construction of the KhAI-5 (R-10) aircraft ).

The first flights revealed good stability and controllability of the SZ-1 aircraft. The car turned out to be simple and easy to pilot.

On September 18, while performing a task to determine horizontal speeds at altitudes, the landing gear retraction and extension system failed. Test pilot M.Yu. Alekseev landed on the right extended support, as a result the plane crashed. The following were damaged: the propeller, the engine and the rear center section spar.

Flights resumed on November 22, 1937. From December 1937 to January 1938, the aircraft's equipment was modified and installed on a ski chassis.

At the end of January, factory flight tests were stopped due to a breakdown of the M-62 engine. The new engine was installed only in November 1938.

On November 25, during a test flight, the engine failed again; test pilot of plant No. 156 V.T. Sakhranov managed to land the plane without damage. After replacing the engine, preparations began for the SZ-1 aircraft for state tests, but a ban on flights with the M-62 followed.

In December 1937, construction of the SZ-2 aircraft with the M-62 engine was completed. At the beginning of January 1938, the car was transported by rail to Yevpatoriya for joint state tests.

On January 29, 1938, test pilot of the Research Institute of the Red Army Air Force, military engineer 2nd rank K.A. Kalilets, took the SZ-2 aircraft into the air. Then, to prepare the vehicle for state tests, flights were carried out for three weeks to select a propeller and fine-tune the propeller-motor group (VMG).

During state tests from February 21 to March 26, 1938, flight characteristics were taken, the tactical properties of the aircraft were revealed, and weapons and equipment were tested.

At the conclusion of the report on state tests of the SZ-2 aircraft, it was noted that:

"1. The Ivanov aircraft designed by engineer P.O. Sukhoi, produced by plant No. 156, satisfies the basic 111 of 1937 with the exception of the maximum speed at the design altitude (403 km/h instead of 420-430 km/h) and the ceiling (7700 m instead of 9000 m).

2. In terms of maximum speeds, firepower, visibility and defense capability, the Ivanov aircraft has advantages over the R-10 and BSh-1 aircraft accepted for supply to the Red Army Air Force.

3. By fine-tuning the VMG with the same motor, the maximum speed should be brought to the value specified by III.

4. By modifying the aircraft by installing a more powerful engine without significant modifications to the design, the maximum speed can be increased from the M-87 to 450 km/h, from the M-88 to 475-500 km/h at the design altitude.

5. Based on the above, the aircraft can be recommended for serial production to replace the Valti aircraft, taking into account the similarity of the technological process for manufacturing parts..."

After completing state tests, the SZ-2 aircraft was sent to plant No. 156 to replace the M-62 engine, which had exhausted its service life.

The new motor was installed only at the end of July. On August 3, 1938, the SZ-2 plane crashed due to the failure of the M-62 engine.

At the beginning of July 1938, employees of the design bureau P.O. Sukhoi: D.A. Romeiko-Gurko, S.N. Strogachev and I.Z. Zaslavsky sent a letter to I.V. Stalin with the following content: “... We, the employees of the design bureau of the head. No. 156, working under the leadership of engineer P. O. Sukhoi, decided to contact you on the issue of a completely intolerable situation with the Ivanov machine designed by Sukhoi.

Having received the Government's order for this machine in January 1937, the bureau staff, at that moment, dispersed through the efforts of Tupolev and

Petlyakov, was reborn around this task. The unity of the designers, and subsequently the plant staff, was greatly facilitated by the naming of this machine “Stalin’s task” - “SZ”, since everyone accepted this task as yours personally.

Despite a number of organizational and technical difficulties and obstacles, the machine was designed and built by August 1937. The bureau team, working with great enthusiasm, tried to put into it all the modern achievements of metal aircraft construction, in order to obtain a simple, cheap mass-produced machine that meets the technical requirements. Due to circumstances beyond the team's control (an emergency landing with a broken engine and the lack of a new one to replace it), the release of the vehicle for state testing was delayed until January 1938. By this time, the second copy of the machine, “SZ-2,” was built, which was submitted for state tests. In order to speed up testing on a wheeled chassis, on the direct instructions of the People's Commissariat Comrade. M.M. Kaganovich, with a great expenditure of effort and money, organized a joint expedition of the Air Force Research Institute and Plant No. 156 to Evpatoria. Due to the exhaustion of engine resources, an incomplete test of the aircraft was carried out, which, however, allowed the Air Force Research Institute to give a positive review in its report on the aircraft from tactical, technical, flight and production points of view and recommend it for serial construction to replace the Vulti.

Based on the positive assessment of the machine, in anticipation of the Government's decision, the design bureau prepared complete drawings for production, having worked on a number of technological aspects. At the same time, by May 1938, drawings of a new, improved version of the machine, the SZ-3, were put into production "with a different engine, taking into account the shortcomings that emerged during testing of the first machines. The development of the latter also continued in terms of improving the propeller-motor group in order to obtain the missing 4-6% of speed.

Continuation of the State. Testing of the SZ-2 machine with an improved propeller-engine group was supposed to take place in May-June after the old engine had been rebuilt or a new one had been received. Exit to the airfield new car"SZ-3" was assigned to July 1938

As a result of hard work, the design bureau promptly submitted the drawings to production and took care of receiving the engine and equipment, thereby ensuring the release of the vehicle on time appointed by the Government. Completion of work on all three aircraft on schedule ensured that the full face of the aircraft with various engines would be revealed during the 1938 flying season.

But, unfortunately, the situation that has recently created at the plant does not allow it to meet the scheduled deadlines and deprives the car of any prospects in the near future. The SZ-1 machine is waiting for a gear motor, the dispatch of which by plant No. 19 was very late, despite a number of promises. The SZ-2 car has just received an engine that was rebuilt after the first stage of the state inspection. tests, but work on it is being carried out at a snail's pace. The SZ-3 machine, which did not make enough progress in May-June, is now completely suspended, without any indication of its completion date.

The complete cessation of work on SZ machines was preceded by a number of alarm signals:

1. At a meeting of shop managers, director Usachev stated that the production of the SZ-3 machine is a secondary task and all efforts should be devoted to building the first copy of the Ivanov machine designed by Polikarpov.

2. Under the priority order, the procurement of parts for “SZ-3” was completely suspended.

3. In the twentieth of June, the plant was visited by the People's Commissar M.M. Kaganovich, who ordered to speed up the production of Polikarpov's machine in order to complete it by July 25. Interpreting this order of the People's Commissar in a peculiar way, the director on the same day at a general meeting of plant workers said that the only work of national importance is the work of Polikarpov's bureau, which created the impression that all the work of the Sukhoi design bureau and the plant workshops on the SZ-3 machine was of no use to anyone. need not.

After the suspension of work on the machine. “SZ-3”, in order to ensure the release date of Polikarpov’s “Ivanov” machine, which was very tense due to the untimely deployment of work on the machine, the installation of parts manufactured for “SZ-3” began on the aircraft. It got to the point that, in order to use the metal slipway of the SZ-3 wing to assemble Polikarpov’s Ivanov wing, the director gave the order to remove the unfinished SZ-3 wing from the slipway. Only the categorical refusal of the leading engineer Rybko to carry out this absurd order saved the frame prepared for sheathing from being rendered unusable as a result of this operation.

All these facts have an extremely painful impact on our team. We are confident that our year and a half work was needed by the country and our vehicle is a good contribution to the defense of our Motherland. We have no doubt that this machine is truly adapted for mass production and even surpasses the Vulti machine in its flight-tactical characteristics and production simplicity, which makes it possible to extremely quickly introduce the machine into series. Therefore, we cannot come to terms with the attitude of the plant management towards our machine and the fate of our team, which is closely connected with it. Plant No. 156, which simultaneously built several heavy and medium-tonnage machines, now suddenly found itself capable of carrying out work on only one medium-tonnage machine, to the detriment of all the others. The Sukhoi Design Bureau is actually deprived of the production base at the plant and is even limited in the construction of prototypes of the machines planned for design. Not only the production, but also the everyday interests of the team are infringed, the main personnel of which work at the plant for 8-12 years. So, when allocating apartments in new buildings, the director did not provide and does not intend to provide a single place for employees of Sukhoi’s bureau who are in dire need of living space.

Objectively, there is every possibility of friendly, joint work of several design teams on the basis of one powerful pilot plant to equip our air fleet with new material. In the interests of the common cause, Sukhoi's bureau shares its experience with Polikarpov's team and provided it with drawings of a number of units of the SZ machine, which were fully used. But in the person of chief designer Polikarpov, the Sukhoi Bureau does not meet reciprocity. Despite the lack of reasons on the part of engineer P. O. Sukhoi, an extremely modest person who does not claim an exclusive position at the plant, recent practice and the policy of clamping down does not leave hope for the normal work of the two teams within the plant and even casts doubt on the possibility of testing the machine "SZ-3" until the end of the summer season.

Aircraft SZ-3 M-87A

A way out of this situation could be the transfer of Sukhoi's bureau to another plant. We think that if the Government resolves favorably the issue of introducing the SZ machine into the series, for the further development of both this and new designs of our bureau and their rapid introduction into the series, it would be advisable to transfer the Sukhoi bureau to a serial plant adapted for mechanized production and having a good experienced workshop. It is clear that such a transition does not relieve plant No. 156 of the obligation to quickly complete the projects started by our bureau and, at first, to carry out a whole series of experimental work on new bureau designs.

Seeing no opportunity within the plant and even the First Directorate of NKOP to find a solution to the issues that deeply concern us, we ask you, dear Joseph Vissarionovich, to say your weighty, wise word about the fate of our machine and our team, always ready to devote all their strength, knowledge and experience to the implementation any of your tasks..."

A special sector of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) forwarded the letter to the CO under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. The acting chief inspector under the Council of People's Commissars, G.P. Leshukov, was sent to plant No. 156.

A memorandum by G.P. Leshukov, with the conclusion: “At plant No. 156, a clearly unhealthy situation has been created that requires the intervention of the Defense Committee” and with the resolution of the Chairman of the Defense Committee V.M. Molotov: “t. Kaganovich. I ask you to look into the affairs of plant No. 156 and report on the measures taken,” was sent to the NKOP USSR. As one would expect, everything was limited only to a change in the management of plant No. 156.

On November 3, 1938, test pilot A.P. Chernavsky made the first flight on an SZ-3 aircraft with an M-87 engine (950 hp).

Factory flight tests have begun. According to the conclusion of A.P. Chernavsky: “The general impression of the aircraft is good. Compared to SZ-1, the take-off run has been reduced. The glide path has been increased, the ailerons have been lightened, and the speed has been increased.”

Before submitting for state testing, at the request of the Air Force, the M-87 engine was replaced with the M-87A.

On November 25, during the next test flight (with an operating time of 3 hours), the M-87A engine failed.

On December 28, 1938, after a test flight with a new engine, the SZ-3 aircraft was transferred to the Air Force Research Institute for state testing. In January 1939, the disassembled car was transported by rail to Yevpatoria. Testing began on February 3, 1939.

On March 28, 1939, People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov and People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry M.M. Kaganovich sent a letter to V.M. Molotov. It noted that:

“The single-engine two-seater Ivanov aircraft, designed by engineer Sukhoi, is an attack reconnaissance aircraft and a light bomber. In March 1938, it passed state tests with the M-62 engine.

Currently undergoing state tests with the M-87 engine in Evpatoria...

The design of the aircraft being tested is all-metal. Production aircraft will be produced with a wooden fuselage, with a subsequent transition in series to a wooden wing with a steel spar...

The Ivanov aircraft with the M-87A, in terms of its flight performance and firepower, is significantly superior to the same type of aircraft in our service (R-zet M-34RN and R-10 M-25V).

Considering the good performance of the Ivanov aircraft with the M-87A, we ask for permission to accept it into service with the Red Army and organize serial production of these aircraft at the Sarcombine plant.

Measures to set up production and release aircraft from the Sarcombine plant will be presented within 20 days.”

“The People's Commissariat of Aviation Industry should organize the production and production of the Ivanov aircraft designed by Comrade Sukhoi at the Sarcombine and 135 (Kharkov) factories.

Submit to the KO within 10 days a detailed action plan ensuring the serial production of aircraft and the size of the order for 1939.”

At the beginning of April 1939, due to a landing gear failure, state tests of the SZ-3 aircraft were interrupted at the final stage. The car was sent to Moscow for repairs. Based on the test results, a report was drawn up, in the conclusion of which it was noted that:

"1. The Ivanov aircraft with the M-87A engine passed state tests satisfactorily.

Aircraft BB-1 M-87B

2. Recommend that the Ivanov aircraft be adopted by the Red Army Air Force as a light bomber, with the possibility of using it as an attack aircraft and short-range reconnaissance aircraft in a mixed design (wooden fuselage and metal wings) with M-87A and M-88 engines.

3. To propose to the PGU NKAP by 1.1 J.39 to produce the first series of aircraft in the amount of 10 copies for military testing, which will be completed by 1.01.40.

4. By 1.06.39, plant No. 156 should present the Ivanov aircraft with M-88 to the Air Force Research Institute for testing.”

In May 1939, a draft pilot construction plan for 1939-40 was ready. Due to the fact that the approval of the plan was delayed, the NKAP PSU sent unapproved tasks to production organizations. By this time, serial production of the Ivanov aircraft with the M-87A was planned to be launched only at plant No. 135, and at Sarkombine (SZK) it was planned to produce the Sh aircraft by S.A. Kocherigin.

To provide technical assistance to the serial plant, the plan provided for the appointment of P.O. Sukhoi (part-time) as temporary acting chief designer of plant No. 135, while retaining his design bureau and production base at plant No. 156. And it was planned to send D.A. Romeiko-Gurko to plant No. 135 as deputy chief designer.

On July 29, 1939, government decrees approved a plan for experimental aircraft construction for 1939-40.

The resolution “On the creation of modified and new experimental bombers, attack aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft in 1939” and the order of the NKAP dated August 4, 1939 prescribed:

“... 7. To the Head of the First Main Directorate of the NKAP, Comrade Lukin, Director of Plant No. 135, Comrade. Neustadt and the chief designer comrade. Sukhoi installed the M-88 engine on the second prototype of the BB-1 aircraft, presenting it for state tests in August of this year.

2. Install the M-63TK engine on the BB-1 aircraft and submit it for state tests in September 1939.

3. Design and build the BB-2 attack bomber with the M-88 and submit it for state tests in September 1939...”

Resolution "On the introduction into mass production of modified bombers, attack aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft in 1939-40" and by order of the NKAP dated August 4, 1939, the management of the NKAP PGU and the director of plant No. 135 were instructed to:

"1. ...to introduce into production the BB-1 aircraft with a wooden fuselage and a metal wing with an M-87A designed by Comrade. Sukhoi (short-range bomber)

Provide for the possibility of installing four wing-mounted ShK AS machine guns to use this aircraft in an assault version.

2. Rebuild the plant's production to produce BB-1 aircraft with the M-87A engine and launch production according to design drawings, without waiting for the end of state tests of an aircraft with a wooden fuselage in such a way as to produce 10 aircraft in 1939, and completely switch over in 1940 for the production of these aircraft, ensuring preparation of production for the production of 500 aircraft in 1940.

All further modifications of the BB-1 aircraft should be carried out in the experimental workshop of plant No. 135.

3. Chief designer comrade. Sukhoi, with the entire team of his design bureau, will be transferred to plant No. 135 in the city within a month and a half. Kharkov, placing at his disposal the entire experimental base of plant No. 135 and appointing him as chief designer of plant No. 135...”

In August 1939, the BB-1 (SZ-3) aircraft with the M-87A successfully passed joint state spin tests.

In mid-September, the M-87B engine was installed on it and on September 19 the plane made a flight along the Chkalovskaya - Kharkov route.

At Plant No. 135, test pilots from the Air Force Research Institute from September 29 to October 3, 1939 conducted state tests of the aircraft for stability, range and maneuverability in bomber, attack aircraft and reconnaissance variants. At the conclusion of the test report it was noted:

"1. The aircraft...in the operational center of gravity range of 22 - 24% of the CV has good static and dynamic longitudinal stability and insufficient lateral stability.

2. Large margins of longitudinal static stability in the presence of dynamic longitudinal stability distinguish the Ivanov aircraft designed by Sukhoi in a better way compared to other domestic aircraft.

3. To increase the lateral stability of the aircraft, it is necessary to increase the transverse V of the wing...”

October 4, 1939, i.e. two months after the approval of the experimental work plan for 1939-40, the head of the Red Army Air Force, commander of the 2nd rank A.D. Loktionov, in a letter addressed to the People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry, reported:

"1. ...Due to the failure to provide apartments in Kharkov, Comrade Sukhoi’s design bureau is still located in Moscow.

The current situation leads to the collapse of the team of Comrade Sukhoi’s design bureau, because KB employees receive offers to move to work in other places and stay in Moscow. As a consequence of this situation, work on Comrade Sukhoi’s prototype aircraft is being carried out extremely poorly.

2. ...the BB-2 aircraft with the M-88 was to be presented by plant No. 135 for state tests in September 1939.

The aircraft is currently at plant No. 156. No work is being done on it. The overall readiness of the aircraft is 45-50%. Due to the current circumstances, it is advisable to complete the construction of the BB-2 aircraft with the M-88 at plant No. 156; this event will speed up the production time of the aircraft.

3. ...the Sukhoi BB-1 aircraft with the M-88 was supposed to be presented by plant No. 135 for state tests in August this year. d. The government's decision has not been implemented, because The motor was received only in September.

4. ...the BB-1 aircraft with the M-63TK should be presented by plant No. 135 for state tests in September of this year. The deadline was missed due to a turbocharger failure. ...

The Military Council of the Red Army Air Force asks you to take the necessary measures on the listed objects."

In his response letter, M.M. Kaganovich confirmed that the facts indicated in the letter were true and listed the measures being taken. But, unfortunately, this situation with the implementation of the pilot construction plan by the end of the year has not changed.

In January 1940, the leadership of the NKAP was updated. The reason for this was the serious omissions he made in his work.

Apparently, a change in the leadership of the industry and the hope for help from him prompted P.O. Sukhoi to write a letter to Deputy People's Commissar A.S. Yakovlev. The message noted that the conditions in which the team’s work takes place create a threat of failure to fulfill the plan and lead to the collapse of the design bureau.

In this situation, P.O. Sukhoi asked for assistance in providing housing and retaining a number of design bureau employees who announced their resignation.

A month later, in his next message to the Deputy People's Commissar, Pavel Osipovich said that in the design bureau's plan there are a number of objects, the production of which on time and with the proper quality at the KB-135 pilot production is not possible. And the work on introducing the BB-1 aircraft into mass production, which requires the presence of the entire team at plant No. 135, has already been completed. Considering these circumstances, P.O. Sukhoi asked to provide his team with one of the Moscow production bases.

On March 4, 1940, the KO under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR ordered the People's Commissariat for Aviation Industry to organize an experimental aircraft manufacturing plant on the basis of KB-29 NKAP (Kaliningrad, Moscow region), based on the production of two experimental aircraft and 10-15 zero-series aircraft per year. Transfer the entire composition of the P.O. Sukhoi design bureau from plant No. 135 to the experimental aircraft manufacturing plant, appointing Pavel Osipovich as the chief designer of this plant and assign it to the specified plant No. 289.

In September 1939, after receiving the M-88 engine, they began installing it on the BB-1 (SZ-3) aircraft, while some changes were made to the design of the machine: they removed the hatch machine-gun installation, changed the configuration of the suction pipe, changed the location of the oil cooler and carried out a number of other works.

For joint state testing of the aircraft, by order of the Air Force Research Institute dated November 20, 1939, a working group was appointed. From plant No. 135 - chief designer P.O. Sukhoi, design engineer D.A. Romeiko-Gurko, leading engineer Vechura, motor equipment engineer E.S. Felsner, aerodynamic engineer I.E. Baslavsky, from the Air Force Research Institute - leading engineer 3rd rank military engineer A.V. Sinelnikov, leading pilot Major B.N. Pokrovsky, senior military engineer 1st rank Pavlov.

During testing from November 1939 to April 30, 1940, 44 flights were completed with a flight time of 1 6 hours 45 minutes. Due to failure, three M-88 engines were replaced. The tests were completed on the fourth engine, in the oil filter of which chips were discovered after the last flight.

The conclusion of the test report noted:

"1. The BB-1 aircraft with the M-88 engine, which is necessary for arming the Air Force, cannot be approved for normal operation in combat units of the Air Force due to the lack of development of the propeller-engine group.

Slow work on introducing the BB-1 into combat units... could lead to the aircraft becoming obsolete in the process of its production and development...

3. The maximum speeds of the BB-1 aircraft with the M-88 engine, 375 km/h at the ground and 476 km/h at the second altitude limit, remained almost the same as on the BB-1 aircraft with the M-87 engine...”

To eliminate these shortcomings it was proposed:

Plant No. 135 should bring the VMG up to speed in the shortest possible time and submit it for control tests, and, in addition, bring the aircraft speed to the design speed (495 km/h);

Plant No. 29 should ensure normal operation of the M-88 engine with a service life of at least 100 hours;

Plant 150, together with plant No. 135, will carry out work on selecting a propeller for the aircraft.

After finishing work on the VMG, it was planned to carry out control tests on the production aircraft to measure flight characteristics.

At the end of May 1940, the BB-1 M-88 (SZ-3) aircraft flew from Kharkov to the Ramenskoye airfield, where until the end of the year, plant No. 289 carried out fine-tuning of the VMG and a number of other systems.

In parallel with the SZ-3, the SZ-1 aircraft was also tested. At the beginning of March 1940, a new M-63TK engine was installed on it, and test pilot A.I. Kalyuzhny began factory tests. Development of the VMG continued until June 1940, and then the aircraft was transferred to plant No. 289 and was used as a flying laboratory for testing various units. The aircraft was not included in the experimental aircraft production plan for 1941.

The delay in serial production of the BB-1 M-87 (M-88) aircraft, to which I.V. Stalin attached special importance, forced the government to connect factories No. 31 (Taganrog) and No. 207 (Dolgoprudny, Moscow) to its production. region), as well as speed up the start of production at plant No. 135. This decision was legitimized by resolutions of the CO under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated February 19, 1940 and May 4, 1940.

In March 1940, Plant No. 135 began serial production of BB-1 aircraft with M-87 and M-88 engines.

In May, military tests of six BB-1 aircraft with M-88 zero and first series began at the Kharkov airfield. The flight technical personnel of the 135th aviation regiment of the Air Force and the combat use regiment of the Research Institute of GUAS KA, combined into a separate test group, took part in the tests. Tests were carried out from May 17 to June 20, 1940. A total of 616 flights were performed with a total flight time of 157 hours.

Aircraft BB-1 M-88B

In the summer of 1940, the following people arrived in Kharkov for an inspection: Deputy Chief of the Air Force, Aviation Lieutenant General P.V. Rychagov, and Head of the Research Institute of GUAS (GU Air Force) of the Air Force, Major General of Aviation A.I. Filin. The purpose of the inspection was to examine “the state of construction at plant No. 135 and operation in combat units of the Kharkov Military District of BB-1 aircraft with the M-88 engine.” Based on the results of the survey, a memorandum was drawn up addressed to the People's Commissar of Defense. It noted that:

“... During the inspection, control flights were carried out by Lieutenant General of Aviation Comrade Rychagov, Major General of Aviation Comrade Filin and test pilot Major Comrade Stefanovsky; In addition, pilots of the 135th Air Regiment carried out flights with bomb loads of 400 and 700 kg. The takeoff of the BB-1 aircraft with a load of 700 kg occurred normally.

The examination confirmed the presence of a number of significant positive aspects of the aircraft, previously noted by state and military tests of BB-1 aircraft:

1. Relatively simple qualities of the aircraft in terms of piloting technique.

2. Powerful bomb armament - in the normal version the aircraft takes up to 500 kg of bombs of caliber from 1 kg to 250 kg and in the overload version, tested in military tests, up to 700 kg.

3. Good firepower of the aircraft in the attack aircraft version:

a) 4 wing-mounted ShKAS 7.62 mm machine guns with a reserve of 850 cartridges per machine gun;

b) 1 turret machine gun with a reserve of 1000 cartridges;

c) 144 bombs of caliber from 7 to 2.5 kg or 30 bombs of caliber from 8 to 20 kg.

Instead of bombs, it is possible to install chemical weapons - two VAP-200.

4. Maximum horizontal speed of the aircraft

at the ground - 375 km/h

at an altitude of 6600 m - 467 km/h...

...The military tests confirmed the inadequacy of the propeller-engine group of the BB-1 aircraft with the M-88 engine and revealed insufficient strength of the landing gear, wheels and pneumatics, which does not allow the normal operation of the aircraft in combat units.

Currently, flights in units on BB-1 aircraft with the M-88 engine have been stopped due to the fragility of the landing gear and pneumatics.

Plant No. 135 has brought the oil temperature to a satisfactory state, which will be finally verified by additional tests at the Air Force Research Institute of Spacecraft.

To ensure normal operation of the BB-1 aircraft with the M-88 engine in combat units of the Red Army Air Force, it is necessary to require the NKAP to carry out the following measures:

1. Strengthen the shock absorber strut and upper landing gear strut and install them on all previously produced aircraft.

2. Strengthen the wheels and pneumatics.

3. Ensure completely reliable operation of the M-88 engine.

4. Eliminate oil from the sight and the navigator’s lower hatch.

5. Oblige the chief designer Comrade Sukhoi to personally supervise the development of the BB-1 aircraft and the elimination of defects at plant No. 135.

For 1941, it is necessary to demand from the chief designer of the BB-1 aircraft, T. Sukhoi and plant No. 135:

1. Installation of slats on the BB-1 aircraft.

2. Increase in transverse V.

3. Installation of the tail wheel according to the type of Messerschmidt 109 aircraft and installation of the crutch stopper.

4. Increasing the release time of the shields to 6-8 seconds.

5. Working out the normal increase in overloads on the rudders by setting “aerodynamic” play in the elevator and friction in the ailerons.

6. Work out the installation for hanging one 500 kg bomb.

7. Bring the aircraft speeds to the design speeds.

8. Work on the issue of using the BB-1 aircraft for dive bombing.”

In December 1940, in accordance with government decree, fifteen samples of new combat aircraft received the designations: Ar-2, Er-2, Il-2, LaGG-1, LaGG-3, MiG-1, MiG-3, Pe-2 , Yak-1, Yak-2, Yak-3, Yak-4, Yak-5, Yak-7, and the BB-1 M-88 aircraft became known as the Su-2.

By the end of 1940, Plant No. 135 produced 110 Su-2 aircraft, against the plan of 275; plant No. 31 - 12, with a plan of 100; Plant No. 207 - 3, with a plan of 25. The shortage of aircraft disrupted the plan for the formation and training of combat units of the Air Force.

The main reasons for failure to fulfill the supply plan were:

Unsatisfactory supply of factories with equipment, materials and finished products;

The hood of the production aircraft Su-2 M-88B

Cowl of a modified Su-2 M-88B aircraft

Modified Su-2 M-88B aircraft with TSS-1

Slowness in preparing production and mastering new technologies;

Unsatisfactory state of production cooperation between factories.

At the end of 1940, in connection with the transition to mass production of LaGG-3 fighters, plant No. 31 stopped producing Su-2 aircraft. In January-February 1941, parts, assemblies and equipment for the Su-2 aircraft were transferred to plant No. 207.

In December 1940, Plant No. 135 presented two production Su-2 M-88B aircraft (Nos. 16/2 and 20/2) to the Air Force Research Institute for state testing. During testing from December 2, 1940 to March 17, 1941, 4 M-88B engines were replaced on aircraft No. 16/2.

In the conclusion of the Act based on the test results, it was noted that:

“1. The temperature regimes of the VMG on the serial Su-2 M-88B after its conversion by plant No. 135 still remain unfinished. ...

4. By 05/01/41, carry out control tests at plant No. 135 to measure the flight characteristics of the Su-2 M-88B.”

In the period from February 13 to March 1, 1941, the Research Institute of the Air Force KA conducted state tests of the modified Su-2 M-88B aircraft (No. 1/6) produced by plant No. 135.

Unlike the serial Su-2 M-88B, on plane No. 1/6 the profile of the engine cowling, the shape of the suction pipe and propeller spinner were changed, and the oil cooler was moved to the wing center section. To create a “reactive effect,” the shape of the exhaust pipe was changed. The rear MV-5 gun mount was replaced with a TSS-1 mount. We installed an L-shaped antenna with a shortened mast. In order to select a propeller, tests were carried out with VISH-23 and VISH-23-7 propellers.

On March 18, 1941, the head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force, Aviation Lieutenant General P.V. Rychagov, approved the Act based on the results of state tests. His conclusion noted that:

"1. The modified Su-2 M-88 B... state tests passed satisfactorily, showing fairly good flight-tactical data.

2. A preliminary positive conclusion on the modified aircraft was already given on February 28, 1941. It is necessary to accelerate the introduction of this aircraft with a VISH-23-7 propeller with blade angles of 22-42 °, with the obligatory elimination of defects in the VMG, TSS-1 installation and radio equipment .

3. Consider the M-88 and M-88B engines to be undeveloped for reliable operation in Air Force combat units. Require plant No. 29 to ensure reliable operation of the engine in operation on an aircraft with a service life of at least 100 hours.

4. Oblige the chief designer and plant No. 135 to present a modified Su-2 M-88B No. 1/6 aircraft with eliminated defects specified in the conclusions of this act for control state tests at the Research Institute of the Air Force KA by March 25, 1941.”

Su-2 as an artillery spotter

On March 29, aircraft No. 1/6 was presented for state control tests, which continued intermittently until the end of June 1941. According to their results, TSS-1 did not pass the test and was removed from mass production. The development of the VMG did not provide normal temperature conditions either.

Considering the M-89 engine (1300 hp) as an alternative to the M-88 engine, the government, by a decree of January 20, 1941, obliged the director of plant No. 135, Yu.N. Karpov and chief designer P.O. Sukhoi “... to work out the VMG and conduct an air test of engine 89 on a Su-2 aircraft by April 15, 1941...”.

During the period from May 5 to June 28, 1941, test pilot A.P. Deev completed a factory test program on the Su-2 M-89 production aircraft (No. 13016).

After these tests were completed, the aircraft was transferred to plant No. 289 for installation of the M-89B engine (with direct injection), and then factory tests began at the LII NKAP airfield. They were not completed due to the evacuation of plant No. 289. At the beginning of 1942, aircraft No. 13016 was converted into an artillery spotter and transferred to the Air Force.

It is appropriate to note that in November 1941, an M-89F engine was mounted on one of the production Su-2s and transferred to the Air Force Research Institute for joint state tests.

At the beginning of July 1941, P.O. Sukhoi, in a letter addressed to Deputy People's Commissar P.V. Dementyev, said that: “The Su-2 M-89 aircraft in factory tests showed a speed at the ground of 415 km/h and at an altitude of 6800 m -514 km/h; respectively, the speeds of the Su-2 M-88 aircraft are 407 km/h and 512 km/h.

The expected speed of the Su-2 M-89 at altitude is 525 km/h. The reasons for the lack of speed are clarified by repeated flights; in addition, Comb. No. 150 sends a new propeller for the aircraft.

But regardless of the results of refinement of factory tests, I consider it necessary to report that at present, in my opinion, it is inappropriate to disrupt the production cycle of plants No. 135 and 29 by switching to the M-89, since the increase in speed is not justified by the delay in production.

Taking into account signals from squadrons operating at the front, it is necessary to increase the production of M-88 to ensure timely replacement of engines in units, because There are indications of a decrease in engine power after 40 hours of operation. Obviously, the M-89, being more powerful, will be no better in this regard than the M-88. At the same time, there is reason to expect that the M-82 will be more reliable in operation.

Taking into account the above, I believe that at the moment it is necessary to delay the transition of the Su-2 series of aircraft to M-89 engines and resolve the issue after the completion of tests of the Su-2 M-82.”

People's Commissar A.I. Shakhurin agreed with these arguments and in August 1941 turned to the Chairman of the State Defense Committee (GKO) of the USSR I.V. Stalin for permission to delay the introduction of the Su-2 M-89 aircraft into the series.

In August 1941, Deputy People's Commissar P.V. Voronin gave instructions to the heads of factories No. 135 and 289: “In connection with the cessation in the third quarter of this year. production of M-88 engines, I propose to use the 96 M-89 engines available at the plant to ensure serial production of the Su-2 at plant No. 135, before switching to the M-82 installation.

Urgently carry out the necessary measures to ensure the installation of these engines on the aircraft.”

Back on May 13, 1941, the People's Commissariat of Aviation Industry issued an order to install the M-82 engine on the I-185, Yak-1 (Yak-3), Su-2, MiG-3, DIS-200 and “103” aircraft. The Su-2 M-82 aircraft was released for flight testing on July 1, 1941.

Design and production work was completed on time. The aircraft was tested in July at the airfield of plant No. 289, and in August-October, on a special assignment from the deputy. People's Commissar V.P. Kuznetsov - in the LII of the NKAP.

Due to unreliable operation and the difficulty of adjusting the carburetor, the tests were delayed. About 80 flights were performed just to select the carburetor. During testing, three engines, six carburetors and a number of other units were replaced. Flight characteristics were measured with two types of propellers.

Ahead of events, I would like to note that this aircraft (Su-2 M-82) was evacuated to Kazan, where it was used to take sketches of the VMG, which was later used on the TB-7 (Pe-8) aircraft.

In accordance with the order of the NKAP dated August 10, 1941, to ensure the production of Su-2 M-82 aircraft, it was prescribed:

"1. The chief designer of plant No. 289, T. Sukhoi, to work out and conduct all flight tests of the Su-2 aircraft with the M-82 engine by August 20, 1941 and transfer the drawings of the necessary alterations for installing the M-82 engine on the Su-2 aircraft to plants No. 135 and 207 to August 12, 1941

2. The director of plant No. 135, T. Kuzin, must ensure the production of five Su-2 aircraft with M-82 by September 1, 1941.

3. The director of plant No. 135, T. Kuzin, and the director of plant No. 207, T. Gorin, should begin preparing the serial production of the Su-2 with the M-82, ensuring their serial production from September 10, 1941...”

Su-2 M-82 aircraft

Su-2 M-82 on a ski chassis

Su-2 at front-line airfields

The M-82 engine was adopted by the KA Air Force at the end of September 1941.

Meanwhile, serial production of the Su-2 M-88 aircraft continued. Plant No. 135 successfully coped with the task, exceeding the plan almost every month. Plant No. 207, having received a backlog of 33 almost finished aircraft and 80 sets of aircraft parts from Factory No. 31 at the beginning of 1941, fulfilled the production plan 100% until April 1941. But since May, the percentage of completion of the production program began to gradually decline and by July reached 39%. This situation with the implementation of the plan at plant No. 207, according to the head of orders and armaments of the Main Directorate of the Air Force, was “as a result of the lack of day-to-day organizational and technical leadership on the part of the plant management...”

On June 22, 1941, the day of Nazi Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union, there were 213 Su-2 aircraft at front-line airfields. Of these: 75 - on the Western Front, 11 4 - on the Southwestern Front and 24 - in the 9th Separate Army (ODVO).

The experience of the first days of the war revealed the need for additional protection for the navigator. On August 11, 1941, the NKAP ordered the head of the NKAP PGU and the directors of plants No. 135 and 207 to:

“...and from August 15, 1941, to produce all Su-2 aircraft with armor protection for the navigator, consisting of sheets of cemented steel 8.5 mm thick;

b) to maintain the alignment and payload of the aircraft, from August 15, 1941, produce all aircraft without a walkie-talkie and radio semi-compasses...”

In July and September 1941, the production Su-2 aircraft (No. 070403), armed with ten RS-132 and RS-82 missiles, was tested at the Air Force aviation weapons research and testing site (NIP AV VVS KA). According to the conclusion of the NIP AV VVS KA, the missile launcher for the RS-82 with the possibility of switching to the RS-132 on the Su-2 aircraft has passed field tests.

Fairing of the Su-2 gargrot in the raised position

Fairing of the Su-2 garrot in the lowered position

In October 1941, the head of the South State Air Forces of the Spacecraft, brigengenger Ya.L. Bibikov, addressing P.A. Voronin, asked: “...to give instructions:

1. To the chief designer of plant No. 289, comrade. Sukhoi to transfer to plant No. 135 the drawings for a rocket launcher for the RS-82 with changes made to them based on the results of field tests.

2. Director of plant No. 135 comrade. Cousin from November 1st. d. introduce a missile launcher for the RS-82 into series and produce all Su-2 aircraft equipped with these launchers..."

In order to identify the possibility of using the Su-2 aircraft as a reconnaissance-spotter of artillery fire, in the period from August 15 to 19, 1941, tests of the serial Su-2 M-88B aircraft produced by plant No. 207 were carried out at the airfield of the Research Institute of the Air Force KA. The conclusions from the test results noted that:

"1. The Su-2 aircraft, being a short-range bomber, despite some inconveniences in observation (front hemisphere), can be used in artillery aviation for the purposes of enemy reconnaissance, aerial photography and artillery fire correction.

2. The speed range of 220-450 km/h and sufficient armament (6 machine guns) allow the Su-2 aircraft to carry out artillery missions, both from its own location and by flying into the enemy’s location.

3. To create greater convenience in the operation of the flight laboratory and the possibility of installing aerial photographic equipment on the aircraft (except AFA-13), it is necessary to make changes:

Install the OPB optical sight;

Place a flare gun with colored flares and a tablet device for adjusting the artillery fire of the PUAOS.

In addition, replace the suspended seat of the letnab with a rigid reclining seat with height adjustment.

Disadvantages: the right side gets splashed with oil during long-term operation...”

In September, by order of P.A. Voronin, plant No. 207 began supplying the troops with Su-2 aircraft equipped as a reconnaissance and artillery fire spotter. Before the evacuation began, plant No. 207 handed over 18 vehicles to the unit.

At the beginning of October, due to the approach of the front to Moscow, the evacuation of the capital's enterprises and institutions began. Plant No. 289 was evacuated to Molotov (Perm) and merged with the evacuated plant. No. 135, which included evacuated factories No. 207, 450, 472, 480.

On November 19, 1941, the State Defense Committee of the USSR adopted a resolution according to which plant No. 135 was to begin serial production of the Il-2 M-82 armored attack aircraft from February 15, 1942. At the same time, Plant No. 135 was allowed to produce a certain number of Su-2 aircraft, limited by the available reserve. As a result, the plant produced 15 Su-2 aircraft in December 1941, and 40 in January-February 1942. Of these, 36 were with the M-82 engine, 2 were M-88, 2 were M-89.

In total, in 1941, Plant No. 135 produced 625 Su-2 aircraft, against the plan of 1068; plant No. 207 - 89, with a plan of 115; Plant No. 31 - 4 aircraft.

According to the Air Force Main Directorate, from June 22 to December 23, 1941, the losses of Su-2 aircraft amounted to 205 units. Of these: shot down in air battles - 50; shot down by anti-aircraft artillery -14; destroyed at airfields - 9;

did not return from a combat mission -103; non-combat losses - 29.

By decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR of January 21, 1942, plant No. 135 was disbanded, and specialists and equipment were distributed to plants No. 23, 30, 381.

By decision of the NKAP, plant No. 289 began to be restored as an independent economic unit.

On February 25, 1942, the production Su-2 M-82 aircraft No. 15116 was presented for state testing.

Until April 24, test pilot of the Air Force Research Institute Captain S.M. Korobov performed 35 flights on the aircraft, 23 of them with ski landing gear. The total flight time was 22 hours 15 minutes.

The conclusions of the report on state tests noted that: “The installation of the M-82 engine with a rated ground power of 1400 hp on the Su-2 aircraft, instead of the previously installed M-88B engine with a rated ground power of 950 hp, significantly increased flight performance aircraft data..."

At the same time, a number of shortcomings were identified both in the aircraft and in the power plant.

In March-June 1942, Su-2 aircraft with M-82 engines were tested in combat conditions. According to the assessment of the flight crew: “The Su-2 M-82 aircraft is significantly superior in its flight performance to the same aircraft with the M-88 both in speed, maneuverability and bomb load.

... The M-82 engine tolerates depletion of lubricant in its rubbing parts quite reliably. In case of damage to the oil system, flying for 2-3 minutes without pressure does not entail destruction of the engine ... "

The production aircraft Su-2 M-88 (M-82) was a two-seat monoplane of mixed design with a low wing.

The fuselage is a wooden monocoque, made without technological connectors. The power frame consisted of 20 frames, four spars, stringers and skin laminated from birch veneer. A welded truss frame was attached to the front frame, on which the piston engine was located.

The crew cabin was located in the middle part of the fuselage. The pilot's cockpit was covered with a sliding transparent canopy, behind which was attached the navigator's turret fairing with a folding visor. Under the floor of the pilot's cabin there was a bomb bay. The hatch in the rear fuselage was intended for emergency escape of the aircraft by the navigator, as well as for the installation of a hatch gun installation.

The cantilever all-metal wing consisted of a center section and two detachable consoles.

The power frame of the center section included two spars, six ribs, two longitudinal walls, stringers and skin. The frame of each wing console consisted of two spars, seventeen ribs, a rear wall, stringers, additional beams in the machine gun compartment and skin. The wing installation angle was 1°30". The transverse V angle of the wing was 6.

The ailerons had a duralumin frame with fabric covering. For weight compensation, a pipe filled with lead was attached to the toe of each aileron. The left aileron had a trimmer. Aileron deflection angles ±25°.

The all-metal landing flaps had four sections, two on the center section and two on detachable wing consoles. The cleaning and release of the shields was carried out using a hydromechanical system. Deflection angles of the shields: - 52°.

The tail included a fin with a rudder and a stabilizer with an elevator.

The removable keel of the all-wood structure consisted of two spars, stringers and ribs, and plywood sheathing. On the rear spar of the keel, a rudder was suspended on two nodes, consisting of a channel section profile to which a skin reinforced with several ribs was riveted. Steering angles ±25е

The cantilever all-metal stabilizer consisted of four channel-section walls, extruded profiles and angles, split ribs and plating. Two halves of the elevator were suspended from the rear of the stabilizer on six nodes. Both halves were connected by a pipe passing through the tail fairing of the fuselage. The elevator frame consisted of a pipe-spar with ribs strung on it. The nose of the steering wheel was sheathed with duralumin, and the rest of the surface was covered with canvas. Elevator deflection angles: ±25°.

The rudder and elevator had trim tabs.

The landing gear is tricycle with a tail wheel. The main supports with brake wheels 750x250 were retracted into the center section and closed with flaps. The 300x125 tail wheel was partially retracted into the fuselage.

The hydraulic system, designed for retracting and releasing the main landing gear and flaps, included: two landing gear power cylinders; shield power cylinder; chassis and flap cranes; pressure reducing valve (25-28kg/cm2); hydraulic pump with electric drive; hydraulic tank and pressure gauges. Hydromixture - 50% alcohol and 50% glycerin. The emergency release of the main supports was performed by the navigator using a winch with a cable transmission. The tail support is retracted and released using a cable transmission connected to the right main landing gear.

Braking of the main wheels was provided by a self-starting pneumatic system, consisting of: a self-starting air cylinder; self-starting manual compressor; shut-off valve; two pressure reducing valves PU-ZK (on the pilot’s pedals); wheel brakes and pressure gauges.

Aircraft control is dual, mixed. The elevator and ailerons had rigid wiring, while the rudder, tail wheel and trim tabs had cable wiring.

Attack bomber BB-2 (ShB)

The power plant consisted of a two-row, star-shaped 14-cylinder air-cooled piston engine M-88, with a maximum power of 1100 hp. and a three-blade propeller VISH-23. The temperature of the cylinder heads was adjusted using the engine hood “skirt” flaps. The oil cooler was placed under the front of the fuselage in a special tunnel with an adjustable damper. Oil tank capacity 55.5 l (50 kg).

The fuel was placed in three tanks. The capacity of the fuselage is 405 l (300 kg), the wing capacity is 175.5 l (130 kg).

Small arms included three ShKAS machine guns of 7.62 mm caliber, two of them were fixedly mounted in detachable wing consoles outside the rotor rotation zone. Ammunition capacity is 900 rounds per machine gun. To protect the rear hemisphere, the navigator mounted a ShKAS machine gun with 1,500 rounds of ammunition on a rotating shielded turret MV-5. Bombs with a caliber of 8-100 kg were suspended on cassette holders in the fuselage bomb bay. The normal bomb load was 400 kg, and the maximum was 600 kg. The internal suspension did not exceed 400 kg. Bombs of 100 and 250 kg could be suspended on external bomb racks.

The main source of direct current electricity was the GS-1000 generator, and the emergency source was the 1 2A30 battery.

Radio equipment - radio station RSB-1 and aircraft intercom (SPU-2).

Instrumentation and aeronautical equipment is a standard set that provides flights in simple and adverse weather conditions.

Photographic equipment - AFA-13 camera.

Flights at high altitude were provided by a set of oxygen equipment.

The main differences between the Su-2 M-82 aircraft and the Su-2 M-88 aircraft:

Installed M-82 engine (1700hp);

VISH-21 propeller installed;

Navigator armor installed;

Machine guns installed: 4 wing ShKAS, 1 turret ShKAS and one hatch ShKAS;

Removed: RSB, RPK-2 and AFA-13.

Basic data of the production aircraft Su-2 M-88B (M-82):

Aircraft length, mm 10250

Wingspan, mm 14300

Wing area, m2 29.0

Aircraft weight, kg:

- empty 2995 (3213)

- flight normal. 4345 (4700)

Maximum speed, km/h:

- near the ground 378 (430)

- at altitude, m 455/4400 (474/3200)

Climb time 5000m, min 12.6 (9.8)

Practical ceiling, m 8900 (8400)

Flight range, km 820 (790)

Run length, m 610 (450)

(Data in brackets refer to the Su-2 M-82 aircraft)

In addition to serial modifications of the Su-2 aircraft, the Sukhoi Design Bureau designed and built modifications of this aircraft, which for one reason or another were not brought to serial production.

On May 5, 1938, the KO under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved a plan for experimental and experimental work on aircraft construction for 1938-39.

One of the points of this plan provided for the creation of a high-speed attack bomber (SB) with an M-88 or M-63 engine in triplicate with delivery dates in June, July and August, respectively.

The work was entrusted to the design department of P.O. Sukhoi. The machine was designed on the basis of the Ivanov (SZ) aircraft built and tested.

Until August 1938, the design of an all-metal aircraft was underway. However, the decision of NKOP to save metal forced the switch to a wooden structure for the fuselage, and later for the entire aircraft.

By the end of the year, the preliminary design was ready, the construction of the model was completed, and 60% of the detailed design was completed.

It was planned to install an M-88 engine on the first copy of the aircraft, an M-80 on the second, and on the basis of the third, P.O. Sukhoi intended to design a single-seat attack aircraft with an M-80 engine.

At the end of 1938, the customer removed the second copy of the aircraft from the M-80 from the 1939 plan, and by mid-1939, the third copy.

On February 22, 1939, the commission approved the model of the ShB aircraft with the M-88. By April, plant No. 156 had produced 50% of the fuselage parts and 40% of the center section, but the lack of wood materials at the plant slowed down the production of the wing. We should also not forget that at plant No. 156, in addition to the team of P.O. Sukhoi Design Bureau was located: N.N. Polikarpov, I.F. Nezvalya, A.P. Golubkova, V.N. Belyaev, Design Bureau of propeller-driven vehicles, torpedo boats and licensed aircraft. Each team had its own projects, the implementation of which was carried out at the pilot production of plant No. 156. All this affected the pace of construction of the ShB aircraft.

ShB at the emergency landing site 06/04/40

ShB at the emergency landing site on November 28, 1940.

The next impetus to speed up work on the ShB M-88 project, designated BB-2, was supposed to be the government-approved experimental aircraft construction plan for 1939-40. But he did not speed up the pace of work on the now only copy of the aircraft. In this situation, the NKAP was forced to file a petition with the Defense Committee to postpone the transfer of the aircraft for state tests from September to the end of 1939. But by the beginning of December 1939, the percentage of readiness of the BB-2 M-88 aircraft was only 45%.

In April 1940, the aircraft was assembled and transferred to the airfield in preparation for factory testing.

On May 25, 1940, test pilot of Plant No. 156, Captain V.T. Sakhranov, took the BB-2 M-88 aircraft into the air for the first time.

On June 4, after completing the flight mission, the landing gear did not extend. Having tried all the release options (main and emergency), captain V.T. Sakhranov landed at the airfield with half-extended struts. The plane received minor damage.

The emergency commission considered the actions of the crew to be correct, and the cause of the accident, in its opinion, was a flaw in the design of the chassis. Deputy Chief Designer D.A. Romeiko-Gurko did not agree with this conclusion of the commission. According to his version, the failure to release the landing gear occurred due to the crew’s poor knowledge of the landing gear operating instructions.

After repairs, testing of the aircraft continued.

On July 16, 1940, while taxiing after landing, captain V.T. Sahranov, inadvertently, removed the landing gear instead of flaps. By order of People's Commissar A.I. Shakhurin, test pilot V.T. Sakhranov was removed from further factory flight tests, and test pilot of the 8th department of TsAGI A.I. Emelyanov was involved in the tests. After the next repair, factory tests continued.

At the beginning of October 1940, plant No. 156 transferred the BB-2 M-88 aircraft to plant No. 289 according to an act.

On October 29, Pavel Osipovich reported to the deputy head of the 7th Main Directorate of the NKAP S.N. Shishkin that: “The BB-2 M-88 aircraft completed factory tests according to the program approved by the 7th Main Directorate.

Due to the discrepancy between the maximum speeds calculated and the flight data, I consider it necessary to continue testing to remove the polarizer and test new propellers and exhaust.

To conduct these flights, a pilot from plant No. 289, T. N.D. Fixon, was assigned.”

On November 27, 1940, the crew consisting of test pilot N.D. Fixon and observer - leading engineer of the 8th department of TsAGI M.D. Sokolov made an emergency landing at the Lipitsa summer airfield, located ten kilometers east of Serpukhov. The reason for the landing was overheating and release of oil with a simultaneous drop in its pressure.

On November 28, the commission of the 8th department of TsAGI examined the aircraft and the engine, and after testing it in all modes, gave permission for the BB-2 aircraft to fly to the Ramenskoye airfield.

An hour after takeoff from the emergency landing site, the M-88 engine began to malfunction, then stopped. The crew made an emergency landing on arable land near the airfield of the SPB-134 military unit (Podolsk region). During landing, the pilot received a facial injury and was sent to the hospital, and the landing gear on the plane was broken, the propeller was bent, the wing consoles, the suction pipe and the oil radiator tunnel were damaged.

The investigation established that the engine stopped due to the complete exhaustion of fuel from the fuselage tank, with a remainder of about 220 liters in the wing tanks. The culprit of the accident is N.D. Fixon.

Apparently, the aircraft was not restored, and by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated April 16, 1941, work on it was stopped.

The design of the BB-2 (ShB) aircraft was somewhat different from the production Su-2 (BB-1) aircraft.

When designing the BB-2, the task was to obtain a design that was simple in mass production, with minimal use of aluminum alloys, replaced by steel and wood.

The fuselage and keel were made entirely of wood.

In the cantilever parts of the wing mixed design, metal was used only in the spars, in the second rib and in the tip. The wing center section also had a mixed design.

The BB-2 aircraft was distinguished by the kinematics of retracting and releasing the main landing gear, which retracted back into the wing center section with the wheels turning at 90 degrees. Subsequently, a similar scheme was used on Su-1, Su-6 aircraft and in a number of other projects.

On March 4, 1940, the KO under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued a resolution “On the modification of the single-engine short-range bomber BB-1 designed by comrade. Sukhoi" obliged the NKAP and the management of plant No. 135:

“...a) Install an M-90 engine with a power of 1500 hp on a single-engine short-range bomber (BB-1). at an altitude of 6000 m. Flight technical data should be as follows:

The maximum speed at an altitude of 7000m is 560 km/h.

Landing speed - 120 km/h.

Range but 0.9 max, speed - 800 km.

Ceiling - 10000 m.

Crew - 2 people.

Armament: 4 7.62mm machine guns forward, 1 7.62mm machine gun on the turret.

Bomb load standard/overload - 400/600 kg.

b) The aircraft should be built in two copies and submitted for state tests within the following time frame: The first copy - by September 1, 1940

While working on the BB-1 M-90 modification project, it received the designation BB-3 M-90 or “MN”. By June 1940, the model of the aircraft was approved, 90% of the working drawings were completed, and readiness for the production of units and parts was approximately determined at 50%. The main delay in the production of drawings and parts was the lack of an M-90 engine.

The lengthy development of the M-90 engine forced the NKAP management to allow the installation of the M-81 engine on the second copy of the BB-3.

In early November, the BB-3 M-81 was transported to the factory airfield, and the design of the BB-3 M-90 was stopped.

On November 29, 1940, test pilot A.P. Deev took the BB-3 M-81 into the air. The next day, during the second flight, the engine failed. The plane was mothballed because... By decision of the government, the M-81 was removed from production.

Apparently, Pavel Osipovich foresaw such a situation, therefore, at the beginning of October 1940, the design bureau completed the development of a preliminary design of the BB-3 aircraft with an AM-37 engine. The explanatory note to the project noted that:

“The BB-3 aircraft is a modification of the BB-1 M-81 aircraft. The changes concern only the propeller-engine group and a small part of the fuselage. Boning up the AM-37 engine somewhat improves the pilot’s visibility compared to the M-81 engine...

The AM-37 engine requires the use of, in addition to normal radiators for water and oil, a radiator to cool the air entering the carburetor. It is possible to install a water radiator with an area of ​​28 dm2, an air radiator with an area of ​​12 dm2 and an oil radiator with an area of ​​9 dm2.

Due to the conditions of minimal modifications of the BB-1 aircraft and the impossibility of placing radiators in the wing, all radiators are installed under the engine in a common tunnel; The tunnel has a common entrance and exits, separately adjustable for each radiator.

This installation of the engine and radiators allows, with minimal modifications to the design and accessories of the serial plant, to produce an aircraft with any of the AM-37, M-81 and M-90 engines, depending on customer requirements and industry capabilities. The only changes to the airframe when switching from the AM-37 to air engines will be the installation of a fairing in the front lower part of the fuselage and the displacement of the fin in the opposite direction, since the rotation of the AM-37 and M-81 and M-90 engine propellers is opposite.

The capacity of the gas tanks is 850 liters, which provides a flight range in the overload version of 1200 km.

Normal filling of gasoline is 525 kg (710 l - author's note), providing a range of 1000 km.

The fuselage of the production BB-1 aircraft changes in the lower front part, where the radiator tunnel extends.

Automatic slats are installed on the aircraft's wing to improve lateral control.

The equipment is retained for the BB-1 aircraft; RPK-2 and armored gunner's back are added to protect against gunfire from behind.

The armament is retained for the BB-1 aircraft with the addition of a hatch installation.

Basic aircraft data

Take-off power of the AM-37 and power at an altitude of 6000m is 1400 hp.

Aircraft flight weight - 4620 kg Climbing time to 6000m - 10.5 min

Service ceiling - 9500 m

Maximum ground speed - 450 km/h

Maximum speed at an altitude of 6000 m - 550 km/h

Landing speed - 116 km/h

The take-off run is 350 m...”

In the conclusion on the preliminary design approved by P.V. Rychagov on December 9, 1940, it was noted:

“... 1. The preliminary design of the BB-3 AM-37 aircraft... - to approve with the additions specified in these conclusions and to recommend the construction of the aircraft according to the project, including it in the experimental aircraft construction plan for 1941.

2. Due to the lack of a used copy of the AM-37 engine, it is considered acceptable to install the AM-35 engine on the first copy of the aircraft...”

On January 25, 1941, the government approved the experimental aircraft production plan for 1941. The resolution “On the single-engine bomber Su-4” and the order of the NKAP dated February 3, 1941 obliged: “... the director and chief designer of plant No. 289, comrade. Sukhoi P.O. to design and build a single-engine Su-4 bomber: the first copy with a 37 engine and the second copy with a 90 engine; both examples have a wooden fuselage and a wooden wing with metal spars.

Submit the Su-4 aircraft for state tests: the first copy with engine 37 by August 1, 1941 and the second copy with engine 90 by September 1, 1941, with the following flight tactical data:

Motor 37 90

Maximum speed at an altitude of 6000 m, km/h 550 560

Landing speed, km/h 120 120

Ascent time to a height of 5000 m, min 9 8

Ceiling, m 9500 9500

Range at 0.8 maximum speed, km 1000 1000

Small arms:

a) Airplane with engine 37

2 ShKAS machine guns of 7.62 mm caliber with a reserve of 750 cartridges per machine gun, with machine guns installed in the wings;

1 Taubin machine gun of 12.7 mm caliber on a turret with limited fire, with a reserve of 250 cartridges;

MV-2 hatch installation with 1 ShKAS 7.62 mm machine gun with an ammunition box for 450 rounds.

b) Airplane with 90 engine

2 Taubin machine guns of 12.7 caliber in the wings with a reserve of 250 cartridges per machine gun;

The turret and hatch machine gun installations are the same as on the aircraft with the 37 engine.

Bomb weapons:

4 bombs of 100 kg inside and, in addition, in overload on the external sling, 2 bombs of 100 kg or two bombs of 250 kg. ..."

On March 4, 1941, People's Commissar A.I. Shakhurin, in addition to and development of the order of February 3, 1941, issued another order, which prescribed: “...To the director of plant No. 135, comrade. Karpov Yu.N. and the Chief Designer of the aircraft, Comrade. Sukhoi P.O.:

a) Assemble one prototype of the prototype Su-4 aircraft with engine 37 and submit it for factory testing on 1.VII - 1941.

b) The Su-4 aircraft, manufactured for the M-81 engine, should be transferred to plant No. 289 by 1.IV -41, without wings, propeller unit, fully equipped, completed and equipped for release for factory flight tests with the M-90 engine 15.VI - this year

...To the Director and Chief Designer of Plant No. 289, Comrade. Sukhoi P.O.:

a) Transfer to plant No. 135 the drawings of the Su-4 airframe with M-37 (without wings) with full equipment by 15.III - 41.

b) Manufacture and transfer to plant No. 135 one set of wooden wings of the Su-4 aircraft with M-37 by 1.VI - 41...”

In mid-March 1941, P.O. Sukhoi presented a memorandum to the leadership of the NKAP, in which he stated:

“Analysis of the M-90 engine data obtained in connection with its installation on the Su-4 aircraft leads me to the following conclusions:

1. Overweighting the engine compared to the original data by 150-200 kg and shifting the center of gravity forward worsens the flight characteristics of the aircraft and causes great difficulties in alignment, because it is necessary to shorten the front part of the fuselage and, as a result, reduce the volume of the gasoline tank located in this compartment.

2. The high specific fuel consumption, which exceeds the consumption of all our engines of similar power, requires a corresponding increase in the volume of gas tanks, which also leads to overweight and deterioration of the aircraft data.

3. High heat transfer into the oil with relatively low pumping entails a sharp increase in the oil cooler.

Based on the above, I am forced to insist on improving the data of the M-90 engine by:

1) reducing the weight of the motor to at least 900-950 kg;

2) reducing fuel consumption to 300-320 g/hp. h at the second speed of the supercharger;

3) increasing oil pumping to 32-36 kg/min.

I believe that without these improvements the M-90 engine will not find use, since it is inferior to the M-71 in all basic data.

Layout diagram of BB M-71F

I ask for your instructions to plant No. 29 to take urgent measures to improve the M-90 engine.”

Fulfilling the departmental order of March 4, 1941, plant No. 289 produced a wing and a set of drawings for the Su-4 AM-37 aircraft and transferred them to plant No. 135.

In July 1941, by order of the NKAP, all work on the aircraft was entrusted to plant No. 289.

In October 1941, unfinished Su-4 M-90 and Su-4 AM-37 aircraft were evacuated to Molotov.

By order of the NKAP, in the summer of 1942, a fully completed Su-4 M-90 aircraft was transferred to plant No. 29, evacuated to Omsk, for flight testing of the M-90. According to reports from the Air Force Research Institute, by April 15, 1943, the aircraft had completed 9 flights with a flight time of 4 hours and 30 minutes.

No work was carried out on the Su-4 AM-37 aircraft during evacuation, and due to the termination of serial production of the Su-2 aircraft, a petition was filed with the People's Commissar to remove this task from the plant plan.

It is interesting to note that the process of improving the Su-2 short-range bomber was not limited to the above modifications. There were also a number of unrealized projects.

One of the points of the government decree dated July 29, 1939 on the issue “On the creation of modified and new experimental bombers, attack aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft in 1939” ordered P.O. Sukhoi “...to develop a preliminary design of a single-engine two-seat short-range bomber as a further development of the BB-1 and presented to the NGO in July 1939...”

In the fall of 1939, a preliminary design of the BB-2 aircraft with the M-106 TK engine (1200 hp) was presented to the Research Institute of the Red Army Air Force.

Basic calculated flight technical data of the BB-2 M-106 TK aircraft:

Maximum speed, km/h:

near the ground 480 (according to TTT - 500)

at 11-6000 m 540

at 11 10000 m 580-590 (according to TTT - 600)

Climbing time Н=10000 m, min 23.0

Practical ceiling, m 12000

Flight range (H=8000m, V=510 km/h), km 1000

Empty weight of the aircraft, kg 2554

Aircraft flight weight, kg 3630

In the conclusion of the Research Institute of the Red Army Air Force it was noted:

"1. The presented preliminary design of the BB-2 with the M-106 engine with the technical design of Comrade Sukhoi cannot be approved due to the fact that the aircraft does not satisfy the specifications in terms of:

a) visibility from the cockpit of the pilot and navigator;

b) shelling the rear shooting point;

c) the general layout of the aircraft;

d) flight characteristics.

2. Propose to the designer, rework the preliminary design in accordance with the technical specifications, and then submit it to the Air Force Research Institute.”

It is known that the design bureau did not rework this project.

In December 1942, specialists from P.O. Sukhoi’s design bureau completed their initiative work - a preliminary design of the “BB” aircraft with the M-71F engine (2200 hp)

Basic design data for the BB M-71F aircraft:

Aircraft length, mm 10700

Wingspan, mm 15000

Wing area, m2 32.0

Aircraft weight, kg:

- empty 3900

- flight 5650

Maximum speed, km/h:

- near the ground 490

- at an altitude of 4600 m 560

Climb time

5000m, min 7.0

Practical ceiling, m 10000

Range of flight

(normal), km 1000

Run length, m 325

This preliminary design was not submitted to higher organizations for consideration.

The first two Su-2 prototypes had an all-metal construction. Not only the wings and stabilizer, but also the fuselage and fin were made of riveted duralumin. The power plant was a nine-cylinder single-row star-shaped engine M-62 with a two-bladed propeller. The rear hood did not have a movable “skirt”, and between it and the fuselage there was a wide gap for the passage of cooling air.

Small arms consisted of four LUKAC machine guns in the center section, one of the same machine gun in the upper turret and another in the lower hatch installation. Both machine guns were served by the navigator, which was not a very good solution, since he could not simultaneously fire from both shooting points.

Su-2 M-87

The first 30 production copies of the Su-2 were equipped with two-row 14-cylinder M-87 engines, much more powerful than the M-62.

In addition, in order to save duralumin, the shortage of which began to be felt even before the war, Sukhoi was obliged to design a wooden fuselage for the aircraft. This caused some weighting of the structure, but it was compensated by a significant increase in power supply.

Another major change was the weakening of small arms. In 1940, the Air Force leadership chose the armored BSh-2 (future Il-2) as a promising attack aircraft, and the Su-2 was left in the role of a short-range bomber. Since it was believed that the main thing for such an aircraft was not machine guns, but bombs, two wing LUKACas were removed from it, as well as the hatch installation.

Su-2 M-88

In 1940, based on the M-87, the M-88 engine was created, which had improved altitude due to the installation of a two-speed centrifugal supercharger. Soon such engines began to be installed on long-range bombers DB-3F () and Su-2.

In March 1941, the MV-5 turret, which had almost all-round fire, was replaced by a lightweight and simplified TSS-1 turret with much narrower sectors of fire. It was covered on top with a transparent visor, which had to be moved forward before opening fire. The new machine gun mount provided gains in aerodynamics and a slight increase in speed, but the aircraft's security was further reduced.

Around the same time, in order to further improve the contours of the Su-2, the oil cooler, which previously hung under the hood, was moved to the center section, and the shape of the engine suction pipe was made smoother. An aircraft with such innovations was sometimes called Su-2M (modified).

With the outbreak of war, emergency changes had to be made to the design of the vehicle.

Firstly, the shortage of Il-2s often forced the use of the Su-2 as an attack aircraft. Four machine guns are better than two when shelling ground targets, and therefore already in July 1941, the aircraft began to be produced with four ShKAS in the wings. The MV-5 turret was also returned to its place and the hatch installations began again, since German fighters often attacked from below.

Secondly, air battles showed that the armor protection of the crew, especially the navigator, was absolutely insufficient.

By August, the problem was partially solved by internally installing armor linings on the bottom and sides of the fuselage in the rear cockpit area. The Su-2 M-88 was produced until October 1941; a total of 811 aircraft of this modification were built.

Su-2 M-82

Strengthening the armament and installing armor caused a noticeable increase in the weight of the vehicle, which in turn led to a deterioration in flight performance. To correct the situation, the Su-2 was equipped with the M-82 engine - the most powerful Soviet air-cooled serial engine at that time. With this engine, which developed up to 1330 hp, the bomber's performance not only returned to normal, but also increased significantly.

The first two copies of the Su-2 M-82 were built and flown in Kharkov in September 1941, but the deployment of serial production was prevented by the urgent evacuation of aircraft plant No. 135 due to the approach of Nazi troops to the city. In October, the plant was evacuated to Perm, and soon trains with the property of plant No. 207 removed from Dolgoprudny arrived there. Both enterprises were merged into a single complex, leaving number 135 behind, but great difficulties arose with the resumption of production. During the evacuation due to bombing, a significant part of the equipment was lost, and not all of the workers were taken out either.
As a result, it was never possible to achieve normal operation at the new location - only 58 bombers were assembled over several months with great difficulty. There was nothing to help the plant, since there were not enough people and machines for everyone. In January 1942, the Defense Committee, having studied the situation, made an unprecedented decision: to stop production of the Su-2, disband aircraft plant No. 135, and distribute equipment and personnel among other enterprises.

Experimental all-wood aircraft BB-2, built in the spring of 1940. It was considered as a simplified modification of the BB-1 for mass production in conditions of duralumin shortage, but did not go into mass production. In addition to the wooden structure, the BB-2 differed from the BB-1 in improved armor and a modified landing gear retraction scheme. The only copy of the BB-2 crashed during testing and was never restored.

In these storerooms of the Monino Museum, I wandered around this plane for a long time, trying to understand what it was!!! My knowledge was clearly not enough, but with the help of books I managed to identify it: Su-2. I couldn’t find anything about this particular plane!!! Maybe someone has information? It was reported on the Internet that the same plane was seen in 1989 in Volgograd, then in the same year on Khodynka. Is it a model or is it an aircraft?

As always, I use information from sites
http://www.airwar.ru
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki
and other sources I found on the Internet and literature.

In the second half of 1936, on the instructions of the Main Directorate of Aviation Industry (GUAP), the design teams of N.N. Polikarpova, I.G. Nemana, S.V. Ilyushina, S.A. Kogerigina, D.P. Grigorovich and P.O. Sukhoi conducted preliminary research on the designs of attack reconnaissance aircraft with an AM-34FRN piston engine.
back view

The SUAI Commission reviewed the projects and decided that they were very close, and decided to build the aircraft in three design options: duralumin, wood and mixed. For each of the options, chief designers were appointed: P.O. Sukhoi, I.G. Neman and N.N. Polikarpov.
On December 27, 1936, the Council of Labor and Defense issued a resolution “On the construction of a high-speed long-range attack reconnaissance aircraft,” later mentioned in correspondence under the code “Ivanov.”

Continuing work on the topic, at the beginning of 1937 P.O. Sukhoi reworked the project for the M-62 air-cooled engine, as it was more reliable in combat conditions. In the design of the new aircraft, extruded profiles, stamped and cast power units made of aluminum alloys, and flexible textolite were widely used, and the use of the plasma-template method made it possible to simplify the manufacture of the aircraft and ensured the possibility of its mass production.

The development and construction of the prototype was carried out in record time - 6 months. August 25, 1937 M.M. Gromov took into the air the first copy of the SZ (Stalinist task)-1 aircraft (aka ant-51). Factory tests, with interruptions caused by engine failures, continued until the end of 1938. The aircraft was not transferred to state tests due to the ban on the operation of M-62 engines.

In December 1937, the construction of the “backup” (SZ-2) was completed, the aircraft made its first flight on January 29, and was immediately transferred for joint testing with the Air Force. The tests were completed on March 26, the aircraft turned out to be successful and was recommended for serial production.
cabin: What the flight crew liked most about the plane was the warm, closed cabin. “In winter, at least fly in a T-shirt, not like on the R-5, where the frost penetrates to the bones!”

For various reasons, “Ivanov” I.G. Neman was not completed, and the plane N.N. Polikarpov took off only at the end of 1938. This meant that “Ivanov” P.O. Sukhoi turned out to be the winner of an unannounced competition. After completing state tests, the SZ-2 arrived at plant No. 156 to replace the engine, which had exhausted its service life. Only a few flights were carried out with the new engine, and on August 3 the plane crashed due to the destruction of the M-62 engine.

The third copy of the SZ-3 aircraft was flown in November 1938 by test pilot A.P. Chernavsky. The M-62 engine was replaced with a more powerful and high-altitude M-87. The capacity of the gas tanks was reduced from 930 to 700 liters, and the ammunition load of the wing machine guns was increased to 850 rounds each. According to pilot A.L. Chernavsky, the new aircraft had a shorter takeoff run and a steeper glide path. Before submitting the SZ-3 for state testing, the military demanded that the M-87 be replaced with the more reliable M-87A, but the latter also failed after three flights on November 25. In terms of its flight characteristics, the aircraft completely satisfied the Air Force. But only at the end of July 1939, at the plant in Kharkov, they began preparing for mass production of the aircraft under the designation BB-1 (short-range bomber - the first). At the same time P.O. Sukhoi was appointed Chief Designer of Plant No. 135.

Unlike the prototypes, the production aircraft had a mixed design (the fuselage was a wooden monocoque with plywood sheathing, the wing and stabilizer were metal). The latter was explained in detail by the fact that the USSR still did not have enough metal for a large series of all-metal aircraft.

Gunner's position: MV-5 or MV-5m turret?

In 1940, the BB-1 (since December 1940 - Su-2), having undergone a number of modifications, began to be produced with the M-88, M-88B engines, and the last production aircraft, about 60 copies, had the M-82 engine.

In addition, in 1940, plants No. 31 in Taganrog and No. 207 in Dolgoprudny were connected to the production of the aircraft. In total, until the spring of 1942, 910 Su-2 aircraft were produced.

During the period 1939-41 in parallel with serial production at the design bureau P.O. Sukhoi, work was underway to modify the aircraft. A number of aircraft projects were developed with improved flight-tactical characteristics, which included improving its aerodynamics, equipping it with new engines (M-63TK, M-81, M-89, M-90), etc.
gunner's instruments drawn

Su-2s began to enter service with the KA Air Force units in the second half of 1940. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Su-2 aircraft fleet in the Air Force totaled 213 units. In combat operations before 1944, (according to various sources) from 14 to 17 short-range bomber air regiments, more than 12 reconnaissance and spotting squadrons and 18 flights armed with Su-2 aircraft took part.

Having completed 5,000 sorties on the Su-2 in 1941, the Soviet Air Force lost only 222 of these aircraft in battle and were missing in action, 22.5 sorties per loss. At the same time, the average irretrievable combat losses of Soviet bombers in 1941 amounted to 1 aircraft per 14 sorties, that is, they were 1.61 times more.

In units that were armed with both the Pe-2 and Su-2, significantly lower losses of the latter were also noted, despite the formally better performance characteristics of Petlyakov’s vehicles: the combat losses of the Pe-2 are determined at 1 loss per 32 sorties, and for the Su-2 at 1 the loss accounted for 71 missions. This difference can be explained by the fact that the Su-2 had an air-cooled engine, which was much more durable than the liquid-cooled engines found on most Soviet bombers and, in particular, on the Pe-2

A distinctive feature of the design was the transition from steel welded components and parts to similar ones made of high-strength aluminum alloys, allowing their mass production by cold and hot stamping (from AK-1 material) and casting (from 195T4 and AK material) with minor mechanical finishing .

The crutch installation had an automatic stop in the neutral position after the tail of the aircraft separated from the ground. It automatically retracted at the same time as the main pillars. The crutch wheel could turn on the ground 42 degrees in each direction.

The nose of the steering wheel was sheathed with duralumin, and the entire surface was covered with canvas. At the tail end of each half of the rudder, a trimmer was suspended from a ramrod.

Small arms included three ShKAS machine guns, two of which were stationary in detachable wing consoles outside the rotor rotation zone. To access the machine guns, there were hatches in the upper surface of the wing. The firing of the wing machine guns was controlled using triggers located on the aircraft control stick.

The fuselage skin was made of birch veneer 0.5 mm thick, glued onto a special blank shaped like the fuselage. The veneer was glued at an angle of 45 to the aircraft axis. The thickness of the fuselage skin was variable. After gluing the shell onto the frame and removing any irregularities, the fuselage was covered with a harsh awning and painted.

engine: layout? The propeller-engine group consisted of a two-row radial 14-cylinder engine M-88 (M-88B) with a rated ground power of 950 hp. With. The engine was equipped with a three-bladed VISH-23 variable-pitch propeller with a diameter of 3.25 m. The propeller fairing consisted of front and rear parts connected to each other by screws and anchor nuts. The fairings were made of sheet duralumin. A heat-treated steel ratchet was riveted to its front part to start the engine from an autostarter.

The pilot's cockpit was covered with a convex, streamlined plexiglass canopy and a high sliding canopy, providing excellent visibility in all directions. The sliding part had a window on the left side that moved back on guides. Fully moving the canopy back ensured the pilot's free exit from the cockpit.
Behind the oblique rear section of the pilot's cockpit canopy was attached the navigator's turret fairing, which consisted of a fixed and folding part. The folding visor could be tilted all the way forward and locked - in this position the navigator could get into the cockpit.

Both cabins were heated. Heating of the air in them was provided by a special pipeline laid on the right side of the aircraft. Air entered the pipeline from the flame pipe of the exhaust manifold. At the request of the crew, fresh air could be pumped into the cabin through the same pipelines.

The wheels of the first production vehicles had insufficiently strong flanges, which collapsed after 15-20 landings. By the beginning of January 1941, in the 135th bap, 27 Su-2s could not take to the skies due to wheel failure. There was also a shortage of spare tires. Operational tests of the reinforced landing gear wheels showed that they began to correspond to the flight weight of the aircraft. By the beginning of April, the factory team had replaced several sets of landing gear shock struts, which had withstood three hundred landings.

The cost per unit is 430,000 rubles, but this is average, and at some factories the cost reached up to 700 thousand rubles

Aircraft control is dual, mixed. The elevator, ailerons, and flaps had rigid control wiring, while the elevator, trim tabs, and flaps had cable control wiring. From the second cabin it was possible to turn off the elevator control.
The shields were controlled by a hydraulic cylinder through a system of rods and rockers. They deviated at an angle of 55 when landing.
The mechanism for retracting and releasing the landing gear is electro-hydraulic.

Equipment. External communication of the aircraft was carried out using a radio station of the RSB "Dvina" type, which was installed in the second cabin in front of the navigator. All units of the radio station were easily removed and mounted on the frame shelf, using rubber shock absorbers of the "Lord" type.

The radio station was equipped with a rigid single-beam T-shaped antenna stretched from the bow rod to the keel. As a rule, radio stations were filmed on bombers. They were left on planes performing reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment tasks.

The AFA-13 camera was installed on the starboard side of the navigator's cabin. In the stowed position it could be secured to the side with a latch.

Aeronautical equipment ensured flights in difficult weather conditions.

Su-2 Su-2 * Crew: 2 people. * Cruising speed: 459 km/h * Maximum ground speed: 430 km/h 370 * Maximum speed at altitude: 486 km/h 455 * Flight range: 910 km 890 * Service ceiling: 8400 m * Climb rate: 588 m/min 400 * Length: 10.46 m * Height: 3.94 m * Wingspan: 14.3 m * Wing area: 29 m² * Empty weight: 3220 kg 2995 * Curb weight: 4700 kg 4335 * Engines: ASh-82FN M -88B * Thrust: 1330 hp 1000 * Cannon armament: 4 x ShKAS fixed and 2 x ShKAS mobile * Ammunition: 3400 for fixed machine guns and 1500 for mobile * Bomb load: 400 kg * Suspended weapons: 10 NURS RS-82 or RS-132
It was the Su-2 (from the 211th BAP) that turned out to be the first aircraft on the account of the future Soviet ace and air marshal A.I. Pokryshkin - he shot it down (by mistake) on the first day of the war, June 22, 1941