Plane crash A310 near Mezhdurechensk. A310 disaster - the pilot's child Victoria Kudrinskaya was the pilot's wife
© Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives. Plane crash site
22 Mar 2019, 13:17March 23 marks the 25th anniversary of the Airbus A310 crash near Mezhdurechensk. 75 people died. The cause of the disaster - the pilot put his son at the helm. Taiga.info recalls the most unusual disaster in the history of Russian aviation and tells what has changed after a quarter of a century.
Causes of the tragedy
On the evening of March 22, 1994, the Aeroflot (RAL) Airbus A310 took off on the Moscow - Hong Kong route. Passing in the area of Mezhdurechensk (at 00:58 local time), the plane crashed in the forest near the village of Maly Mayzas.
75 people died: 63 passengers and 12 crew members. In addition to the Russians, there were citizens of China, Hong Kong, India, Great Britain and the USA on board. It is known that the hero of Socialist Labor Dmitry Melnikov and the avant-garde director Igor Aleinikov flew on this flight. As Igor Muromov notes in his book 100 Great Air Crashes, the passengers were "wealthy people."
The cause of the crash was the human factor - the airliner's commander put his 15-year-old son at the helm, the teenager's actions led to the autopilot turning off and the aircraft crashing (falling from the train).
The last three hours the plane flew without deviations from the plan, all systems worked properly. According to the investigation report, there were “simple weather conditions” on the night of the disaster.
What is known about the Airbus A310 pilots?
Flight SU 593 Moscow - Hong Kong was assigned to aircraft commander (PIC) Andrey Danilov, reserve PIC Yaroslav Kudrinsky, co-pilot Igor Piskarev - all first class pilots. Before the flight, they underwent a medical examination: there were no comments on health and professional training. Each of the pilots had a family and children.
Kudrinsky was taking the children - 15-year-old Eldar and 13-year-old Yana - on a four-day vacation to Hong Kong. Once a year, Aeroflot provided the families of pilots with the right to a preferential flight.
Conversations in the cockpit before the crash
30 minutes before the crash, commander Kudrinsky and co-pilot Piskarev were in the cockpit. Commander Danilov, who has served the prescribed amount at the helm, is resting in the passenger compartment.
From 00:40 local time, Kudrinsky's children and his friend Makarov, also an experienced Aeroflot pilot, who flew as a passenger, enter the cockpit. In fact, only Kudrinsky is responsible for piloting the aircraft. He invites Yana to sit in the pilot's seat.
Come sit on my chair, would you like to?
The girl takes over from her father at the helm.
Dad, lift me up [in the chair], she asks.
Well, Yana, will you pilot? Hold on to the helm, hold on.
After about 5 minutes, the aircraft makes a turn to the left and then to the right, after which it enters the program course. Kudrinsky shows his daughter how to fly the plane using the autopilot. Later in the act of investigating the disaster, this maneuver will be regarded as a "distraction for the crew."
Yana releases the helm, her place is taken by Eldar. What is happening in the cockpit is filmed by a friend of the Makarov family. Kudrinsky shows Eldar the same maneuver as for Yana. Three minutes before the crash, the son asks to “turn” the steering wheel:
Can this be rotated?
Yes, the father says. - So, watch the land where you will turn. Let's go left, turn left.
Eldar executes the command - a properly functioning autopilot responds to this. The automatic control of the ailerons responsible for the roll of the aircraft is disabled. Further, piloting, in fact, is carried out manually, but no one notices the fact that the autopilot is turned off.
After ten seconds, the aircraft gradually moves to the right and reaches a critical roll. Eldar notices "something incomprehensible":
And why is he [the plane] turning?
Does he turn himself? - specifies Kudrinsky.
Pilots do not understand what is happening with the liner. Makarov assumes that the plane has entered the "holding zone" - the space for waiting for the landing approach. Piskarev and Kudrinsky agree with him. (Possibly "false" flight paths appeared on the navigation display.)
The plane falls into a deep roll, the pilots do not notice it immediately. The overload is growing.
Guys-ah! - stretches Makarov.
Hold on! Hold the helm, hold! - Kudrinsky shouts to his son, noticing the shaking.
The co-pilot tries to get the plane out of the right bank, but it's too late - the plane is tilted 90 degrees, it starts to stall.
In reverse! Turn left! Left! - Alternately command Kudrinsky and Makarov.
The pilot Piskarev gives the same commands to Eldar, but the boy interferes with his actions, holding on to the helm. (The commission that conducted the investigation calls the actions of the crew to parry the roll "inadequate to the situation.")
The aircraft departs from the preset altitude, the “Stall Warning” signal appears in the cockpit, and the autopilot is disengaged.
Yes to the left! The earth is here! - shouts Piskarev.
Eldar, come out! Crawl back.
Apparently, the crew takes the plane out of a deep roll, but the liner goes into a dive and picks up speed. The overload reaches 4.6 units - about the same amount experienced by astronauts during their descent to Earth. Kudrinsky tries to sit at the helm, but in conditions of overload Eldar cannot get up from his chair.
After 30 seconds, the plane enters a "corkscrew", a steep dive begins. After several attempts, Kudrinsky finally takes his place. (The commission of investigators believes that at the time of the "corkscrew" the crew could still bring the aircraft into controlled flight modes.)
Full throttle! - shouts Piskarev.
Gave gas! Kudrinsky answers.
The speed is very high! Get the gas out! Little by little!
Let's go out now! Everything is fine! Slowly, dammit!
At 0:58, the plane collides with the ground in the vicinity of the village of Maly Mayzas. The liner is completely destroyed, a fire starts.
Decryption of black boxes:
What did the pilots of the plane violate?
According to the commission, commander Kudrinsky left his workplace and put his 15-year-old son Eldar, who did not have the appropriate rights and qualifications, at the helm.
According to NPP GA-85 (manual on flight operations in civil aviation), "the commander is allowed to leave the workplace under favorable flight conditions." In this case, the control of the aircraft lies with the co-pilot. The Commission of Investigators calls the actions of Commander Kudrinsky "complete carelessness and the result of low discipline."
Another violation: Eldar Kudrinsky and co-pilot Piskarev acted against the autopilot - as a result, the system ceased to be responsible for the state of the roll of the aircraft. Probably, the fact that the autopilot disengaged was not noticed by the crew due to the lack of a warning signal in the cockpit. It is possible that the co-pilot and PIC Kudrinsky did not have time to react to the sudden transition to manual control mode.
The crew noticed the tilt late - the plane began to fall. The Air Crash Investigation Commission calls Piskarev's actions "inadequate and ineffective" because he did not turn off the autopilot in a critical situation. The Airbus A310 owner's manual states that operating against the autopilot is "abnormal procedure".
Also, Piskarev could not level the plane, because Eldar Kudrinsky's son was at the second helm.
“After all, children were put at the helm before. In fact, there is nothing wrong if the kid sits in the pilot's seat while the autopilot controls the liner. The question is: what did the “partner” of the happy father do while he was working with his son?” - recalled seven years after the accident, Vladimir Kofman, then chairman of the commission for the investigation of air crashes of the IAC.
The first versions after the crash. Why did the Novokuznetsk riot police come?
The crash of the liner became known only two hours after the disaster - after the crew stopped responding to requests from ground services. A local resident reported burning aircraft wreckage in the forest. A group of police officers moved out of the village of Maly Mayzas to cordon off the territory.
The search helicopter immediately discovered a strong fire, but could not land due to the mountainous forest terrain and poor visibility. Rescuers could not approach the crash site for a long time: only by noon on March 23 did they manage to build a toboggan road, when, in fact, there was no one to rescue. For three days, 238 people carried out emergency work, searched for and evacuated bodies.
Journalist Vasily Gorbunov, who arrived with the rescuers, recalled the strong smell of kerosene and fragments of the plane scattered for half a kilometer. Two of the three "black boxes" were seriously deformed.
“Looks like the plane literally shattered. Almost everything that remains of people is strongly pressed into the snow. Cans of beer, bags, clothes, dollars are scattered everywhere, ”Gorbunov said in Igor Muromov’s book.
Jewelry, several thousand dollars, gold jewelry were found at the crash site. Apparently, many passengers of the Airbus flew to Hong Kong on vacation. During the search operation, troops and the Novokuznetsk OMON had to be involved in order to protect the place from marauders.
At first, employees of the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Emergency Situations expressed versions of a terrorist attack, an instantaneous depressurization of the cabin, which occurred as a result of an explosion or a collision with a foreign object. Yury Korenevsky, Deputy Head of the Air Transport Department of the Ministry of Transport, noted that the preparedness and professionalism of the crew was beyond doubt.
“The case was unprecedented,” Vladimir Kofman recalled after the investigation. “At that time, as they say, we didn’t have the conscience or the courage to say that a child killed the plane.”
What has changed since the investigation?
The investigation of the crash ended in March 1995, experts identified a number of shortcomings in the field of civil aviation. It turned out that in Russia there was no document regulating the acceptance of foreign aircraft for operation. The corresponding order was adopted only in 2003.
The fall of the liner had a negative impact on the image of Aeroflot. According to the results of the first half of 1994, the airline lost about 30% of potential passengers. By 1996, Aeroflot had paid compensation (the minimum amount was $20,000) to 80% of the relatives of the victims. The rest of the relatives were not satisfied with the amount of payments, they went to court.
As the investigating experts note, the crew of the Moscow - Hong Kong flight did not have the appropriate training to bring the plane out of the "corkscrew". In 1999, Aeroflot and the Airbus Industrie consortium launched the first simulator in Russia for pilots of the A310 airliner. On it it was possible to simulate the situation in which the liner crashed near Mezhdurechensk fell.
In 2015, the Federal Air Transport Agency punished Saratov Airlines for "gross non-compliance" with safety rules: an acquaintance of the airline's CEO who was not a member of the crew flew in the cockpit. The woman was allowed on board under the wording "service passenger". Saratov Airlines has limited flights to international destinations.
Prepared by Egor Fedorov
March 22, 1994 in the area of Mezhdurechensk (Kemerovo region) at 20:00. 58 min. crashed and crashed an Airbus A-310, owned by Russian Airlines and flying on the route Moscow - Hong Kong. There were 63 passengers and 12 crew members on board. The opening of the black boxes subsequently showed that the cause of the disaster was the human factor, the crew's poor knowledge of this type of equipment and gross violation of instructions.
3.5 hours after takeoff, the crew commander Yaroslav Kudrinsky called his two children into the cockpit - daughter Yana and son Eldar, where, in violation of the charter, he allowed first his daughter and then his son to sit in the chair of the ship's commander. This circumstance was ignored by other crew members. In addition, in the cockpit was a friend of the Kudrinsky family - Makarov, also a pilot who flew on the same flight as a passenger.
Before letting the children take the command chair, Kudrinsky turned on the autopilot. First, the commander's daughter, 13-year-old Yana Kudrinskaya, was in the pilot's seat. She did not attempt to take any action to control the aircraft. After her, the captain's son, 15-year-old Eldar Kudrinsky, sat at the helm. The teenager held on to the steering wheel, rocking it slightly from side to side. Everything was perceived as entertainment and adults did not control the teenager. At one point, the guy shook the steering wheel harder and the autopilot, mistaking this for the pilot's command, turned off. In one second, the plane became obedient to a teenager who continued to play pilots.
The autopilot disabling warning light worked, but the crew did not notice this, since the design feature of the A310 is the absence of an audible autopilot disengagement signal. Once again tilting the handle of the steering wheel to the side, the boy introduced the airbus into a deep roll, which soon reached 45 degrees and caused an overload of about 5g. In the first seconds, both professional pilots could not understand the reason for the abnormal behavior of the aircraft for several seconds. And when the crew noticed that the autopilot was off, they tried to take their seats again.
Contrary to instructions, the co-pilot, in the absence of the commander in his seat, pushed his seat all the way back, which for a long time did not allow him to take up a working position due to the resulting overloads. And the aircraft commander, due to strong overloads and a large bank angle, could not get into his seat for a long time.
The situation was greatly complicated by the fact that in the left seat there was still the only person who had the physical ability to fly the aircraft - the 15-year-old son of the commander, who received and tried to carry out various, inconsistent and conflicting commands from his father, co-pilot and Makarov. According to the analysis of the "black box" soundtrack, Eldar's attempts to correct the situation were greatly hampered by ignorance of the pilot's jargon. As an example, the command “Hold the helm!” Was cited, which the boy mistook for a command to hold the helm in the extreme right position, while the pilots meant the command to level the aircraft.
Meanwhile, the bank had already reached 90 °, and the plane began to lose altitude. In order to prevent further descent, the autopilot (only the automatic roll was turned off) increased the pitch angle to such an extent that the aircraft began to quickly lose speed and went into a stall. The co-pilot completely turned off the automatic and managed to bring the plane out of the stall by lowering the nose. The overload decreased, and the commander finally managed to pull his son out of his chair and take a job. The pilots brought the plane into normal flight mode, but could not recognize their spatial position in time. Flying over a hill at low altitude, the plane caught on the edges of trees and crashed into a forest near the village of Maly Mayzas, about 20 kilometers southeast of Mezhdurechensk.
Crew talks, chronology of events
Symbols used in the text:
PIC - aircraft commander Ya. V. Kudrinsky
Yana is the commander's daughter, born in 1981.
Eldar - the son of a commander, born in 1978
2P - co-pilot I. V. Piskarev
Makarov is a pilot flying to Hong Kong as a passenger
E - one of the pilots in the cockpitBefore the crash - about half an hour. The plane flies on autopilot. In the cockpit are the aircraft commander, co-pilot and two strangers - the daughter of the aircraft commander Yana and passenger Makarov.
17:43:30: FAC [referring to his daughter Yana]: Come sit here now, on my chair, do you want to?
17:43:31: PIC left his workplace
17:43:34-17:43:37: Yana sat in the FAC chair
17:44:10: Yana: Dad, lift me up [Yana asked to lift her chair up]
2L: Novosibirsk, Aeroflot, 593rd passing your point at flight level 10,100.
17:47:06: FAC: Well, Yana, will you pilot?
Yana: No!
FAC: Don't press the buttons. Don't touch this red one!
Yana: Dad, can this be twisted?
FAC: Do you see Novokuznetsk on the left?
Yana: Are we flying so low?
FAC: Ten thousand one hundred meters.
Yana: That's a lot, right?
FAC: A lot...
Yana tries to leave the chair.
FAC: Wait, don't rush...
Yana: I'm being careful...
17:51:12: Yana left the FAC chair
The son of the aircraft commander Eldar appears.
17:51:47: Makarov: The counter is being removed.
17:51:55: Eldar sat in the chair of the FAC.
17:52:46: Eldar [referring to Makarov]: Are you filming?
17:52:48: Makarov: I'm filming.
Eldar: Can this be twisted?
17:54:25: FAC: Yes! If you turn left, where will the plane go?
Eldar: Left!
FAC: Turn around! Turn left!
17:54:35: FAC: So, watch the land where you will turn. Let's go left, turn left!
Eldar: Great!
17:54:37: FAC: Let's go, right?
17:54:39: Eldar turned the steering wheel to the left by 3..4 degrees.
17:54:40: FAC: Is the plane going to the left?
17:54:41: Eldar: Coming.
17:54:42: FAC: You can't see it, right?
E:< неразб>
17:54:50: E: Now it will go to the right
17:54:53: Makarov: Set the artificial horizon for him normally.
17:05:05: The aircraft began to roll to the right.
17:55:12: FAC: What do you want, Yana?
Yana:< неразб>
17:55:15: FAC [referring to Yana]: Why?
Yana:< неразб>
17:55:18: FAC [referring to Yana]: In the first class you will only sleep.
17:55:27: FAC [addressing Yana]: Don't run there, otherwise they will kick us out of work.
17:55:28: Since that time, unnoticed by either the PIC or the co-pilot, a gradual increase in the right roll began.
17:55:36: Eldar [about the course of the aircraft]: Why is he turning?
17:55:38: FAC: Does he turn himself?
17:55:40: Eldar: Yes.
17:55:41: E: Why is he turning?
17:55:42: Eldar: I don't know.
17:55:45: FAC: Can't you knock the course?
17:55:45: Makarov: He still turns the zone, guys. [Makarov suggested that the plane was leaving for the holding area]
17:55:46: 2P: We went to the zone, waiting.
17:55:48: FAC: Yes?
17:55:49: 2P: Of course.
17:55:50: Makarov: Re-bya-ta! [Thus, Makarov reacted to the rapid increase in vertical acceleration in the aircraft]
17:55:52: FAC: Hold on! Hold the helm, hold!
17:55:55: 2P: Speed!
17:55:56: 2P: In the opposite direction.
17:55:58: 2P: In reverse.
17:55:59: 2P: Back!
17:55:59: FAC: Turn left! Left! Right! Left!
17:56:06: E: Right?
17:56:08: E: Can't you see?
17:56:11: The autopilot has disengaged.
17:56:14: E: Turn right.
17:56:17: FAC: Right!
17:56:18: 2P: Yes, to the left! The earth is here!
17:56:24: FAC: Eldar, come out!
17:56:26: FAC: Crawl out back.
17:56:28: FAC: Crawl back, Eldar.
17:56:30: E: You see< неразб>No?
17:56:34: 2P: Ores for small!
17:56:38: FAC: Come out!
17:56:40: E: Come out, Eldar.
17:56:41: E: Come out< неразб>.
17:56:43: E: Come out.
17:56:44: E: Come out.
17:56:47: E:< неразб>.
17:56:49: E: Come out.
17:56:52: E: Come out, I say.
17:56:54: 2P: Full throttle! Full throttle! Full throttle!
17:56:55: By this time, the PIC had taken his workplace.
17:56:56: 2P: Got the gas!
17:56:57: FAC: Full throttle!
17:56:58: 2P: Gave!
17:56:59: E:< неразб>.
17:57:00: E: Full throttle.
17:57:05: E: I gave gas, gave it.
17:57:08: E: What is the speed?
17:57:09: E:< неразб>.
17:57:13: E:< неразб>.
17:57:17: E: Yes.
17:57:23: FAC: The gas is full!
17:57:25: 2P: The speed is very high!
17:57:27: E: Big, right?
17:57:28: E: Big.
17:57:29: E: I turned it on.
17:57:30: FAC: So, that's it, let's go, let's go.
17:57:32: FAC: Right! Right foot!
17:57:35: FAC: High speed.
17:57:36: FAC: Get the gas out!
17:57:37: 2P: Cleaned up!
17:57:42: FAC: Quietly-oh-oh-nechku!
17:57:47: 2P: B… again!
17:57:48: E: Don't turn to the right.
17:57:50: E: Speed added.
17:57:53: FAC: Let's get out now! Everything is fine!
17:57:55: FAC: Slowly on yourself.
17:57:56: FAC: Slowly.
17:57:57: FAC: Slowly, I say!
17:58:01: Aircraft hits the ground.
In the course of an investigation conducted jointly by Aeroflot and Airbus, changes were made to the aircraft documentation and the Aeroflot pilot training plan. And when flying on simulators, performed by Russian instructor pilot Vladimir Biryukov together with Airbus test pilots, it turned out that if both pilots could not reach the controls, the automatic control system could take control and quickly restore a straight-line safe flight.
The plane crash of flight SU593 occurred on March 22, 1994 near Mezhdurechensk in the Kemerovo region. As a result of the crash of the Aeroflot A310 aircraft, all 75 people on board were killed.
The main cause of the disaster was an unacceptable situation in which the aircraft commander put his fifteen-year-old son at the helm of the airliner, whose unintentional actions led to a partial shutdown of the autopilot. Secondary reasons were the undocumented behavior of the autopilot, and the absence, at that time, of the rules for making decisions in such situations in the crew training program.
Catastrophe
Flight 593 was operated by an Airbus A310-304 (tail number F-OGQS) from Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport to Hong Kong. Crew commander Yaroslav Kudrinsky took on board his two children - daughter Yana and son Eldar. When the plane was flying in the Novokuznetsk region, Kudrinsky, in violation of the charter, allowed first his daughter, and then his son, to sit in the chair of the ship's commander. This circumstance was ignored by other crew members.
Before letting the children take the command chair, Kudrinsky turned on the autopilot. The daughter of the commander did not try to take any action to control the aircraft. After her, the captain's son, 15-year-old Eldar Kudrinsky, sat at the helm. The child held on to the steering wheel, rocking it slightly from side to side, which could not lead to the “overpowering” of the autopilot. However, in the end, Eldar applied a force of 12-14 kg to the helm, which led to a partial shutdown of the autopilot, which stopped giving commands to the ailerons, which caused an uncontrollable roll to the right. Prior to this, this feature of the A-310 autopilot was unknown. The mode shutdown light signaling worked, but the crew did not notice this, since the design feature of the aircraft is the absence of audible signaling of the autopilot shutdown.
The aircraft turned to the right along the longitudinal axis at a speed of 1.5 ° per second, and soon the right roll reached 45 °, which is above the permissible limit. This caused significant positive g-forces (4.8 g). When the crew members noticed that the autopilot was disabled, they tried to retake their seats. It was not difficult for the co-pilot, since his seat is on the right in the cockpit, and the plane was banked to the right. The commander, for a long time, could not get into his seat due to a strong overload and a large roll angle.
Meanwhile, the bank had already reached 90 °, and the plane began to lose altitude. In order to prevent further descent, the autopilot (only the bank was turned off) increased the pitch angle to such an extent that the aircraft began to quickly lose speed and went into a stall. The co-pilot completely turned off the automatic and managed to bring the plane out of the stall by lowering the nose. The overload decreased, and the commander finally got to his place. Now the plane was rapidly picking up speed and rapidly losing altitude. The crew reduced the engine operating mode and pulled the helm to the limit, but there was not enough headroom, and 2 minutes 6 seconds after entering the tailspin, the plane crashed into the forest a few kilometers southwest of Mezhdurechensk.
Transcript of negotiations
Co-pilot: Novosibirsk, Aeroflot, 593rd passing your point at flight level 10100.
Commander: Well, Yana, will you pilot?
Yana (sitting in the ship's commander's chair): No!
Commander: Don't press the buttons. Don't touch this red one!
Yana: Dad, can this be twisted?
Commander: Do you see Novokuznetsk on the left?
Yana: Are we flying so low?
Commander: Ten thousand one hundred meters.
Yana: That's a lot, right?
Commander: A lot...
Yana tries to leave the chair.
Commander: Wait, take your time...
Yana: I'm so careful...
The son of the commander of the Eldar ship appears. He sits in the first pilot's seat.
Eldar: Can this be twisted?
Commander: Yes! If you turn left, where will the plane go?
Eldar: Left!
Commander: Turn around! Turn left!
Eldar: Great!
Commander: Is the plane going to the left?
Eldar: Coming.
Several minutes pass.
Eldar: Why is he turning?
Commander: Does he turn himself?
Commander: Hold the helm!
Pilot: Speed!
Commander: Turn left! Left! Right! Left! The earth is here! Eldar, come out!
Get out, Eldar! Come out! Come out! Come out! Come out! Come out, I say! Full throttle!
Pilot: Accelerate!
Commander: Full throttle!
Pilot: Yes!
Commander: Full gas!
Pilot: The speed is very high!
Commander: Yes! Let's go! Right! Right foot!
Commander: Get the gas out!
Pilot: Got it!
Commander: Quietly-oh-oh-nechku!
Pilot: B... again!
Commander: Let's go now! Everything is fine!
Commander: Slowly, I say!
End of record.
Audio recording of negotiations
OLCrashed plane a year before the crash
A310 crash near Mezhdurechensk- aviation accident that occurred on March 23, 1994. Airliner Airbus A310-308 of Aeroflot Airlines operated international flight SU593 on the Moscow-Hong Kong route, but 4 hours and 19 minutes after takeoff, it crashed into a forest near Mezhdurechensk (Kemerovo region) and completely collapsed. All 75 people on board were killed - 63 passengers and 12 crew members.
The main cause of the disaster was an unacceptable situation in which the crew commander put his 15-year-old son at the helm of the aircraft, whose unintentional actions led to the shutdown of the autopilot. The secondary causes of the disaster were the undocumented behavior of the Airbus A310 autopilot and the lack of decision-making rules in such situations at that time in the crew training program.
Encyclopedic YouTube
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✪ For the sake of a joke, the pilot put his child at the helm of the plane, but no one expected such consequences...
✪ Plane crash in Vnukovo on 12/29/12. Service Talk.3gp
Subtitles
Flight 593 details
Airplane
The Airbus A310-308 (registration number F-OGQS, serial 596) was released in 1991 (the first flight was made on September 11 under the test number F-WWCS). On December 11, 1992, it was transferred to the Russian airline Aeroflot, in which it received the tail number F-OGQS and the name Glinka. It is equipped with two General Electric CF6-80C2A2 bypass turbofan engines. The last maintenance took place on February 23, 1994, no problems were found. On the day of the disaster, the liner made 846 take-off and landing cycles and flew 5375 hours.
Crew and passengers
The aircraft was flown by an experienced crew, the composition of which was as follows:
9 flight attendants worked in the cabin of the aircraft.
| Citizenship | Passengers | Crew | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| 40 | 12 | 52 | |
| 6 | 0 | 6 | |
| 6 | 0 | 6 | |
| Republic of China Chinese Republic | 5 | 0 | 5 |
| 4 | 0 | 4 | |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | |
| Total | 63 | 12 | 75 |
Among the passengers on board were:
- Dmitry Melnikov, Hero of Socialist Labor, General Director of the Khimvolokno Production Association.
- Igor Aleinikov, film director.
In total, there were 75 people on board the aircraft - 63 passengers and 12 crew members.
Chronology of events
Preceding circumstances
At 20:39 KRAT (13:39 UTC), flight SU593 took off from Sheremetyevo Airport and headed for Hong Kong. At 21:39 KRAT the plane took flight level FL330 (10100 meters). At 00:26, the crew commander Yaroslav Kudrinsky called his two children into the cockpit - daughter Yana and son Eldar. When the plane was flying in the Novokuznetsk region, Kudrinsky, in violation of the charter, allowed first his daughter, and then his son, to sit in the chair of the ship's commander. This circumstance was ignored by other crew members. In addition, in the cockpit was a friend of the Kudrinsky family, Vladimir Makarov, also an Aeroflot pilot, who was flying on the same flight as a passenger.
Catastrophe
Before allowing the children to take the command chair, Kudrinsky turned on the autopilot. First, the commander's daughter, 13-year-old Yana Kudrinskaya, sat at the helm. She did not attempt to take any action to control the aircraft. After her, the son of the commander, 15-year-old Eldar Kudrinsky, sat at the helm. The teenager held on to the steering wheel, rocking it slightly from side to side, which could not lead to the autopilot being turned off by “overpowering”. However, in the end, Eldar applied a force of 8-10 kilograms to the helm for 30 seconds, which led to a partial shutdown of the autopilot, which stopped giving commands to the ailerons, which, in turn, caused the aircraft to roll uncontrollably to the right. Prior to this, this feature of the Airbus A310 autopilot was unknown to the crew. The mode shutdown light alarm worked, but the crew did not notice this, since the design feature of the Airbus A310 is the absence of an audible autopilot shutdown alarm (in the transcript of the conversation, however, it is indicated that the sound of the autopilot shutdown is heard during the last two minutes before the fall).
Eldar was the first to notice the roll of the plane and reported it. However, both professional pilots for several seconds could not understand the reason for the abnormal behavior of the aircraft. As the trackline on the screen changed to a circle, the co-pilot assumed that the aircraft had entered the "holding zone", that is, it was describing circles of large diameter - a flight pattern used while waiting for landing clearance.
The aircraft rolled to the right at a speed of about 1.5° per second and soon the right roll reached 45°, which was above the permissible limit. This caused significant positive overloads (4.8 units). When the crew noticed that the autopilot had been disabled, they tried to retake their seats.
Contrary to the instructions, the co-pilot, in the absence of the PIC, moved his seat all the way back, which for a long time did not allow him to take up a working position due to the resulting overloads. The commander, due to strong overloads and a large bank angle, could not get into his chair for a long time.
The situation was greatly complicated by the fact that in the left seat there was still the only person who had the physical ability to fly the aircraft - the 15-year-old son of the commander, who received and tried to carry out various, inconsistent and conflicting commands from his father, co-pilot and Makarov. According to the transcript of the voice recorder, Eldar's attempts to correct the situation were greatly hampered by ignorance of the pilot's jargon. As an example, the command Hold the helm!, which the boy mistook for a command to hold the steering wheel in the extreme right position, while the pilots meant the command to level the aircraft.
Meanwhile, the roll had already reached 90 ° and the liner began to lose altitude. In order to prevent further descent, the autopilot (only the automatic roll was turned off) increased the pitch angle to such an extent that the aircraft began to quickly lose speed and went into a stall. The co-pilot completely turned off the automatic and managed to bring the plane out of the stall by lowering the nose. The overload decreased, and the commander finally managed to pull his son out of his chair and take a job. The pilots brought the plane into normal flight mode, but could not recognize their spatial position in time. Flying over a hill at extremely low altitude, flight SU593 caught on the tops of trees and crashed into a forest near the village of Maly Mayzas, about 20 kilometers southeast of Mezhdurechensk, and completely collapsed. All 63 passengers and 12 crew members died.
Looking for the wreckage
Search and rescue operations at the crash site were carried out for quite a long time: the remains of passengers and the wreckage of the aircraft were scattered within a radius of 2 kilometers. Later, the found parts of the aircraft were transported to the hangar of the aviation enterprise of the Novokuznetsk airport, where they were attached to the frame according to the shape of the aircraft.
Investigation
The Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) with the participation of representatives of Aeroflot and Airbus took up the investigation into the causes of the crash of flight SU593. Both flight recorders found at the crash site were burned and deformed, but the information on them was preserved. They were deciphered in France in the presence of IAC experts.
Transcript of negotiations
Abbreviations
- FAC: Aircraft Commander - Yaroslav Vladimirovich Kudrinsky
- 2P: Co-pilot - Igor Vladimirovich Piskarev
- Yana: Yana Kudrinskaya - daughter of the crew commander
- Eldar: Eldar Kudrinsky - the son of the crew commander
- Makarov: Vladimir Makarov - pilot-passenger
Decryption
| 00:43:30 | FAC | Come sit here now, on my chair, would you like to? |
| 00:43:31 | The PIC left the pilot's seat. | |
| 00:43:34-00:43:37 | Yana sits in the FAC chair. | |
| 00:44:10 | Yana | Dad, pick me up. |
| 2P | Novokuznetsk, Aeroflot 593, passing your point at flight level 10100. | |
| 00:47:06 | FAC | Well, Yana, are you going to raise? |
| Yana | No! | |
| FAC | Don't press the buttons. Don't touch this red one! | |
| Yana | Dad, can this be twisted? | |
| FAC | Do you see Novokuznetsk on the left? | |
| Yana | Are we flying that low? | |
| FAC | 10100 meters. | |
| Yana | That's a lot, right? | |
| FAC | A lot of. | |
| Yana tries to leave the chair. | ||
| FAC | Wait, take your time. | |
| Yana | I'm so careful. | |
| 00:51:12 | Yana leaves the FAC chair. | |
| 00:51:47 | Makarov | The pilot takes off. |
| 00:51:55 | Eldar sat in the FAC chair. | |
| 00:52:46 | Eldar | Are you filming? |
| 00:52:48 | Makarov | I'm filming. |
| Eldar | Can this be rotated? | |
| 00:54:25 | FAC | Yes! If you turn left, where will the plane go? |
| Eldar | Left. | |
| FAC | Turn around! Turn left! | |
| 00:54:35 | FAC | So, watch the land where you turn. Let's go left, turn left! |
| Eldar | Great. | |
| 00:54:37 | FAC | Went, huh? |
| 00:54:39 | Eldar turned the steering wheel to the left by 3-4 °. | |
| 00:54:40 | FAC | Is the plane going to the left? |
| 00:54:41 | Eldar | Goes. |
| 00:54:42 | FAC | Can't see, right? |
| Eldar | (nrzb). | |
| 00:54:50 | FAC | Now it will go to the right. |
| 00:54:53 | Makarov | You put the artificial horizon normally for him. |
| 00:55:05 | The plane begins to roll to the right. | |
| 00:55:12 | FAC | What do you want, Yana? |
| Yana | (nrzb). | |
| 00:55:15 | FAC | For what? |
| Yana | (nrzb). | |
| 00:55:18 | FAC | In the first class you will only sleep. |
| 00:55:27 | FAC | Do not run there, otherwise they will kick us out of work .. |
| 00:55:28 | The roll of the aircraft to the right increases, neither the PIC nor the co-pilot noticed this. | |
| 00:55:36 | Eldar | Why is he turning? |
| 00:55:38 | FAC | Does he turn himself? |
| 00:55:40 | Eldar | Yes. |
| 00:55:41 | FAC | Why is he turning? |
| 00:55:42 | Eldar | Don't know. |
| 00:55:45 | FAC | Can't take the course? |
| Makarov | He still turns the zone, guys. | |
| 00:55:46 | 2P | We went to the waiting area. |
| 00:55:48 | FAC | Yes? |
| 00:55:49 | 2P | Certainly. |
| 00:55:50 | Makarov | Kid-I-ta-ah-ah! |
| 00:55:52 | FAC | Hold on! Hold the helm, hold! |
| 00:55:55 | 2P | Speed! |
| 00:55:56 | 2P | Reversed. |
| 00:55:58 | 2P | In reverse. |
| 00:55:59 | 2P | Back! |
| FAC | Turn left! Left! Right! Left! | |
| 00:56:06 | Eldar | Right? |
| 00:56:08 | 2P | You don't see, do you? |
| 00:56:11 | Autopilot disengage sound ( plays until the end of the recording) . | |
| 00:56:14 | 2P | Turn right. |
| 00:56:17 | 2P | Right!. |
| 00:56:18 | 2P | Yes to the left! The earth is here! |
| 00:56:24 | FAC | Eldar, come out! |
| 00:56:26 | FAC | Crawl back. |
| 00:56:28 | FAC | Crawl back, Eldar. |
| 00:56:30 | FAC | You see (nrzb) No? |
| 00:56:34 | 2P | ore for small! |
| 00:56:38 | FAC | Come out! |
| 00:56:41 | FAC | come out (nrzb). |
| 00:56:43 | FAC | Come out. |
| 00:56:44 | FAC | Come out. |
| 00:56:47 | FAC | (nrzb). |
| 00:56:49 | FAC | Come out. |
| 00:56:52 | FAC | Come out, I say. |
| 00:56:54 | 2P | Full throttle! Full throttle! Full throttle! |
| 00:56:55 | KVS took his workplace. | |
| 00:56:56 | FAC | Gave gas! |
| 00:56:57 | 2P | Full throttle! |
| 00:56:58 | FAC | Dal! |
| 00:57:00 | 2P | Full throttle. |
| 00:57:05 | FAC | I gave gas, gave. |
| 00:57:08 | FAC | What is the speed? |
| 00:57:09 | 2P | I didn't look at the device! |
| 00:57:13 | FAC | So. |
| 00:57:17 | FAC | So. |
| 00:57:23 | FAC | Full gas! |
| 00:57:25 | 2P | The speed is very high! |
| 00:57:27 | FAC | Big. Yes? |
| 00:57:28 | 2P | Big, of course! |
| 00:57:29 | FAC | I included... |
| 00:57:30 | 2P | All right, let's go, let's go. |
| 00:57:32 | 2P | Right! Right foot! |
| 00:57:35 | 2P | High speed. |
| 00:57:36 | 2P | Get the gas out! |
| 00:57:37 | FAC | Cleaned up! |
| 00:57:42 | 2P | Quietly-oh-oh-oh! |
| 00:57:47 | 2P | Damn, again! |
| 00:57:48 | FAC | Don't turn right. |
| 00:57:50 | FAC | Speed added... |
| 00:57:53 | FAC | Let's go out now! Everything is fine! |
| 00:57:55 | FAC | Slowly towards yourself. |
| 00:57:56 | FAC | Slowly. |
| 00:57:57 | FAC | Slowly, dammit! |
| 00:57:59 | Impact sound, short crack. | |
| 00:58:01 | End of record. |
Speculation and rumors
Before the publication of the transcript of the flight recorders, the first versions of the causes of the disaster seemed exotic: the plane either collided with a natural celestial body or became a victim of a UFO. These assumptions were based on the fact that the airliner was flying at an altitude of 10,100 meters, clearly withstood all the specified flight parameters, the crew did not give any emergency signals, there was no information about the failure of any instruments, an experienced crew flew the aircraft. Later, there were rumors about an alleged terrorist attack and depressurization of the aircraft, which caused the instant death of the crew and passengers.
News agencies put forward their own version of the disaster: the pilot allowed the children to sit at the helm. The commander's son pressed the wrong button, and the plane began to fall. However, all competent persons unanimously declared that this could not be true and that nothing of the kind could happen in principle.
IAC chairman Vladimir Kofman admitted a few years later: “ The case is unprecedented. At that time, as they say, we did not have the conscience or the courage to say that the plane was killed by a child. But the recording on the voice recorder and further investigation, which lasted a whole year, showed that other options were excluded. After this incident, the journalists spoke in unison about the "pilot's fault", the "human factor" in matters of accidents and so on. And we thought about something else - about the role of the co-pilot. After all, children were put at the helm before. In fact, there is nothing wrong if the kid sits in the pilot's seat while the autopilot controls the liner. The question is different: what did the partner - the "technical reserve" of the happy father, while he was engaged in with his son? Instead of keeping an eye on the instruments and, in which case, quickly take control of himself, he went to the corner of the cabin to film Eldar on a video camera. And he missed the moment when the boy switched the airbus to manual control and did not notice the deep roll into which the plane went. When the pilots realized it, it was already too late ...».
Final Investigation Report
The crash of an Airbus A310 aircraft occurred as a result of its entry into a stall with a spin and collision with the ground due to a combination of the following factors:
- Permissions of the reserve PIC to take his workplace and interfere with the control of the aircraft to an unauthorized person (his son), who does not have the right and appropriate qualifications.
- Performing demonstration maneuvers not provided for by the flight plan and the flight situation using the autopilot of the PIC who is not at his workplace.
- Application of forces by an unauthorized person and the co-pilot to the controls, preventing the normal operation of the autopilot in roll (this is not recommended by the A310 Flight Manual), which led to overpowering and disconnection of the autopilot from the aileron control wiring.
- The fact of disconnection of the autopilot from the aileron control wiring, unnoticed by the co-pilot and the PIC, probably due to:
- the absence of an instrumental disengagement alarm system on the A310 aircraft. The presence on the aircraft of an alarm system made in accordance with the requirements of clause 8.2.7.3. NLGS-3 airworthiness standards and recommendations of international practice could ensure timely detection by the crew of the autopilot disconnection;
- possible ignorance by the co-pilot and the PIC of the features of the release mechanism and actions in such a situation due to the lack of relevant information in the AFM and exercises in the flight crew training programs;
- difficulty in determining the moment of disconnection of the autopilot by the co-pilot by sensations, either due to small efforts on his steering wheel, or because he accepted the change in efforts for the actions of Eldar Kudrinsky;
- the absence of the PIC at his workplace and diverting his attention to conversations with his daughter Yana.
- Unintentional and slight additional rotation of the helm(s) after the autopilot was disconnected, resulting in a further development of the right bank.
- Failure of the PIC and the co-pilot to detect an increase in the right bank above the value allowed in operation, and late inclusion in the aircraft control loop due to diversion of their attention to clarifying the causes of the aircraft's motion in the bank, interpreted by them as a maneuver corresponding to the flight to the "holding zone" without the appearance or with a new (false) track appears on the navigation display. Signaling a strong attracting action about exceeding the permissible roll angle in operation, taking into account the time delay for recognizing, assessing the situation and making a decision, could in this situation attract attention and contribute to earlier detection of the roll development by the crew.
- Bringing the aircraft to the aerodynamic shaking (buffing) mode and high angles of attack by the autopilot, which continues to perform its functions of maintaining the flight altitude during the development of the right bank even after the steering gear is disconnected until it is turned off by overpowering along the longitudinal channel.
- Inadequate and inefficient actions of the co-pilot, expressed in the failure to turn off the autopilot and the steering wheel “away from you” in conditions of aerodynamic shaking (buffing) and the aircraft being in a difficult spatial position (large roll and pitch angles). Such actions, which led to the stall and the aircraft falling into a tailspin, could be due to:
- the presence of an unauthorized person in the left pilot's seat and the late inclusion of the PIC into the control loop of the aircraft associated with this;
- non-optimal working posture of the co-pilot, who was in the pilot's seat pushed back;
in series Child at the controls of an airliner.- It is also mentioned in the book by I. A. Muromov "100 Great Air Crashes" in the chapter Accident of the Airbus "Glinka" A-310.
25 years ago- March 23, 1994 in the Kemerovo region, an Airbus A310 airliner crashed, flying Moscow - Hong Kong and bearing the name of the Russian composer Mikhail Glinka. The crash killed all 75 people on board: 63 passengers and 12 crew members. The reason for the crash was, in particular, that one of the pilots let his 15-year-old son take the helm.
The Airbus A310 airliner of the Aeroflot subsidiary RAL, created specifically for the operation of Airbuses, took off from Moscow at 20:39 on March 22. Four hours later, as the plane was flying over Novokuznetsk, the crew's shift commander, Yaroslav Kudrinsky, called his two children, 13-year-old Yana and 15-year-old Eldar, into the cockpit and invited them to sit at the controls. As follows from the decoding of the black boxes, Yana did not try to fly the plane. After her, her brother sat at the helm.
Eldar: Can this be twisted?
Kudrinsky: Yes! If you turn left, where will the plane go?
Eldar: Left.
Kudrinsky: Turn around! Turn left! So, watch the land where you turn. Let's go left, turn left!
Eldar: Good.
The A310 airliner, developed and put into production in the early 1980s by the European concern Airbus, was purchased by Russia in 1992. At that moment, the country began to feel the need for wide-body passenger aircraft - the narrow-body Il-62 was considered obsolete. The domestic wide-body Il-96 has only been developed so far. The choice was between the American Boeing 767 and the European Airbus A310. It is possible that the decision was also due to political considerations - the Cold War with the United States had barely ended by that time.
The purchased Airbuses made only foreign flights, and only high-class pilots who had at least 1000 flight hours, were fluent in English and were tested and trained by the manufacturer, Airbus Industry, were allowed to operate them. There were only 16 of them, including the replacement commander of the Hong Kong flight, Yaroslav Kudrinsky - he took this position in November 1992.
On that fateful day, while flying a plane with the permission of his father, Eldar accidentally turned off the autopilot, but no one paid attention to the light warning about this, and the technician did not give a sound signal: as it turned out later, the team did not suspect this feature of the control system. The International Aviation Committee, summing up the results of the investigation of the crash, pointed to the lack of an instrumental signaling system for turning off the autopilot on the A310 aircraft as one of the possible causes of its death.
The plane rolled slowly, but no one noticed this until the overloads became noticeable, and the liner began to lose altitude. Passengers, feeling a strong roll, screamed. The team also realized that the situation was out of control, the roll reached 45 degrees, which exceeded the maximum allowable values for the A310. Due to large overloads, Yaroslav Kudrinsky could not take his place at the helm - he was literally pressed against the side panel. For the same reason, the aircraft commander Andrey Danilov, who accounted for almost 10,000 flight hours, more than 950 of them on the Airbus A310, could not get into the cockpit from the cabin where he was sleeping before the plane began to roll. He had flown the previous 3 hours, and the next morning he had a return flight. Co-pilot Igor Piskarev, who had 5885 flight hours and sat at the helm of the Airbus six months before the crash, tried to take control, but nothing came of it: even before the autopilot was turned off, he pushed his seat all the way back, and there was no overload allowed him to return to work.
The pilots tried to explain to Eldar what to do, but he did not understand the meaning of professional terms and acted rather at random, because of which the plane continued to fall. The panic lasted a little over a minute. Nevertheless, after several attempts, Piskarev managed to send the plane up, the overload decreased. Kudrinsky took the pilot's seat and pulled the plane out of a spin. However, this did not save them from death.
From the decoding of the flight recorders.
Kudrinsky: The gas is full!
2 pilot: The speed is very high!
Kudrinsky: So, that's it, we're leaving, we're leaving. Right! High speed. Get the gas out!
2 pilot: Cleaned up!
Kudrinsky: Quietly-oh-oh-nechku!
Kudrinsky: Let's get out now! Everything is fine! Slowly towards yourself. Slowly. Slowly, I say!
These words were the last. In the confusion, the pilots lost sight of exactly where their ship was at the moment. And at 0:58, a minute after the teenager gave way to his father at the helm, the plane touched a hill twenty kilometers southeast of Mezhdurechensk with its tail. A fire started. The plane crash killed 75 people, in addition to 52 Russian citizens, on board were six Chinese, six Hong Kong citizens, five Taiwanese, four British, an Indian, and a US citizen.
Things, jewelry, dollars were scattered along the slope, outwardly everything looked like a dump. There was a strong smell of kerosene
Later it turned out that the autopilot was not completely turned off, but partially, which also confused the pilots: because of this, they made the wrong decisions. When modeling the current situation on the Airbus Industry simulator in France, the experts came to the conclusion that Igor Piskarev brought the plane out of the dive very abruptly, directing it almost vertically - apparently, weightlessness formed inside the plane at that moment. The built-in self-preservation mechanism would not have allowed the Airbus to fall down even at low speed, and if the pilots had not reached the helm, the autopilot would have restored a safe flight. In any case, such results were shown by Airbus Industry simulators. But, apparently, the team simply did not know about all these technical nuances of managing an imported airliner.
The crash of the A-310 became known only two hours later, after the aircraft stopped responding to requests from ground services. Rescuers, police officers, the Investigative Committee, and journalists arrived at the scene.
- I got a call from the press service of the administration of Mezhdurechensk and they said that the plane had crashed. I was surprised, I joked, they say, tell me that this is a bomber. Then they called back from the rescue service and this information was confirmed. When we arrived at the place, the police immediately cordoned off everything, journalists were not allowed anywhere. We just looked at how the rescuers work. Later, soldiers from Krasnoyarsk were brought there, and investigations began. What did I see there? Things, jewelry, dollars were scattered along the slope, outwardly everything looked like a dump. There was a strong smell of kerosene. There was no big flame, only in some places there were small fires. It was difficult to determine where the remains of the bodies or something else were, everything was mixed up: snow and things, and debris. At the bottom of the valley, where the stream, lay a large piece of the wing with the landing gear. It's about five square meters. Across the slope, on the other side - 50 meters wide fragment of the fuselage with portholes. The trees were well taken down there. It so happened that the plane touched the top of the hill with its tail and rolled down the slope, scattering down. If at the top he knocked down the trees under the root, then at the bottom they stuck out about a meter from the ground. It was customary for aviators to let friends steer and take pictures when the plane was on autopilot. And they showed it on TV, and such things slipped in the press: that a famous hockey player or football player was sitting in the cockpit. That is, it was not special news that the child was sitting at the helm.
Soldiers also took part in the liquidation of the consequences of the disaster. That's how describes it Maxim Karpovich: "I participated in the transportation of cargo 200 when I served in Military Unit 6609. They carried the remains in the Novokuznetsk morgue with bare hands. They put them in coffins, then in chickens. They took them to the airport and loaded them on flights to Moscow."
Although the main parts of the aircraft were taken away for examination, there were small parts scattered two kilometers away, chairs, tables of stewardesses. Even that was enough to terrify
Work on the site lasted several months, but the bodies of 22 passengers could not be identified. Soon the criminal case was terminated due to the death of the accused. According to the act of investigation, the experts counted eight causes of the accident, among which the first is the presence of a child at the helm.
- We wanted to go to the scene of the tragedy immediately on the same day, but everything was cordoned off there. We have a colony-settlement near the village, and the first officers of the GUFSIN were sent to the place to guard everything. They said that dollars and jewelry were scattered around the place. Whether this was so, the colony employees did not even tell us, the neighbors. It feels like they were forbidden to talk about what they saw. But the peasants walked gloomy for a long time, as if someone had died there. We got there just a week later. Even after so many days, there was a smell of kerosene. From the tops of the trees, the trajectory of the fall was clear: the branches of the trees seemed to be cut down. And although the main parts of the aircraft were taken away for examination, there were small parts scattered two kilometers away, chairs, tables of stewardesses. Even this was enough to be horrified, - a local resident recalls those events. Olga.
According to the lawyer of the relatives of the victims Diana Sork, as a result, settlement agreements were concluded in all cases, all clients received insurance and compensation for non-pecuniary damage.
– Each victim received compensation, although compensation for non-pecuniary damage was small. In principle, in those years it was impossible to get more in court, - says Diana. - Payments were received by the heirs, and if there were several, then the amount for each was small. There were also those who were dissatisfied with the amount of payments, but since settlement agreements were concluded with the victims, those who signed them could not do anything. During the work on this case, we did not meet any opposition, except that the case was considered for a long time. This was the period of the 1990s when the courts were overwhelmed and trying to delay everything they could. Nothing was hidden in the investigation. From the very beginning, it was clear: the pilots noticed late that the plane was out of automatic control and the voice sensor did not work. Among the victims were different people. There were girls of about 20 years old who did not work a day in their lives, their husbands, who flew on this flight, took care of everything. There was a woman with two children, she did not work for many years, she was engaged in raising children and was left, in principle, without a livelihood, and the only money she had was a social pension.
And yet who is to blame for the tragedy? The pilot team that allowed a child to fly, or the aircraft manufacturer that caused the autopilot to turn off without the team noticing? , an honored pilot of Russia, an aviation expert, believes that it is impossible to unambiguously answer this question.
After this disaster, it became forbidden in Russia to keep the doors open, and after September 11, 2001, they began to install armored doors.
- There is no single cause of the tragedy, there is a whole chain of events following one after another. But, by and large, the fault was with the corporation, the manufacturer of the A310 airliner - Airbus Industry. During the flight, it turned out that the autopilot wanted to turn the plane according to the course, but the boy held the helm through physical strength. In fact, the child struggled against him, and as a result, the helm puck entered the neutral position, and he disengaged into right and left. And this disconnection was not signaled, Airbus simply did not foresee this. Moreover, this was not mentioned anywhere, not in the technical documentation, and we, the pilots, were not taught this.
- Finding a stranger in the cockpit - how normal was it for those years?
- Of course, on the ground to sit at the helm is normal. But in the air, when you have 200 passengers behind you, it's irresponsible, you shouldn't have done that. At that time we studied in Canada, Austria, Germany, where all the pilots flew calmly with the door open. They set an example for us in this. Passengers could enter the cabin, or walk past and see that the crew was not sleeping, but working. However, after this catastrophe, it became forbidden in Russia to keep the doors open, and after September 11, 2001, they began to install armored doors.
- Judging by the decoding of the flight recorders, the pilots managed to align the plane's course, and if it weren't for the hill on the way, the tragedy might not have happened?
- Exactly. I looked at the transcripts, the conversations in the cockpit. By the way, the crew quite calmly struggled with the situation. They leveled the plane, but, unfortunately, the hill turned out to be higher than their flight level.
–Are there cases of looting at the site of the tragedy?
- Such cases take place everywhere, human greed is not regulated by legal norms. I know the people who were there during the investigation, but I don’t know anything about looting, and these cases have not been officially recorded in any way.
How did the representatives behave during the investigation?Airbus Industry?
“They participated in the investigation absolutely objectively. Moreover, after the tragedy, they taught all the pilots who operate this type of aircraft that an unannounced shutdown can take place, and taught how to behave in such situations, some preventive work was carried out. We have been in contact with Airbus for many years, this aircraft was operated for almost 20 years, flew with their instructors, and there was no reason to change their attitude towards this manufacturer, or for them to change their attitude towards us.
The crew of the wrecked liner is buried at the Mitinsky cemetery in Moscow.
“Yes, just like yesterday. The crew was buried on Mitinsky, yesterday there were 30 people, every year less and less. Shortly before the disaster, I accidentally met a flight attendant, Artyom Sh. etc., practically independent) to switch. The most prestigious flights and planes at that time, the payment was appropriate. Damn it, "- on the day of the anniversary of the plane crash, a flight attendant with the nickname Ars wrote online.
Six months after the disaster, Aeroflot CEO Vladimir Tikhonov said that the scandal surrounding the fall of the Airbus had led to the loss of approximately 30% of potential passengers. The following year, Aeroflot's subsidiary RAL, which operated Airbuses, was liquidated. The Moscow-Hong Kong flight number was changed from SU593 to SU212, Airbus removed it, replacing it with Boeing 777-300ER. The name of the composer Glinka was no longer assigned to any of the Aeroflot aircraft.